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Abstract: 
Author: Abdulelah Aljohani 
Degree: PhD 
Title: Cost Overrun Causality Model in Saudi Arabian Public Sector Construction 
Projects. 
Keywords: Saudi Public projects, Cost overrun, Contractors’ cost overrun. 
Saudi public projects construction performance has been poor over the years, with 
70% of projects considered as failures and costing the country over 1 trillion SAR 
(over £202 Billion) between 2005 and 2015. The project delivery mechanism used 
to deliver construction projects is one of the main reasons for such poor 
performance as all service providers (consultant, designer, and contractor) are 
chosen based on the lowest price. The contract evaluation shows that contractors 
hold most of a project’s risks and suffer a cost overrun problem, thereby positioning 
them as the weakest link in the procurement chain. This study aims to develop a 
contractors’ cost overrun causality model in the Saudi public sector. 
A systematic literature review was performed and shows three schools of thoughts 
regarding the investigation and identifying cost overrun causes. However, none of 
the three schools has addressed the limitations of exploring the interaction between 
any causes identified and then linking root causes with a direct cause, nor including 
the effects of the of the context and the process that used to develop construction 
projects. Exploring the interaction between causes is important in that the 
construction projects that provided the research base reported within the literature 
involved different stakeholders at different phases in a project’s life cycle. 
Moreover, it has been found that the amount and the causes of cost overrun are 
different based on the projects’ global location. 
As an approach to achieve the research aim which is to develop contractors' cost 
overrun causality model in the Saudi public sector that considers the effects of 
context, the practices, and processes of developing construction projects. The 
research explore the commercial context of the Saudi public construction projects 
procurement under four major portfolios (Economy, Business, Resources, and 
Regulation), as well as the process and practices which are used to develop 
construction projects in the sector based on the Porter model (diamond) and 
institutional theory. Then, the research establishes the link between the commercial 
vii 
context of the Saudi public construction projects procurement and contractors' 
performance. 
Based on the systematic literature review and interviews, the causalities of cost 
overrun in Saud Arabian construction projects were critically reviewed, established, 
classified and evaluated. The data created a causes pool with over 200 causes 
which were passed through a number of sieves resulting in 49 remaining causes. 
Based on these causes, the study explores the relationship between them to create 
causal paths and eventually the overall model. During the model’s development, 
the model building process and the resultant outputs were reviewed by two industry 
experts, resulting in more than one attempt to reduce the complexity of the model. 
The final model contains 49 causal chains that have been individually explained 
thoroughly. 
Because of the nature of the problem investigated, this research adopts a 
Pragmatism philosophical and an abductive approach to achieve the stated 
objectives. Systematic literature review and case study are the main research 
strategies which were adopted, along with using Interviews, and Project Document 
as methods to collect the data. 
The research emphasises the importance of investigating the context and projects’ 
development process. In fact, the study finds, by comparing the Saudi public sector 
practices to the identified best practices, that the weaknesses within the context, 
process, and practices, which occurs in the early stage of project life cycle, work as 
triggers and contributors for the causal chain. However, during the construction 
phase, it is established that only direct causes occur. Moreover, the output confirms 
that the current environment, regulation, practices, and behaviours of the Saudi 
public sector increase the risks of projects failing and damaging the construction 
industry. 
Therefore, and based on the findings of the research, the Saudi public agency 
needs to:  
1) Adopt a project delivery approach that reduces the fragmentation in delivering a 
construction project and which is tailored to the project context and characteristics.  
2) Adopt a new method to finance construction projects that is less affected by 
fluctuations in the oil economy.  
3) Build a long term relationship with service providers (designers, consultants, and 
contractors) that is built on trust, sharing of information, and lesson learning and 
improvement.  
viii 
4) Adopt a new contract that is based on fair risk appropriation where the risk 
transfer is to the most suitable party to effectively manage that risk. 
5) Generate general regulations and laws that transform the construction industry 
so as to be less affected by the external environment, more controlled by all the 
involved parties, and more attractive to invest in. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Background: 
1.1.1 Construction industry characteristics: 
The construction industry has been described as a unique industry due to its 
products being site-based (Ashworth and Perera, 2018). For the construction 
industry, each project is unique as it is influenced by factors, such as, location 
(unique site) which affects the products assembled. 
Additionally, the relationship between the primary stakeholders (owner and 
contractor) is adversarial and temporary, typically only for the duration of a project 
(Fearne and Fowler, 2006; Briscoe and Dainty, 2005). Arguably, the current 
relationship status within the construction industry does not allow beneficial 
cooperation and integration of activities between stakeholders (Briscoe and Dainty, 
2005). Moreover, a project contains typically a significant number of interdependent 
tasks performed by different technical teams (Winch, 1989; Gidado, 1996) and 
thereby the industry can be classed as a complicated industry. 
Economically, the construction industry has an impact on a country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) as well as the employment rate (Takim, 2005). Moreover, some 
studies claiming that the impact of the construction industry is crucial to a country’s 
economic growth (Yakubu, 2010). Construction projects are generally used as 
investment vehicles to promote economic improvement and growth (European 
Commission, 1998; Ansar et al., 2016). According to Ansar et al. (2016), there is a 
widespread belief in the economics literature of a link between the economic growth 
of a country and the level of investment on infrastructure projects. However, 
examples of the poor performance of projects from around the world show that 
unproductive projects have been chosen and projects do not hit the expected 
outcome. The result of an investment could be a national build-up of debt rather than 
economic growth (Ansar et al., 2016). The cost overrun and delay that construction 
projects may suffer, and undermine any expected economic growth. Also, 
researchers found that once a construction project begins, it is rarely "killed” even 
when underperforming, with this behaviour being linked with psychological 
phenomena such as sunk cost, groupthink, escalation of commitment, and conflicts 
of interest (Royer, 2003; Simester and Zhang, 2010). 
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Researchers suggest that the traditional method of construction project management 
is the primary cause for poor performance as it focuses independently on each stage 
of the project production and that it should be replaced with a dynamic approach that 
depends highly on trust and active communication between stakeholders (Agapiou et 
al., 1998; O'Brien et al., 2004; Akintoye et al., 2000; Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2000; 
Dainty et al., 2001; Harland, 1996; London and Kenley, 2001; O'Brien et al., 1995; 
Ofori, 2000b; Hu, 2008; Biemans and Brand, 1995). However, awareness of this is 
limited, and change is slow compared to other industries (Love, 2000) which could 
explain the continuing poor performance of construction projects. 
Other characteristics of the construction industry that could hinder the adoption of 
this approach are: project-based production systems, customer influence, low 
investment in training and development, participants’ multiple goals, fragmentation 
within the industry, resistance to change, number and type of stakeholders, lack of 
openness, and opportunistic behaviour (Fearne and Fowler, 2006; Pesämaa et al., 
2009; Kornelius and Wamelink, 1998; Miller et al., 2002; Lu and Yan, 2007; Arantes 
et al., 2015; Egan, 1998; Cheng et al., 2010; Love et al., 2002; Baiden et al., 2006; 
Hu, 2008; Briscoe and Dainty, 2005; Yadav and Ray, 2015; Kumaraswamy et al., 
2005; Cheng et al., 2001; Xue et al., 2007; Huxham, 1996; Cox and Townsend, 
1998). 
Construction projects and organisations consider being an open system as they 
interact with the external environment (Yahya, 2010). Researchers have emphasised 
the effects of a project's environment in developing countries where construction 
projects face social and economic stress, resource limitation, unusual organisation 
structures and limited ability to tackle main problems, besides the usual technical 
challenges (Musa et al., 2015). The projects' environment differs from one country to 
another as the culture, regulations, laws, and management approaches vary. Thus, 
the nature of a project's host country, as well as the environment, must be illustrated 
and evaluated to investigate problems related to construction projects. As a result, a 
deep understanding of the problem will be gained, and the interdependency between 
factors will be evident. 
Considering the above, the nature of the construction industry in Saudi Arabia needs 
to be illustrated, as well as the environment of public construction, laws, and 
regulation. Therefore an investigation within the Saudi context is performed in the 
next section. 
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1.1.2 Nature of the Saudi construction industry and public 
projects: 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), is the biggest country area in the middle east 
region covering 2.25 million Sq.KM. With high yearly population growth rate (2-6%), 
the population of the country has quadrupled over the last 40 years, rising from 7.5 
million in 1975 to 32.5 million in 2017 (GASTAT, 2018). The population boom 
happened after oil was discovered in the late 1940s and commercially developed in 
the 1970s to become the biggest oil producer which changed the country’s 
demographic. 
KSA is an absolute monarchy as the king has the final say on the public affairs as 
well as head of the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) which has executive authority to 
supervise all public affairs as well as producing laws and regulation (Jabbra and 
Jabbra, 2005; Al‐Ghanim, 2010). The public does not participate in electing the key 
personnel who are responsible for making, monitoring and supervision of policy, 
laws, and regulation as well as public affairs. 
The current government system has been scoring medium to low ranking among the 
186 countries in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Table 1). 
The flexibility and reforming of the whole system, or part of it, are less likely which is 
not in the system’s favour within the current era where change and reforming are 
needed more regularly. 
The Saudi construction industry is relatively young compared to developed countries. 
However, the construction industry has grown to be one of the biggest in the Middle-
East region and the second largest industry in Saudi Arabia after oil (EDRT, 2010). 
Figure 1 illustrates the size of the total construction contract value over ten years with 
a total of USD 650 bn (EDRT, 2010). As a rule of thumb, the Saudi construction 
industry employs 10% of the total workforce in Saudi Arabia and contributes 7% to 
the Saudi GDP (MEP, 2010b). The rapid increase in the industry’s growth was mainly 
a result of government investment in infrastructure projects to cope with the growth of 
the population (Alrashed et al., 2014) resulting in hundreds of projects build each 
year. 
While it can be argued that the Saudi construction industry is, overall, unique when 
compared to construction industries around the world (discussed later in chapter two) 
but, in part, also has similarities with construction industries elsewhere. For example, 
the construction industry in Saudi Arabia, like anywhere else, is affected by the 
country's economic cycle. Before the oil price increase in 1973, Saudi Arabia was an 
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emerging country and government spending was very limited which resulted in a 
fragile economy. The increase in oil prices and oil production during the 1970s and 
early 1980s led to a substantial increase in government revenue, which in turn 
allowed the Saudi government an opportunity to invest in the infrastructure of the 
country. Both the First (1970-1975) and the Second (1975- 1980) National 
Development Plans gave construction priority in spending terms which created a 
boom in the construction industry and the share of construction in GDP terms 
increased from 4.5% in 1970 to 14.4% in 1982 (MEP, 1970; MEP, 1975). 
Indicator Score Ranking 
1996 
(%) 
2016 
(%) 
1996 (out of 
193) 
2016 (out of 
194) 
Voice and Accountability 9 4 177 186 
Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence 
41 29 108 137 
Government Effectiveness 49 63 91 67 
Regulatory Quality 41 56 109 82 
Rule of Law 56 68 83 58 
Control of Corruption 51 63 89 67 
Table 1: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Saudi Arabia. 
Source: (World Bank, 2018b). 
 
 
Figure 1: Total construction contract value between 2005 and 2015. 
Source:(MEP, 2005; MEP, 2010b; MEP, 2010a; MEP, 2015). 
 
1.1.3 Cost overrun in construction projects: 
It is a challenge to meet the projects’ professional requirements (finish projects on 
time, on budget, and within specification). A study conducted by The Standish Group 
studying over 8000 projects showed that only 16% of the projects could satisfy the 
three important performance criteria: completing projects on time, within budgeted 
cost and quality standard (The Standish Group, 1995). Construction projects face 
similar challenges, with studies describing cost overrun in construction projects as a 
regular feature and a ubiquitous global problem (IDFC, 2002; Kaming et al., 1997a; 
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Frimpong et al., 2003; Rosenfeld, 2013), while the knowledge that has been gained 
about this problem seems unable to resolve the issue. 
Construction projects have been described as unique, expensive and usually carried 
out within a limited time frame, as well as complicated and uncertain in nature, as 
each construction project is carried out uniquely (Alalshikh, 2010; Federal Transit 
Administration, 2009; British Standards Institution, 2000). Based on projects' 
ownership, construction projects classified into private and public projects. Each 
year, public sectors in almost all countries execute thousands of construction projects 
for different reasons. For example, in the 1990s, construction projects were executed 
globally to reflect countries’ political and economic status in a competitive global 
context (Jia et al., 2011) which could explain the increased number of projects. 
Evaluation of a project’s success is considered as one of the vaguest areas in project 
management as different stakeholders are involved in each phase of the project’s life 
cycle. Each stakeholder has its own needs and expectations which affect their 
definition of project success (Cleland and Ireland, 2004). History shows that some 
projects which are considered as “failed” from the project manager perspective (cost 
and time overrun) may be considered as successful projects from the end-user 
perspective. Furthermore, it is seen that project success has different criteria and 
factors during the project life cycle. For example, Atkinson (1999) and Shenhar et al. 
(1997) consider cost, time and quality as temporary success criteria during the 
delivery stage. Other success factors have been added in recent research such as 
scope and risk (Mirza et al., 2013). For construction projects, a framework was 
developed by Lim and Mohamed (1999) to look at project success during the 
different phases of a construction project. The framework shows that the success 
criteria during the construction phase (micro viewpoint) are time, cost, performance, 
quality, safety. While during the rest of the project life cycle (macro viewpoint) 
maintaining the users and stakeholders' level of satisfaction is the main success 
criteria. 
According to Elattar (2009) hierarchical model for construction projects’ success 
criteria from the owner’s, designer’s and contractor’s perspective, executing projects 
within the estimated budget is a typical success factor for all stakeholders and might 
be the most important one. A contractor’s perspective is more concerned about 
meeting the budget of the project or keeping below it to make a profit, which is logical 
as contractors are there to make a profit. Thus, cost performance is a primary 
concern of all participants in the construction industry, so it is frequently seen as a 
pivotal criterion to determine the success level of a project (Hwang et al., 2013). 
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However, studies from around the world show that construction projects are far from 
achieving that aim as Table 2 shows. 
In the Saudi context, it should be noted that international contractors can also suffer 
cost overrun as well. China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), for example, 
lost over USD 640 million (nearly 40% cost overrun) in a single Saudi public project 
(Mecca light rail project) (Shih, 2010; Min, 2011; White, 2010). 
Study Sample Characteristics Region % of cost 
overrun 
Merrow et al. 
(1988) 
52 Megaprojects Worldwide 88% 
Morris (1990) 133 Public Projects India 82% 
Pickrell (1990; 
1992) 
Rail Projects The US 61% 
Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2003a) 
258 Transport Projects Worldwide 28% 
(Merrow, 2003) Offshore Projects Worldwide 40% 
Odeck (2004) 620 Road Projects Norway 7.9% 
McKenna et al. 
(2006) 
Mega Offshore Worldwide 10% 
Dantata et al. 
(2006) 
16 US Rail Projects The US 30% 
Omoregie and 
Radford (2006) 
Construction Projects Nigeria 14% 
(Ellis Jr et al., 
2007) 
3130 Road Projects The US 9% 
(Moura et al., 
2007) 
Construction Projects Portugal 12% 
(Azhar et al., 
2008a) 
Construction Projects Pakistan 10% 
(Lee, 2008c) 161 Transport Projects Korea 52% 
(Seung Heon 
et al., 2009) 
7 Megaprojects, 29 Medium sized 
projects 
Korea 122.4% 
(Singh, 2009b; 
Singh, 2010) 
925 Infrastructure Projects India 13.45% 
(Cantarelli et 
al., 2012b) 
78 Transport Projects Netherlands 16.5% 
Table 2: Cost overrun in different contexts. 
 
Projects that suffer cost overrun lose economic competitiveness and cost efficiency 
(Baccarini and Love, 2013), which in turn reduce the return on investment, damage 
the corporate reputation of organisations involved in the projects, and impact upon 
organisational goodwill and market share value. Failure to address cost overruns in 
projects may put future projects and investments in jeopardy (Ford et al., 2014; 
Olaniran et al., 2015b). The negative impact could not only reflect on the project itself 
but also reach other projects. If the cost of a public project is overrun, it reduces the 
amount of money allocated for building, maintaining, and/or operating other projects 
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(Love et al., 2016) leading to financial deficiency, disrupting a public agency’s future 
plans, and conflict with taxpayers (Bordat et al., 2004). 
For contractors, cost overrun will seriously affect their profits, cash flow, liquidity, 
productivity, and damage their image and reputation (Wang et al., 2008; Love et al., 
2016). It is not unusual that cost overrun seriously overextends a construction 
company (main contractor or subcontractor) financially, which may lead to unfinished 
projects or may even have to be abandoned by its contractor or leading to a 
contractor's bankruptcy. 
In light of the above, it is apparent that different stakeholders of projects from 
different regions around the world are suffering from cost overrun. However, the 
magnitude of the cost overrun is different in each study, ranging from 10% to 105%. 
The variance in studies results raises the question of whether the cost overrun 
magnitude has improved over time or remains the same. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) and 
Lundman (2011), for example, argue that there has been no improvement in cost 
overrun in the past 70 years, despite improvements in technical aspects and 
knowledgeability and the technical explanation for cost overrun is explicitly rejected. 
On the other hand, studies by Dantata et al. (2006) and Singh (2010) suggest a 
reduction of cost overrun over the years. 
Besides the variation in study samples, such as the type of projects, the variance of 
the cost overrun magnitude is mainly caused by the variance in perspective to cost. 
For example, Flyvbjerg et al. (2003b) include only construction costs (neglecting 
other costs such as maintenance). Moreover, the “base estimate” used to measure 
and define cost overrun (“…the degree to which the final cost of the project exceeds 
the ‘base’ estimate” (Himansu, 2011)) differs from one study to another as projects 
have more than one cost estimate during their life cycle (Figure 2). For example, 
some studies have used estimation at the initial planning stage as the base point 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b; Cantarelli et al., 2012b), while others used the detailed 
planning stage (Odeck, 2004), full funds authorization (Merrow, 2011), or made no 
mention of where the base estimation lay. Thus, for a research studying cost overrun, 
defining what cost overrun is and what the cost contains are both crucial, as noted by 
Olaniran et al. (2015b) and Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. (2015) who believe that the "lack of 
consistency" in cost overrun definition caused the variance in cost overrun 
magnitude.  
Frankly, the status of a project's maturity level could be different for a similar named 
point (stage) from one context to another, which reflects the lack of a standardised 
8 
definition for each stage. To illustrate, the "Detailed planning" stage could mean a 
different stage from one country to another. Thus, exploring the project life cycle of a 
project is needed to gain a deep understanding of cost overrun. 
 
Figure 2: Key Project Stage. 
Sources: (KPI working Group, 2000). 
 
For contractors, the project delivery mechanism and contract document play 
significant roles in defining cost overrun and cost content. Delivery mechanism, for 
example, illustrates the contractors’ involvement point (base point), while contract 
document, helps to define cost content by identifying contractors’ responsibility as 
well as any risk apportioning. Thus, evaluating the project delivery mechanism and 
the contract for Saudi’s public sector are needed to investigate the contractors’ cost 
overrun accurately. 
To explain the complexity in the differentiate cost overrun definitions, researchers 
have described cost overrun as a reflection of human imperfection in predicting future 
events and the effect of this imperfection on project cost, and then ask owners to be 
flexible in measuring projects’ cost success (Ogunlana, 2010). This is supported by 
the lean management in construction projects that looks for the value that is created 
over the process, rather than the traditional measuring technique for the cost 
(Latham, 1994). In fact, some studies suggest that cost overrun is inevitable, and 
project owners should accept a certain amount of cost overrun (Enshassi et al., 
2009). For example, some studies excluded projects with less than a certain 
percentage of overrun from their analysis, such as 10% (European Commission, 
1998) and 30% (Lind and Brunes, 2015), which indicates that a certain percentage 
over the base cost should be accepted and not considered as a cost overrun. 
Moreover, according to expert opinion (in particular, expressed by J. Ots, manager of 
one of the world’s largest construction companies, Sweden’s Skanska), a cost 
overrun by about 20-30% is quite admissible for a large-scale project, and for the 
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construction of, say, an underground or sunken-tube tunnel even a double overrun of 
the projected cost is “normal”. This gives a somewhat different perspective on what 
should be considered as a cost overrun. 
The above suggestions are, however far from the reality in which public sectors in 
many countries are working within a limited budget and usually are chased financially 
by other agencies, offices and the taxpayers. Thus, risks are usually transferred to 
contractors to reduce the likelihood of cost overrun. However, contractors are less 
willing to accept cost overrun because their business aims to make profit, with the 
exception of some contractors who are willing to accept cost overrun for specific 
projects as these projects could gain them other non-financial benefits, with an 
example being the Mecca light rail project constructed by China Railway Construction 
Corporation (CRC). According to Zhao Guangfa, president of CRCC, within the 
company, this project was considered more a political mandate than a commercial 
project, and failure was therefore not an option (Xiangyang, 2010; Shih, 2010). 
1.1.4 The effects of the context on the construction projects: 
As section (1.1.3) and Table 2 show that projects’ performances vary between the 
countries. Some of the studies link the variation to the contexts that the projects are 
developed in such as Lee et al. (2015) who prove that the host countries’ 
characteristics such as political, economic, social, cultural, and business 
environments provide a context within which performance occurs. 
This is not limited to the construction industry, as Pulaj and Kume (2013) stated that 
the context affects an organisation regardless of its being of any industry, any size, 
and any product or service provided. However, the degree of effect differs among the 
industries. Based on that, the literature places emphasis on considering the context 
effects for any organisation, as highlighted early by Child (1972) who stated that an 
organisational choice will be directly affected by context and the degree of change 
within that context. He further stated that the success of an organisation would 
mainly depend on responding to any change in its context that has a high degree of 
unpredictability and requires ongoing analysis and understanding of the mechanism 
causing effects. Moreover, Wood and Kennedy (1999) stated that events in the 
context (non-market environment) would cause financial, strategic or personal losses 
to a firm. For a construction organisation, as highlighted in section (1.1.1), there is 
the further problem that the organisation works in an industry which is characterised 
by high levels of complications, uncertainties, and unique risks (Hastak and Shaked, 
2000).  
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For the construction industry, different studies have highlighted the importance of the 
context effects in construction projects’ performance, such as in the Arabian Gulf 
region (Al-Sabah et al., 2014), Mexico (Fernandez-Dengo et al., 2012), and Russia 
(Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser, 2002). Moreover, it has been found that the country’s 
(context) characteristics are considerably more complicated in terms of their effects 
than are the technical risks (Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser, 2002) in that they are linked 
to intangible continuous changes in the project context (Raiszadeh et al., 1995). The 
effects occur throughout the phases and stages of a project life cycle such as 
planning (Lee et al., 2015), development (Musa et al., 2015), procuring 
(Ratnasabapathy et al., 2008), construction (Wang and Yuan, 2011a). 
For a construction firm such as contractors, context and technical factors play a 
significant role in the profitability of the organisation as well as the production and 
transaction costs (Makino et al., 2004). In fact, a study has analysed nearly 3000 
construction projects completed by Korean contractors in 30 different countries and 
concludes that the host country affects the construction firms more indirectly (Lee et 
al., 2015). The study also concluded that effects are more visible and greater in 
developing countries compared to developed countries. With a specific focus on cost 
performance, a survey of top international construction firms based in Singapore 
shows that context affects contractors’ cost performance and could lead to 
contractors’ cost overrun (Chan and Tse, 2003). 
The focuses of these studies during the context analysis was mainly from a foreign 
construction company point view rather than local ones. The literature shows that 
there are different outputs for the context (country/market) evaluation from the 
international and local construction companies’ perspectives (Gunhan and Arditi, 
2005). An evaluation for the context (country/ market) for a domestic company is less 
complicated and contains fewer profiles to analysis compared to international 
business. 
The literature review evidences only minimal consideration of the effect of the context 
on a contractors’ performance. Moreover, there is no study that has evaluated nor 
investigated the Saudi public sector context and its effect on contractor performance. 
Therefore, the study will consider the context when investigating the causality of the 
contractors’ cost overrun. 
Different methods, tools, and profiles have been considering during the context 
evaluation. For example, Al-Sabah et al. (2014) include the Political, Economic, 
Legal, and Social profiles, Fernandez-Dengo et al. (2012) include Operational, 
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Political, and financial profiles, and El-Sayegh (2008) considers Political, Economic, 
Natural, and Social & Cultural profiles. 
The difference in the method, tools, and profiles that are used for the context 
evaluation could be related to the observation of Dill (1962) and lately by other 
researchers (Pulaj and Kume, 2013) that there is no agreement on the profiles that 
could describe the context as it could comprise everything that surrounded the 
organisation or the project. The definition and the profiles that describe the context 
have been changed over time, which raises the question of what the profiles does an 
organisation need to be evaluated so as to measure the context effects and risks. 
Although most of the previous studies focus on the effect of the host countries on 
international construction firms, they can be used to shed light on the way of 
investigating the effect of the Saudi public sector (the context) on the local 
construction industry. Moreover, the studies mentioned the effects of the context of 
the projects and organisations; however, these studies have not evaluated the 
context, nor do they establish a link between the context and poor performance. 
Thus, an investigation to identify and explain factors (weakness) that affect 
contractors' performance in general and cost performance specifically, as well as 
showing how they are linked to each other, is needed. 
For the purpose of this study, and guided by the previous studies and research 
limitations, four profiles will be used to evaluate the context effects which are: 
Economic, Business Environment, Resources, and Regulation and Laws. 
The profiles are formulated on the basis of two theories which are the Porter model 
(diamond) and institutional theory as Figure 3 shows. Porter model (Porter, 1995) is 
normally used to evaluate the external environment (context) using four determinants 
which are factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, 
and firm strategy and rivalry. Porter and Kramer (2002) argued that the four 
determinants closely affect each other; consequently, they act as a unique system for 
a given country. The institutional theory, on the other hand, explains how the context 
environment of a country affects an organisational structure (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Although definitions vary across the 
academic disciplines, according to this theory, an organisation must conform to the 
institutional systems (e.g., laws, regulations, norms, and cultures) prevailing in a 
given environment to survive. The main reason that an organisation conforms to 
institutional pressures is to secure legitimacy in a given business environment, 
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thereby expecting long-term survival. Scott (2008) classified institutions into three 
elements: (1) regulative, (2) normative, and (3) cultural-cognitive elements. 
 
Figure 3: Porter model (diamond) and institutional theory. 
 
Based on the above, the four profiles adopted for this research are defined as 
follows: 
Economic profile: Economic factors have to do with the nature and direction of the 
economy in which the company operates (Fahey and Narayanan, 1986). This profile 
will focus mainly on the Saudi Arabian economy in general and how public sector 
projects are financed, any payments are delivered and how it would affect the 
contractor’s performance. 
Business environment profile: this profile will include mainly the culture environment, 
Dispute Resolution and Litigation environments, and discuss corruption and fraud in 
the sector. 
Regulation and Laws profile: Regulation and Laws have a considerable influence on 
the regulation of business activity, the purchasing power of consumers and other 
businesses. This profile mainly focuses on government regulations and laws that 
have an impact on the contractual agreements between the contractors and the 
public sector. 
Resources profile: this profile will discuss the primary resources for construction 
projects which are Finance, Labour, Material, and Plant. 
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1.2 Problem Statement: 
The size of investments in construction worldwide is considered to be as large as 
10% of the world economy (Hampson et al., 2014). Meeting the project cost 
estimates has been found as the prime success factor by all project stakeholders 
(Baloi and Price, 2003; Meeampol and Ogunlan, 2006). However, it is not unusual to 
see projects, owners, and contractors suffer cost overrun (Azhar et al., 2008a). The 
negative impacts of a stakeholder’s cost overrun will reach other stakeholders beside 
that stakeholder who suffer cost overrun. For instance, a contractor’s cost overrun 
may lead to contractors’ bankruptcy and project abandonment and thereby affecting 
the owner financially and reinforcing the construction industry’s poor performance 
reputation, in turn resulting in decreased investment for new projects (Mbachu and 
Nkado, 2004). 
Literature shows that cost overrun is a common problem in construction projects and 
still exists despite the problem having been investigated for over 30 years (Love et 
al., 2016), thus suggesting that further research is needed to alleviate cost overrun 
(Abderisak et al., 2017). Moreover, the literature shows that the cost overrun 
magnitude differs between studies. The variation of this magnitude could be related 
to different factors such as project size (Singh, 2009b; Singh, 2010; Odeck, 2004), 
project type (Odeck, 2004) and project location (Cantarelli, 2011; Cantarelli et al., 
2012a; Cantarelli et al., 2012b; Cantarelli et al., 2012c). Equally, the studies support 
the claim that worldwide findings are not always applicable for individual countries. 
The apparent lack of consistency regarding the causes of the cost overrun, in spite of 
having been investigated for over 30 years, and that the cost overrun problem still 
exists, indicate that the current literature does not identify the true root causes. 
Providing solutions to the problem cannot be achieved by investigating cost overrun 
from the wrong angle. Thus, the current cost overrun literature is, in this thesis, 
evaluated so as to identify limitations in identifying the real causes. Moreover, as a 
result of the illustration in section (1.1.4) of the effects arising from the context of the 
construction industry, projects, and organisation, the evaluation will also consider 
whether the previous studies consider the effects of the context as well as the 
process of developing the construction projects. 
As the background review has shown, the studies that identify the cause(s) of cost 
overrun suffer from a limitation regarding the way of looking at the causality of the 
cost overrun. The results of the evaluation suggest a rethinking in the method of 
identifying the causes of cost overrun. The analysis shows a need to move from 
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listing individual (standalone) causes and attendant ranking, to develop a model that 
illustrates the complexity and dynamic connection between those causes and cost 
overrun. Moreover, identifying and measuring the effect of individual causes does not 
reflect the reality in which overrun occurs, so leading to inadequate assessing and 
managing of the causes leading to cost overrun. 
This research investigates the cost overrun problem from a different perspective by 
including effects flowing from the context that the construction projects are developed 
in. As illustrated in sections 1.1.3 and 1.1.4, different contexts (laws, regulation, 
industry's environment, and project's lifecycle) usually mean different cost overrun 
magnitude. Moreover, researchers have highlighted the importance of studying cost 
overrun at the level of individual countries (rather than seeking a global ‘solution’) as 
the causes could be related to the institutional structure of that country (Cantarelli et 
al., 2010; Cantarelli et al., 2012b; Cantarelli et al., 2012c; Odeck, 2017). Also it has 
been illustrated in section 1.1.4 that context affects the operation of a construction 
industry, its projects, and organisations and it is not unusual for this to lead to cost 
overrun and bankruptcy. As a result, investigating the context first is essential to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the issue of cost overrun. The argument thus follows 
that to fully understand the causal nature of cost overruns in construction projects, 
the context and environment of the project must be clearly articulated, and the 
methods used for their investigation need careful consideration. Nevertheless, as 
literature shows different points of view regarding any context investigation, this 
research has developed four profiles (lenses) that will be used to investigate the 
context (see section 1.1.4) which are: Economic, Business environment, Resources, 
and Regulations and laws. Moreover, links between the possible weakness of the 
context, process of developing construction projects and the cost overrun need to be 
established and evaluated. 
The Saudi Construction Industry is a part of the global construction context. Despite 
being the most significant construction industry in the region, studies investigating the 
construction industry are limited (Mitra and Wee Kwan Tan, 2012). The Saudi 
construction industry is unique compared to other construction industries around the 
world. This uniqueness is partly inherited by the country's regulation, culture, and 
work environment as shown in Chapter Two and the results of Objective One. As 
was argued in section 1.1.3, regarding the importance and mutual effect of the 
context that a construction project is developed in, the systematic literature review 
shows that the context of the Saudi public sector’s components has not been 
investigated regarding the effect(s) on the construction industry in general, and on 
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contractors’ cost performance specifically. Based on that, and as this study’s context 
is the Saudi public sector, in order to understand the contractors’ cost overrun in-
depth, the context of the Saudi public sector and the process that are used to 
develop a construction project need to be explored, evluated and understood through 
the four lenses explained earlier. 
Moreover, to deeply understand the causal nature of cost overrun, researchers have 
emphasised investigation of the project's context and environment to help to 
understand the inheritance of cost overrun from the very early stages of the project's 
lifecycle (Ahiaga-Dagbui et al., 2017; Jennings, 2012). Thus, gaining insight into the 
mechanism (interaction) of the context and any process effects that occur during the 
projects’ development is the next step in order to more fully understand the 
contractors’ cost overrun. Based on the results of the evaluation, possible weakness 
that could lead to the cost overrun will be identified and links to the outcome of cost 
overrun will be established. As a result, causality paths will be developed which will 
be used to build the causality model. 
It is argued that exploring the local context, mechanisms, and process benefits 
expands the value of this research and the contribution it offers to more fully 
understanding the causal nature of context with regard to cost overrun. In particular, 
this contribution will benefit other research that targets improving the Saudi public 
sector’s projects’ performance, mechanism, or process. 
1.3 Research questions: 
Based on the research justification, the following questions are raised: 
• What are the nature of the environment around the construction industry and 
construction project processes and practices that the Saudi public sector use 
to deliver a construction project? Related to this, how the environment, 
processes, and practices lead to contractors' cost overrun? 
• What are the main causality paths of contractors' cost overruns? How are the 
causes interacting within the context of the Saudi public sector to lead to 
contractors cost overrun? 
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1.4 Aim and objectives of the research: 
This study aims to develop contractors' cost overrun causality model in the Saudi 
public sector that considers the effects of context, the practices, and processes of 
developing construction projects. 
1.4.1 Research objectives: 
To achieve the aim of the research, the following objectives will be addressed under 
the umbrella of the four lenses of Business environment, Economic, Regulation, and 
Resources lenses: 
Objective 1: To explore the commercial context of the Saudi public construction 
projects procurement. 
Objective 2: To establish the link between the commercial context of the Saudi public 
construction projects procurement and contractors' performance. 
Objective 3: To critically review and establish the causalities of cost overrun in Saud 
Arabian construction projects.  
Objective 4: To classify and evaluate the possible causalities of cost overrun in Saud 
Arabian construction projects. 
Objective 5: To develop a causality model that illustrates the interdependency 
between the causes of the contractors’ cost overrun within the Saudi construction 
public projects based on the evaluation of the context and process. 
1.5 The scope of the study: 
This study concentrated on Saudi public building construction projects. The reasons 
behind choosing public projects is that the primary owner (public sector) controls over 
two thirds of the country’s projects. Regarding choosing the building projects, a 
project’s type analysis of approved public projects in 2013 shows that the majority of 
projects are building followed by road projects. Moreover, construction project multi 
tasks projects where tasks included electrical, mechanical ...etc. works. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi classification system shows that most of the Saudi 
contractors are classified under the “building”, the classification system is explained 
thoroughly in analysing objective two. Thus, focusing on the building projects will be 
beneficial for the whole industry and all parties.  
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This study will also be limited exploring identifying evaluating to cost overrun causes 
as it has been found that time has fewer implications on cost compared to cost on 
time. Therefore, if a project has the right financial resources time overrun will not be 
an issue. A number of studies which studies both cost and time overrun shows that 
cost overrun occur more often than time overrun (Kaming et al., 1997a; Cox et al., 
1999; Radujkovic, 1999). This makes the problem of cost overruns one of great 
significance. 
This study focused on contractors who work in Saudi public projects. Although the 
research does not specify their focus on the nationality of the contractors, the 
majority of classified contractors (over 99%) are local contractors (Saudi contractors). 
Moreover, all the interviewees are working for local contractors. Thus, the outputs are 
more related to local contractors rather than international contractors. 
Post-contractor's involvement phases are a significant focus in this study. This is 
because the study focuses on contractors' cost overrun. However, the paths 
development goes beyond this focus. This is because construction projects are 
developed in subsequent processes. Thus, the root causes usually are in the early 
stages. 
Moreover, this study is limited to the public projects that are delivered using the 
standard process explained in the STP. 
1.6 Limitations of the study: 
The research was limited to investigate the Meso Level of the Saudi public practices 
and process of developing a construction project. This because of the lack of a 
unified system on the technical level (low level) for all the Saudi public organisation. It 
is more likely that because there are no general regulations at such level. Therefore, 
the work can only reliably be applied to the Meso Level of management of 
construction project processes in the Saudi public sector. 
Despite other contexts' profiles also affecting the construction industry, however, this 
study was limited to investigate Business, Economic, Regulation, and Resources 
profiles. This because of this study concentrated on looking into the cost overrun 
issue from the contractor’s perspective and it was discovered these four profiles have 
the major effects on the contractors' cost performance. 
This study is tailored (limited) into the current process and practised in developing a 
construction project in the Saudi public sector. However, the lack of unified practices 
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and processes for developing a public construction project also created a challenge 
during weaknesses points identification (objective two) activity. 
Regarding data, the lack of research outputs on the context of Saudi Arabia as well 
as the problem of ready-made data (and difficulty to explicate data) forced the study 
in some objectives to rely on secondary data rather than primary data. Moreover, it 
also forces the research investigation to be on broader contexts, such as exploring 
the whole process and practices of developing a construction project as well as the 
overall project life cycle (to identify the weaknesses), rather than addressing a 
specific phase, process, or practice in detail. The data collected forced the 
researcher to eliminate the planning phase; the document data was limited, and the 
interviewees were not involved in the planning phase. 
1.7 Structure of the thesis: 
This thesis is divided into five chapters that interact to reach the study’s aim and 
objectives, with Figure 4 showing the interaction between chapter contents. The 
research design figure (Figure 22), presented in Chapter Three, shows how the each 
of the data collection methods serve the research aim and objectives. 
1.7.1 Chapter One: 
In Chapter One, the research highlights the background of the study. The nature and 
characteristics of the construction industry in general, and in Saudi Arabia 
specifically, have been illustrated, along with the problem of cost overrun in the 
construction industry. Moreover, the importance of the of the context and its effects 
on the construction industry, projects, and organisations involved were discussed 
and four lenses has been developed (based on Porter’s model and relevant 
institutional theory). Following that, the problem statement was discussed and 
followed by the research questions, aim, and objectives. Finally, the research scope 
and limitations were discussed and illustrated. 
1.7.2 Chapter Two: 
In the second chapter, the researcher explored the context of the Saudi public sector. 
Based on four profiles (lenses): Business, Economic, Regulation, and Resources, the 
public sector context is explained. Moreover, the chapter explained how these 
profiles affect the construction industry, projects, contractor as well as the 
development of public projects. The results of the chapter will be used later in 
Objective Two where the explanation assists in identifying the possible weakness 
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that could lead to cost overrun. In this chapter Objective One is resolved and the 
research/literature gaps that need to be further investigated are identified. 
1.7.3 Chapter Three: 
In this chapter, the research systematically illustrated and justified the research 
paradigms, methodologies and techniques which are applied to achieve the research 
aim and objectives. Research design is developed, which shows how each objective 
will be achieved and which research approaches, data gathering, and analysis 
techniques are used. 
1.7.4 Chapter Four: 
In this chapter, the data collected analyses and discussion for the five objectives 
were presented. In the beginning, descriptions of the process and practises of 
developing a construction project in the Saudi public sector and identifying their 
weaknesses are presented. At this point, links between the weaknesses and the 
possible causes of cost overrun were established, showing how the context and 
process lead to cost overrun. Other possible causes of the cost overrun which are 
not related to the context and process, were identified in the critical analysis of the 
cost overrun causes literature. As a result, causes from the context, process, and 
literature were comprehensively identified and classified. Based on that, causality 
paths were built and evluated for use in building the cost overrun model. In this 
chapter, Objectives Two, Three, Four, and Five have been resolved and achieved. 
1.7.5 Chapter Five: 
In this chapter, the general conclusion of the study and the major findings of the 
study were presented. Research questions and objectives were revisited and linked, 
where appropriate, to the findings of the research. The chapter also discussed the 
contribution to and implications for the study for the construction project management 
body of knowledge and practise whilst also, the chapter presenting the limitations of 
the research and recommendations for future study. 
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Figure 4: Research structure. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: 
2.1 Introduction: 
The first section of this chapter illustrates and evaluates the current literature on the 
construction industry in Saudi Arabia and other relevant aspects, such as the 
business environment and construction resources. Besides that, the chapter 
provides literature review for the other Objectives Two, Three, and Four.  
The amount of the literature is limited for the subjects under investigation which are 
the Saudi Public sector context, the process and techniques for developing the 
Saudi public sector, and the cost overrun causes. Thus, the chapter mainly fulfils 
the first objective of the research which aims to explore and explains the Saudi 
context based on Business, Economic, Regulation, and Resources profiles, identify 
their weakness, and explain their effects on contractors cost performance. The 
second part introduces the cost overrun literature and illustrates the extent of the 
cost overrun issue while also investigating attempts to solve the problem. The 
publications on the major contemporary issues and factors of the construction 
industry in Saudi Arabia were reviewed. This was considered essential in order to 
build up the background of the origin of the current conditions affecting the 
environment of the government construction sector. These characteristics and 
conditions are well defined and explained in this chapter. However, the chapter was 
less focused on Objectives Two, Three, and Four. 
As the previous chapter mentioned, understanding the internal and external 
projects’ environment in Saudi Arabia is essential to understand the real causes of 
the cost overrun in that context. As the resources about the Saudi construction 
industry are limited, a systematic literature review and interviews were carried out to 
understand the context. The literature in this context is limited in quantity; gaps in 
the literature will be identified so as to allow them to be possibly addressed at the 
data collecting stage. By the end a summary of the literature review where the gaps 
in the literature are presented and linked them to the research aim and objectives.  
2.2 Economic Profile for Saudi Arabia and construction: 
The Saudi economy is the largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa 
area (Akoum, 2009) and the biggest oil producer globally with, on average, 10 
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million barrels per day (bpd). The income from oil expanded the country’s GDP 180 
times from the 1968 level and reduced the country debt to be one of the lowest in 
the world (Clyde & Co and Blanksby, 2011). Figure 5 shows the Saudi Arabian 
GDP over the last 50 years. The GDP composition in 2014, for example, is 12% 
government, 43% oil, 45% other. The ministry of planning publication shows that 
construction contributes on average 7% to the total GDP and 35% of the non-oil 
productive sectors. The country’s currency is the Saudi Riyal (SAR) which is fixed-
linked to the US Dollar (1 USD=3.75 SAR) (SAMA, 2017). 
 
Figure 5: Saudi Arabia (KSA) GDP (USD billion) between 1968 and 2016. 
Source: (World Bank, 2018a). 
 
The fundamental contribution of the oil sector, which in 2015, for example, was 80% 
of total budget revenue, enables the government to invest in massive public 
spending programs without the need for taxation, falling into balance-of-payments 
deficits or inflationary difficulties, which other developing countries suffer from 
(Vohra, 2017). However, Figure 6 shows that KSA has failed to mitigate its 
dependency on oil ever since it was discovered, as shown by the high correlation 
between the Saudi economy and oil prices. The figure demonstrates the similarity 
between the country’s GDP and the average oil price fluctuation over the last 45 
years, which is something not seen in the United Kingdom and the United States’ 
economies (Figure 7 and Figure 8) because their economies are multi-source 
economies (IMF, 2018; IMF, 2017). 
The current KSA system has developed a strong economy -at least in the short-
term- making the construction industry less affected by the fluctuation of 
international currencies, which is vital for the stability of the construction industry 
particularly in a country where most of the construction materials and technologies 
are imported (OBG, 2018). Despite that, the Saudi government has admitted that 
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the current economy is not sustainable and will not cope with the long-term plans 
for the country (MOF, 2017). Moreover, the high revenue achieved from one source 
only worsens the macroeconomic instability and results in adverse effects on 
growth and the stability of non-oil sectors while also maximising international 
investors’ hesitation to invest in long-term projects in the country (Vohra, 2017). 
Nevertheless, oil price instability creates an economic event referred to as oil shock 
- when the revenue of the country maximises followed by high spending of the 
country especially on major megaprojects, followed by a sudden sharp drop of oil 
price resulting in a deficit of the budget (Algahtani, 2016). 
 
Figure 6: A comparison between Saudi GDP and the avg. Oil barrel price between 
1968 and 2013. 
 
 
Figure 7: A comparison between UK GDP and the avg. Oil barrel price between 
1968 and 2013. 
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Figure 8: A comparison between USA GDP and the avg. Oil barrel price between 
1968 and 2013. 
 
Within the Saudi economy history, a peak-to-trough event had occurred four times 
(1982–86, 1998–99, 2008–09, and 2014-now) when oil revenues decreased by 
50% either because oil prices fell, oil output fell, or a combination of both. According 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, the macroeconomic reaction to the 
low oil revenue during these events is almost the same. The declined oil revenue is 
also combined with a deficit of the country’s budget to result in a decrease of Saudi 
government spending, slowing of money and credit growth, decreased export 
receipts, and minimised financial reserves if any (IMF, 2015). For example, the last 
oil price drop in late 2014 resulted in 20% reduction of the Saudi government 
budget in 2016, and the IMF predicted that this defect would continue till 2020 if the 
oil price per barrel stays under USD 50 (IMF, 2015; IMF, 2016a; IMF, 2016b). 
The KSA’s political system shaped in a traditional way where the government is 
responsible for creating public jobs for the population which gives the government 
little space to cut or reduce the spending on public employees’ salaries during the 
low government revenues. Thus, it should not be a surprise that construction 
projects arguably are the first and the most affected sector by any government 
spending cut as Ministry of Finance (MoF) annual reports show (IMF, 2016a; Arnold 
and Torchia, 2016). This is because of the short sight of the finical decision makers 
in looking into public construction projects as unnecessary expenditures rather than 
as investment vehicles. Such sudden financial cuts result in adversarial behavioural 
patterns that worsen the economic difficulty, such as contractor's margin erosion, 
adversarial contract negotiations, and cash flow issues (Hughes, 2016). 
To illustrate the impact on the construction industry of an oil price drop, the oil price 
drop in late 2014 was followed by signs that the government had started slowing 
and postponing some of its infrastructure projects to save money. In July 2015, the 
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Spanish manufacturer Talgo reported that Saudi Arabia had cancelled a USD 201 
million contract for six high-speed trains (Rashad, 2015). Moreover, in September 
2015 the Saudi finance minister announced that the government would cut 
“unnecessary” expenditures and delay some projects to cope with the low oil prices 
(Torchia, 2015). In the same month, the High Commission for the Development of 
Riyadh, which owns the most significant project in Saudi Arabia – the Riyadh Metro 
(USD 22 billion), reported that the Saudi government had moved to cut spending on 
the Riyadh Metro while also investigating other expenditure reduction options 
(MEED, 2015). 
2.3 The business environment for Saudi Arabia and 
construction: 
In Saudi Arabia, the government is the leading player in the economy and is backed 
by oil revenue (Mhamed et al., 2018). In the construction industry, for instance, two-
thirds of construction projects are owned by the government as a result of the rapid 
development of the country (Al-Jarallah, 1983). The Saudi government has been 
responsible for providing services in the last 50 years, and the private sector either 
was not able to cope with the rate of development or barely existed at the time. As 
a result of private sector immaturity, the public-sector agencies established their 
own companies – so as to be less controlled by public regulations and be more 
flexible- in sectors such as Power, Telecommunication, Petrol, and Chemicals. 
Despite reports by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) and IMF showing 
that private sector participation is fundamental for macroeconomic stability, 
especially in the non-oil sectors, by improving labour regulations and access to 
finance, and attracting foreign direct investment (IMF, 2016b; Sommer et al., 2016), 
the private sector mainly depended on government contracts. This resulting inability 
for the Saudi private sector to create real financial participation in the economy, 
delaying the development of a profitable private sector and slowed the growth of the 
financial and labour markets (Mhamed et al., 2018; Biygautane, 2017a; AGSIW, 
2014; IMF, 2016b). In other words, public spending is the primary driver for the 
country economic growth. Nevertheless, the private sector still faces a challenge to 
compete with the public sector or create any real growth within the economy. 
The Saudi government announced an ambitious “2030 vision” in April 2016 by 
investing USD 4 trillion in programmes aiming to double GDP by 2030 so as to 
repeat the doubling between 2003 and 2013 (Vision 2030, 2018; McKinsey & 
Company, 2015). The country, therefore, reduced public spending by 11% in 2016 
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and planned to also increase the non-oil revenue from USD 43.5 billion to USD160 
billion by 2020. Moreover, another focus of the country is direct internal and 
external investments in government services under the “Privatisation programme” 
(Khan, 2016; Nurunnabi, 2017). Such a change needs a fundamental change within 
the regulation and laws of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Saudi Economy and Planning 
Minister said that part of the 2030 vision was the rehabilitation of the Saudi 
business environment to be business-friendly (Al-Harthi et al., 2015). 
Arguably it is easy to establish a business company in Saudi Arabia. A construction 
company, for example, could be regulated online within the same day without any 
experience or professional certificate required (Presley and Westaway, 2017). 
However, around 80% of Saudi private companies are controlled by a small number 
of family businesses (Hertog, 2013). The biggest construction companies in the 
country are owned and controlled by a few families (Zendera, 2014). 
The construction sector is less affected by competition with government companies 
as the government agencies frequently use a third party (private sector) to perform 
design, consultant, and construction projects rather than construct it themselves. 
However, construction companies compete with each other, and the ones awarded 
a contract are generally among the lowest bidders and with a probability to fail. The 
high competitive could explain partly the meagre rate of 50% of project success in 
Saudi Arabia identified by international and local contractors (Mosley and Bubshait, 
2015). 
Construction is described as a “sensitive business” (Medallah, 2015) as all project 
components and the surrounding environment contribute to the risk, which is 
irregular. As a result, an exploration within the business environment components is 
needed. 
2.3.1 Governance and Regulatory Environment: 
One of the main challenges that faced the Saudi government when attracting direct 
external investments was the lack of a governance system, laws, and regulation 
capacities (OECD, 2014). Table 1 (page 4) shows the country has scored low in 
regulatory quality and government effectiveness over the years and this could be 
one of the higher risks for investors as it gives the impression that regulatory reform 
performance is prolonged. These low scores have negative consequences for 
attracting foreign businesses and direct investments (Alter, 2015). The other 
regulation-related factor that makes the business environment extremely risky is the 
sudden changes in laws and regulations without prior notice (Assaf et al., 2015). 
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The effects of such regulation changes reach contractors even when it is not 
applied to contractors; however, the effects of these risks are more significant on 
contractors’ main resources (Finance, Material, and Labour) which are regulated by 
the country solely. The press is full of examples of regulation changes which mainly 
relate to the labour and material which are the backbone of the industry and 
sensitive subjects, as will be explained in sections (2.4.2 and 2.4.3). 
For the construction industry (a risky industry by its nature), the absence of good 
governance and the rule of law as well as sudden changes in laws and regulations 
without prior notice exaggerates the Saudi construction industry risks leading to 
poor performance in terms of time and cost for both local and international 
contractors (Assaf et al., 2015). 
2.3.2 Culture: 
The early work of Hofstede described culture as "the collective programming of the 
mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another" 
(Hofstede, 1980). Culture is one of the aspects that usually changes based on 
location (Kendra and Taplin, 2004). Understanding the national culture 
(unconsciously acquired the culture of early life), and the organisational culture 
(shared values and beliefs held by a certain segment of society) (Igo and Skitmore, 
2006), is critical to understand any business environment (Pheng and Leong, 2000; 
Shore and Cross, 2005). Different researchers pointed out that culture impacts 
aspects of business such as: decision making and bureaucracy (Müller et al., 2009; 
Wang and Liu, 2007), teamwork (Mead, 2004),leadership and empowerment 
(Turner and Müller, 2005), business relationships (Zigang and Fan, 2004), risk 
management (Mihet, 2012), conflict resolution (Mulcahy, 2005), project failure 
(Muriithi and Crawford, 2003), and management control (Amy and Pulatov, 2008; 
Van der Stede, 2003). An example illustrating the influence of national culture is 
behaviours towards risks and implementing new strategies. In China, it has been 
found that Chinese project managers tend to be less prudent in risk management 
and so utilise higher risk strategies that maximise profits (Tan, 2016). Furthermore, 
it is more difficult to implement some management strategies because the Chinese 
are less interested in rule structures compared to other cultures (Pheng and Leong, 
2000; Fan and Zigang, 2004; Wang and Liu, 2007). 
Studies such as Pant et al. (1996), Pheng and Leong (2000), Chen and Partington 
(2004), and Wang and Liu (2007) have shown that the cultural difference between 
Asia and the West have affected the project process and by the end project 
performance in the relevant regions. One of the main reasons for the differences 
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displayed is related to the varying political and social ideas, such as bureaucracy, 
social consciousness, and communications. Although there is some evidence that 
culture influences management styles, decisions, and behaviours, as well as 
employees’ expectation on how to be managed (Tsai, 2011; Adeyemi-Bello and 
Kincaid, 2012), the influence of culture on the project management aspects have 
not been widely investigated (Hoole and Du Plessis, 2002). Additionally, Amy and 
Pulatov (2008) have highlighted how project management bodies, such as APM, 
PMI and IPMA have not recognised the importance of culture, particularly national 
culture, and its effect on project management. 
In Saudi Arabia, one of the elements that form the culture is the religion (Islam), 
which influences every aspect of life and business and influences the business 
environment (Rees and Althakhri, 2008; Alsaif, 2013). Rice (2004) described the 
business environment in Saudi Arabia as conservative, with its policy and decision-
making influenced by Islam. Another element that forms the Saudi national culture 
is the "tribal heritage". The implications of such influencing touch the whole 
environment, resulting in a business environment that is very detail oriented, 
emphasising expected social behaviours, ethics, and the organisational structure. In 
a more recent study by Al-Rasheedi (2012) focused on culture through 
implementing Hofstede and Bond (1984) cross-cultural dimensions, shows that in 
Saudi Arabia the national culture affects the performance of the project in three 
different themes: 
1. Low commitment to project control through deadlines. 
2. Distant relationships with project managers. 
3. Change is perceived as negative. 
Kerzner (2004) recognised collaboration and teamwork as bases for project 
management. However, collaboration and teamwork could be less active within the 
Saudi construction industry. The culture affects the positions of a public 
organisation compared to a contractor organisation. The state organisation is 
always in a higher position than the private sector, resulting in contractors being the 
weakest link in that the first one feels he is not obligated to collaborate or negotiate 
with the second. Thus, it should be no surprise in such a culture that contractors 
hold most of the project risks, are expected to obey all contract conditions, and try 
his best to keep the states' representatives happy. 
Teamwork and collaboration could be less effective in Saudi Arabia as individuals 
adhere to strict divisions between members of society based on several factors 
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such as tribal affiliations, age, and gender. This could be the opposite of the 
western views of social relationship; every team member is playing an equal role 
(Chen and Partington, 2004). Moreover, the culture difference between the team 
members could affect their performance. As will be illustrated later (section 2.4.3), 
the private sector in Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on a foreign workforce from 
different countries, and contractors are no exception as they usually contain 
multinational teams. Cultural distance between contractors' team members could 
affect knowledge exchange and learn within the team, managerial conflicts, conflict 
resolution, and individual capabilities (Nielsen et al., 2007; Park and Ungson, 1997). 
Also, a typical organisational structure in Saudi Arabia (public or private) comprises 
strong hierarchical lines by placing the highest power at the top with each 
subsequent step down the chain of command having a drastic decline in authority. 
Familial ties, gender and age heavily influence positions of power. Moreover, Saudi 
national culture scored high in the power distance dimension (Hofstede-insights, 
2018), which indicates that people are more likely to accept the difference in power 
and expect a definite hierarchy. These two facts cast a dark shadow over 
communication between the top management and lower levels, resulting in less 
effective teamwork and collaboration. 
Within the communication distance, Saudis are close to Asian culture where 
Chinese and Japanese tend to be more reserved in confrontations (social or 
business), rather than western countries where project managers are more open 
and direct in their communication and style of management (Chen and Partington, 
2004; Gobeli et al., 1998; Pinto and Kharbanda, 1995). On the other hand, Saudi 
decision-making behaviour is closer to the individualised methods of North 
American project managers, rather than Japanese and Chinese cultures tend to 
see the importance of teamwork as a way of making important decisions (Kerzner, 
2004). 
The Saudi national culture encourages some sorts of corruption as the tribal 
heritage of the country holds that “loyalty [is first] to the family, then the clan, the 
tribe, and the nation” (Rice, 2004). Researchers have reported that as individuals 
are more loyal to the family and the tribe over the country, they usually look for 
ways to overcome rules and regulations so as to award services to their friends, 
extended family, or tribal members (Jabbra and Jabbra, 2005). These services 
range from awarding government contracts to unsuitable contractors to facilitating 
bureaucratic processes (Ali, 2010). In non-tribal societies (usually developed 
countries) this is seen as corruption, nepotism, or patronage. However, it is seen in 
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Saudi Arabia as an obligation (House et al., 2013). Similar behaviour has been 
found in some Asian countries such as China, Nepal, and Japan where family 
loyalty and respect influence decision-making processes (Pant et al., 1996; Pheng 
and Leong, 2000; Wang and Liu, 2007). 
Nevertheless, Alseghayer (2013) mentioned that national culture encourages two 
behaviours that affect a project performance: low productivity and punctuality. 
Alseghayer (2013) emphasised that the Saudi national culture does not give 
timeliness, nor tight schedules, a high priority. 
The difficulty of measuring the effects of national and organisational culture on any 
project's aspect performance could be a reason for the limited published research 
on this issue. In addition, participants in such research may not realise that culture 
is influencing their behaviour, as seen in research applied to Saudi Arabia where 
cultural differences are emphatically denied as causes of conflict in the Saudi 
construction industry (Al-Sedairy, 1994). The author suggests that the data is not 
reflecting the real picture and confirms that culture in itself is a “highly sensitive 
issue” and suggested that denial by participants means any direct approach to 
measure the impact of culture will not work. 
2.3.3 The Dispute, Dispute Resolution, and Litigation 
environments: 
One of the characteristics of the construction industry is being highly adversarial, 
typically deemed to be due to each stakeholder having different definitions and 
parameters for success as well as fragmentation of projects' development process 
and the team involved in each stage. As a result, construction industries have long 
been linked with dispute occurrences (Keil, 1999). Although disputes are inevitable 
in some cases, they could destroy both sides financially (Mahamid, 2016), and 
changes in a project’s scope and variations are actually the root source for most of 
the disputes in construction projects worldwide (Jaffar et al., 2011). In the Saudi 
Arabian case the leading causes in addition to scope change and variations are: 
delay in progress payment by the owner; unrealistic contract duration; poor quality 
of completed works, and labour inefficiencies (Mahamid, 2016). 
To avoid financial loss, a dispute’s parties usually avoid going to court and use 
other methods such as arbitration whenever possible. However, in the Saudi public 
sector government agencies are prohibited from engaging in arbitration, although a 
Saudi arbitration law exists (Royal Decree No. M/34, 2012). As a result, arbitration 
will not be covered as it is considered out of the research context of public 
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construction projects. It should not, therefore, be a surprise that the most commonly 
used dispute resolution method in Saudi Arabia is litigation (Al-Ghamdi et al., 2012). 
Disputes that are related to Saudi public projects should be settled at a special 
court ("Grievance Board"), which is an Islamic court fully authorised to settle public 
sector’s agencies’ disputes (Council of Ministers Resolution No. 190, 1989). 
The legal system of Saudi Arabia is based on Sharia or Islamic law. The king of 
Saudi Arabia appoints Sharia-trained judges who maintain Islamic jurisdiction within 
the court system. Such a system is less familiar to international investors who could 
act as a hindrance to such investment. The interpretation of documents - especially 
in the absence of legal precedent case - in the current legal system has been 
criticised as similar cases could reach very different results. Moreover, the system 
has been described as very a slow legal system. Al-Reshed (2002) examined 77 
dispute cases between government agents (public owners) and main contractors 
and found that approximately 92% of cases took more than a year to hear, and 
some lasted up to eight years. The absence of using arbitration in resolving 
disputes and the limited number of courts contribute to the slowness and also 
contribute to Saudi Arabia being ranked last in the “Resolving Insolvency” indicator 
of the World Bank Doing Business ranking and indicates that risk could arise from 
such an environment. This undoubtedly increases the damages on the harmed 
party who resorted to the judiciary. 
Jannadia et al. (2000) indicated that severe disputes concerning construction 
contracts have become increasingly common over the last two decades. In 2006, 
45% of the litigation cases within the Board of Grievances were concerned with 
construction disputes or projects (Al-Rabiah, 2013; Al-Rabiah, 2006). It goes 
without saying that the number and value of disputes in a contract are inversely 
proportional to the clarity of contract documents. 
In a case of loss and expense, the general principle (in Sharia law) is that a party 
may receive damages equivalent to the loss incurred and caused by the other 
party. However, the weaknesses of the mechanism of compensation applied by the 
judiciary, and that, in many disputes, the judiciary refuses compensation for not 
proving the damage or compensation awarded is at a negligible level, are problems 
affecting dispute resolution. In addition, the damage that may be compensated 
includes the actual losses such as the financial damage, the actual loss suffered by 
the injured person, but does not include moral damages nor punitive damages. 
There is also a weaknesses and lack of expertise in the judicial or arbitration courts 
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to provide expert technical opinion on the issues of dispute in specialised 
construction contracts (Almutairi, 2015). 
In the Saudi public context, different factors, which some have been explained 
earlier such as culture and others will be explained later, make it difficult for 
contractors to prove the damages and losses. For example, in the case of the 
absence of proof additional works, being the weakest link among other 
stakeholders, contractors accept additional work without the assignment being 
adequately agreed upon in the contract or issued by a non-authorised person. 
Thus, contractors are more vulnerable not to be adequately compensated for the 
actual damages and losses. 
Penalty clauses in a contract are nonetheless permissible unless contracts in which 
the original commitment is in the form of credit (debt) (Islam Q&A, 2015). However, 
some conditions have been raised regarding compensation, such as that it should 
be a reasonable amount, should be fair and impartial, and based on the actual 
harm (not including intangible harm). 
Furthermore, there are two cases in which the compensation penalty is not payable: 
1. The one on whom it was stipulated was unable to comply due to reasons beyond 
his control 2. The one in whose favour it was stipulated was not harmed by the 
failure to fulfil the contract (Ali, 2013; Enazi, 2016; Al-Munajjid, 2011; Othman, 
2009). 
2.3.4 Corruption and fraud: 
The potential for fraud and corruption to occur exists throughout the business world, 
and construction projects are no exception. The lack of governance and control, as 
well as the cultural acceptance in which some actions are not categorised as fraud 
or corruption, enhance the chances of corruption exists. Indeed, there are more 
opportunities to commit fraud on a construction project than there are in business 
operations, where usually corporate policies and procedures are well enforced, and 
internal or external audit is an ongoing requirement. One example of corruption 
caused by a lack of governance and legislation and effective litigation systems is 
that contractors in Saudi public projects are working under unbalanced risk 
appropriation contract that put the state representative in a position of unlimited 
authority, are accepting additional work without the assignment being issued in the 
proper manner agreed upon in the contract, or issued by a non-specialist. 
The tribal and strong family links in Saudi Arabia, which is one of the themes that 
influence the national culture, encourages some sorts of corruption. The tribal 
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heritage ranked the loyalty as follow: at first to the family, then the clan, the tribe, 
and the nation (Rice, 2004). One of the corruption actions is that individuals often 
look for ways to manoeuvre around bureaucratic rules and legal regulations to grant 
favours to their friends, extended family, or fellow tribal members. These favours 
range from granting government contracts to unsuitable contractors (Ali, 2010), to 
facilitating bureaucratic transitions (Jabbra and Jabbra, 2005). Although the west 
perceives this as nepotism, corruption, or patronage, in Saudi Arabia, it is 
considered a duty to prioritise one’s family in business deals before evaluating 
technical competency or financial competitiveness (House et al., 2013). Such 
behaviour has been found in some Asian countries such as China, Nepal, and 
Japan; family loyalty and respect influence decision-making in project management 
to become bureaucratic and more prolonged (Pant et al., 1996; Pheng and Leong, 
2000; Wang and Liu, 2007). 
Other cost-related actions within the construction industry that could be labelled as 
corruption and fraud are: Increasing the attractiveness for approving the project 
(Consultant); ‘Unbalanced bids’ (contractors); Overestimated change orders 
(Contractors); Unsubstantiated change orders (Owner representative); Delayed 
and/or improper approvals by the appointed project consultant, Over-reported 
project performance to either over-invoice for work on-site or hide project delays 
(Sohail and Cavill, 2006; Gunduz and Önder, 2013). 
2.4 Resources availability and construction: 
The construction industries in the developing countries face significant challenges 
with the resources such as management and shortages. In the following sections, 
the four primary resources will be discussed.  
2.4.1 Finance: 
For a construction project, the main finance types needed are development finance 
to cover the cost of initial stages, construction finance to cover the cost of the 
project implementation, and contingency finance to cover cost overruns and delays 
(Zainudeen et al., 2010). Saudi public projects usually have one major financer 
(normally Ministry of Finance (MoF)) who control funding for all public projects. 
However, under the solo financer, the whole public projects are affected by any 
negative financial capability of that financer resulting in threatening the whole 
industry in that country. 
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In the case of public projects in Saudi Arabia, there is a lack of law or regulation for 
funding construction public projects. However, the literature indicates two ways to 
fund public construction projects. First, directly by the Saudi government in that 
Saudi Arabia is a rich country and the government can fund the majority of public 
projects through the MoF (MEP, 2010b; MEP, 2010a). Second, the country has 
opened public projects to the private sector to part-fund projects using contracts 
such as BOT and PPP (Al-madina, 2012). 
From a financier perspective, construction projects frequently exceed cost and time 
limits. Moreover, the time usually needed for a construction project to be finished is 
relatively long. A financer needs to be financially stable to finance such projects, 
avoid any claims, and finish projects on time. For Saudi MoF, as the country 
depends on a single source of income (oil), any drastic changes in the value of that 
resource affect the value of projects that can be funded. As the main owner 
financier, this profoundly affects the industry as a whole, especially contractors, 
which could be reflected in their account statements (Argaam, 2016) and the worst 
cases lead to contractors’ bankruptcy as with Saudi-Ojer which was the second 
major contractor in the country (Dey, 2016). 
To gain more in-depth understanding of the public sector construction industry the 
manner in which public projects are funded need to be investigated and evaluated, 
particularly the process of payment for completed work as it has been found as the 
primary reason for poor performance (Althuniain, 2012; Almahmoud et al., 2012; Al‐
Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006). 
2.4.1.1 Contractors' financing mode: 
Access to credit is essential for a construction company to gain working capital, 
provide a financial guarantee to clients, and balance the cash flow curve 
(Palliyaguru et al., 2006). Similar to most services providers, a contractor provides 
services (part of the project) then will be paid for them. In the short term, a wide 
variety of financing options exist including overdraft facilities, loan facilities, trade 
credit, construction guarantee fund, and private sources. Among these, the familiar 
source of finance for unexpected cash flow deficits is bank overdrafts. 
For Saudi construction contractors, Islamic finance is the preferred source for 
financing (Jamal, 2009; Alriyadh Trading, 2014). All banks in Saudi Arabia provide 
financial services which include but are not limited to advance progress payments, 
progress payment certificates and short-term loans (Alfransi, 2018; Bank Albalad, 
2018; Riyadh Bank, 2018). According to Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) 
speaker, direct loans provided to contractors are 8% of the total Saudi bank 
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financing portfolio (USD 30 billion), and more than that if indirect loans (financial 
guarantee, …etc.) is included (Hafiz, 2016). Banks usually secure their loans 
against the assignment of proceeds, however, in the case of a severe delay by MoF 
paying contractors, which generally happens when there is a decrease in the oil 
price, banks stop financing contractors more new loans. Moreover, banks increase 
the risk ratio/category for the construction industry, resulting in a higher interest rate 
and reluctant to finance contractors (Habtoor, 2016; Al-Busaily, 2016). The 
consequences could be worse in the case of an unplanned capital incident; banks 
charge a higher interest percentage. 
2.4.2 Material: 
For the construction industry, the building materials sector is crucial. It serves as 
both a barometer of the broader health of the construction industry and as a critical 
factor in the bottom line of local contractors. This because materials are a primary 
component for construction projects (Gulghane and Khandve, 2015) through 
consuming typically between 50% to 70% of a project’s cost (Gulghane and 
Khandve, 2015; Patil and Pataskar, 2013). The price of material in a country affects 
building cost, for example, a building in Saudi Arabia costs 42% to 85% of the UK 
cost, with access and availability of building materials being key reasons of the 
difference (Colliers International, 2016). 
In Saudi Arabia, basic construction materials such as cement, steel, and paint are 
produced locally, and most of the electromechanical, IT, Safety, control systems are 
imported (EDRT, 2010; Alhzaha, 2013; Assaf et al., 2013). In their aim to stabilise 
and nationalise the construction materials market, the government provides direct 
financial support to local producers such as free-interest loans and subsidised fuel 
(OBG, 2018). Moreover, the government controls the construction materials’ 
importing and exporting limits in exchange for this financial support (Tomalieh, 
2015). For example, cement plants are not allowed to export their product outside 
the country unless they pay back the amount of difference in fuel price that was 
provided at a lower price by the government. 
The Saudi construction industry suffers from oversupply and undersupply of 
construction materials caused by the differences in the projects’ number over the 
years which linked to oil price as mentioned earlier. The supply fluctuation results in 
price fluctuations, for example, material costs increased by 12% from 2012 to 2014 
(oil price high) and decreased in demand since 2015 (oil price low) resulted in a 
17% reduction in cement price (OBG, 2015). 
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Although the Saudi government have regulations to stabilise material prices, these 
regulations affect the local basic materials, but the current development in projects’ 
design usually needs complex, advanced technology, and innovative construction 
materials which are mostly produced elsewhere. 
2.4.3 Labour: 
Labour play an essential role in the success of construction projects (Proverbs et 
al., 1999). Moreover, the construction industry workforce ranges from 6 to 14% of 
the total workforce (Figure 11) for a country, and providing an experienced 
workforce is an important factor for attracting direct foreign investments. In the case 
of Saudi Arabia, the top two problematic factors for doing business in the country 
are labour-related factors which are: inadequately educated workforce, and 
restrictive labour regulations (World Bank, 2016) which partly explains the difficulty 
of securing foreign investment. 
Saudi Arabia is a young and newly developed country which was founded in 1932. 
Since oil was first produced commercially, a significant portion of national income 
has been spent on building the country’s infrastructure. In the early days, there was 
a tiny percentage of skilled and educated locals, resulting in skilled workforce 
shortages to cope with the boom in construction activities. Dependency on foreign 
labour continues today and partly explains the large number of foreign workers in 
Saudi Arabia compared to other countries (Figure 9). Foreigners constitute more 
than half of the workforce and more than a third of the population, which is very 
high compared to other countries (see Figure 9). 
It worth highlighting that the majority of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia are male, 
with less than 30% female, which is a very high percentage compared to the UK or 
Saudi nationals (Figure 10). 
As Figure 11 shows, the construction industry in Saudi Arabia occupies 14% of the 
workforce which comes second after service industries (Assaf et al., 1996). The 
percentage is relatively high compared to the other countries, demonstrating the 
importance and the size of the construction industry in the Saudi context. Most 
construction workers, skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled, are imported from far 
Eastern and Middle Eastern countries; a process that takes almost six months 
(Donaghy, 2016). 
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Figure 9: Percentage of foreign workers in the population and labour force. 
Sources: (OECD, 2015a; OECD, 2015b; SAMA, 2015). 
 
Figure 10: Male and female percentages in the UK and Saudi Arabia. 
Sources: (CDSI, 2014; OECD, 2015a; OECD, 2015b). 
 
 
Figure 11: Distribution of employment by main economic activity in different 
countries (2014). 
Source: (ILO, 2015). 
 
For Saudis, the building and construction sector is the least attractive sector 
regarding employment (Alyom newspaper, 2011). Local workers constitute 10% of 
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the construction industry workforce (Figure 12), with one reason being the low 
salary offered by the private sector. Moreover, there is no minimum wage for 
expatriates in Saudi Arabia which makes it harder for Saudis to gain a position 
within the private sector in general and within the construction industry in particular 
(Ministry of Labor, 2005). 
Reliance on foreign labour is the standard feature of the private sector in Saudi 
Arabia; the construction industry is the only industry in which reliance on 
expatriates’ labour has never been less than 90% (Figure 12). The over-reliance 
and preference of the Saudi private sector for expatriates has been discussed by 
(Ramady, 2010), and he points out that factors such as cost, culture and control 
play significant roles. 
 
Figure 12: Expatriates percentage in different Saudi sector. 
Source: (SAMA, 2015). 
 
Moreover, statistics show that the private sector and the education system in Saudi 
Arabia are incompatible which contributes to the preference for expatriates. As 
Figure 13 shows, almost two-thirds of the labour force’s education in Saudi Arabia 
is at a low educated level, which is very high compared to the UK where only 29% 
of the workforce has a low level of education. By contrast, Figure 14 illustrates that 
universities annually produce a substantial number of graduates with a high level of 
education that are not employed by the private sector. 
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Figure 13: Labour force education in Saudi Arabia and the UK. 
Source: (OECD, 2015b; SAMA, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 14: Number of Saudi graduate students with different degrees between 
1995-2012. 
Sources: (SAMA, 2015). 
 
With 93% of jobs in the public sector occupied by Saudis, compared to 22% in the 
private sector, Saudis always prefer to work for the public sector (IMF, 2016a). One 
of the reasons is job security, which is prioritised over a high salary. Moreover, in 
general, salary, working hours, job requirements and description, and work 
conditions in the public sector are much better especially for the fresh employees, 
and an increase in wage is guaranteed yearly. Public sector wage policies reduce 
the incentive for individuals to look for private sector jobs or launch their own 
businesses. 
A report by the Ministry of Planning and Economy stressed that the private sector is 
unable to resolve the unemployment problem because the majority of the jobs it 
provides are unskilled and do not require a high level of education (MEP, 2010b). 
According to the report, this situation makes the replacement of foreign workers by 
national workers difficult as the majority of the national labour force is skilled labour, 
and most of the unemployed have a university degree. 
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Figure 13 and Figure 14 shows that the private sector focuses on cheap 
professional labour while most of the graduates are high-educated and the smallest 
are professional labour. The figures suggested the decision-makers should look 
more into the privates’ sector requirements and focus more on the professionals 
who will increase the value of the money that spent on the high-education which 
was confirmed by other studies (Al-Qarni, 1990; Al-Nemer, 1993; Al-Jabr, 1994). 
According to one of the studies that communication is missing between higher 
education institutions and the private sector (Jeffrey, 1997). 
In the construction industry, contracting companies are usually owned by Saudis, 
but most of the employees, from the top level to labour level, are imported from 
abroad; in 2013 alone, more than 432,000 work visas were issued for the 
construction and building sector (Figure 15) (CDSI, 2014). With 61% of the 
population who are in the working-age (15-64 years old), it must be pointed out that 
over-reliance of the private sector on expatriates has economic, social and political 
outcomes (Al-Dosary and Rahman, 2005). For example, the extent of Saudi 
unemployment has increased especially amongst young people and reached 11.7% 
(male) and 32.8% (female) in 2014 (Table 3). 
The employment situation has put pressure on government decision-makers to 
introduce the Saudization programme (translates in Arabic as “Nationalisation of the 
Saudi labour market”). According to Looney (2004), the Saudization program 
focusses on three primary goals: 
1. Increase employment for Saudi nationals.  
2. Reduce and reverse over-reliance on foreign workers.  
3. Recapture and reinvest foreign income that otherwise would have gone 
overseas. 
 
Figure 15: Work-Visas approved in 2013. 
Source: (CDSI, 2014). 
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11.7 Unemployment Rate for Citizens 
5.9 Male  
32.8 Female  
Table 3: Unemployment Rate for Citizens. 
Source: (CDSI, 2014). 
 
The programme will be a new challenge for contracting companies, especially the 
ones already involved with large projects. Such a significant replacement of the 
workforce in a company takes time. However, contractors were tasked to deal with 
the new situation over two years, and the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA) cancelled dozens of business licenses where entities failed to 
meet the Saudi hiring requirements (The Economist, 2014), and has delayed 
issuing residency visa requests for businesses to obtain employees from other 
countries (US Department of State, 2015). Another problem that could hit the 
construction industry is poor labour productivity. Figures show that construction 
labour could not cope with increased complexity and innovation (Khan et al., 2013). 
The lack of trust and socio-economic changes among workers has been identified 
for reasons for the decrease in labour productivity (Radosavljević and Horner, 
2002). 
In short, expatriates occupy more than 90% of the construction industry jobs, which 
is a very high percentage as the industry failed to reduce this rate and replace them 
by locals. The over-reliance on expatriates will be a new challenge for all Saudi 
contractors in terms of the new nationalisation scheme. Foreigner labours' 
regulation, law, and enforcing them are all very changeable and hardly predictable. 
The Saudi government are affected by the situation where a good number of young 
Saudis are unemployed in a country where 1/3 of its population are foreigners. 
2.4.4 Plant: 
The third important component of project resources is construction plant. To 
achieve project goals (finish on time and reach high-quality standards with an 
effective cost), mechanisation of previously manual work needs to be done. This 
highlights the importance of plant (the machinery and equipment used in 
construction) (DBW, 2018). Construction machinery is not cheap and is normally 
considered as a major component of a construction company’s assets. The cost of 
equipment constitutes a significant investment for most construction contractors in 
Saudi Arabia (Shash, 2012). Maintaining heavy machinery is also expensive, so 
hiring plant is an option but mainly for light use task-specific machinery. In the UK, 
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for example, plant hire is well established and worth over £4 billion, while the Saudi 
machine hire market has annual revenue of USD 66 million, so is not significant as 
in the UK, partly as Saudi contractors own 83% of the machinery required (Shash, 
2012). Because of the shortage of a permanent labour force in Saudi Arabia, 
construction equipment is used to the maximum possible extent. 
The country’s harsh weather can result in damage to machinery, and this should be 
considered as part of the maintaining of the plant, with its associated risks. If the 
equipment was to fail during a project, the firm could face heavy financial losses, 
delayed schedules, and additional funds would be required to either quickly repair 
the equipment or purchase a new one. 
In a Saudi construction project, the equipment cost ranges from 10 to 12 % of the 
project cost. In addition, a skilful operator is needed to get the full optimisation of 
that machine. Small mistakes by the operator could cause damage leading to 
financial loss. A good example is the carne crash in Makkah city that killed 111 and 
injured 394 pilgrims in 2015 (BBC, 2015). The incident led to the suspension of all 
the company contracts with the government which was worth billions as the 
company was the most prominent contractor in the country and held most of the 
major project contracts (Reuters, 2015). 
Despite the importance of construction machinery in the country, the researcher 
faced insufficient numbers of studies covering construction plant in Saudi Arabia. 
2.5 Saudi Public Projects: 
The Saudi public sector is that part of the country’s economy owned and supported 
financially by the Saudi government. Thus, Saudi public construction projects are 
those owned and supported financially by the Saudi government. The public usually 
has high expectations of the output of “their” public projects, resulting in high 
pressure to finish on time and within budget cost. 
Saudi Arabia’s government takes the responsibility to provide free infrastructure for 
the citizens based on 5 year development plans that started in 1970 (MEP, 2010a; 
MEP, 2015; MEP, 2005; MEP, 2000; MEP, 1995; MEP, 1990; MEP, 1985; MEP, 
1980; MEP, 1975; MEP, 1970). Switching this responsibility to the private sector 
has been seen by the public as “selling the country” (Biygautane et al., 2018). 
Despite the downturn of the Saudi economy in some periods, the government has 
continued its obligation to provide the required infrastructure (Dew, 2003). 
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The effect of oil prices on the construction industry became more pronounced 
between 2004 and 2015. During this period, the average oil price rose dramatically 
from almost USD 34 per barrel to reach just over USD 110 per barrel. At the same 
time, the Saudi economy started benefiting from increased total income; USD 250 
billion in 2004 to a new income peak in Saudi history in 2013 with almost USD 750 
billion. Focusing on this period, Figure 16 shows the total approved budget by the 
government of Saudi Arabia quintupled from USD 10 billion in 2004 to reach its 
peak in 2010 with almost USD 50 billion. 
 
Figure 16: A comparison of the total approved budget for construction projects with 
the avg. Oil barrel price between 2004 and 2013. 
Source: (MOF, 2005; MOF, 2006; MOF, 2007; MOF, 2008; MOF, 2009; MOF, 
2010; MOF, 2011; MOF, 2012; MOF, 2013). 
2.6 Regulation and Project Development: 
The regulations and laws applied to the Saudi public construction project are shown 
in Figure 17. The higher ranking in the pyramid should not conflict with the lower 
one. According to Article 1 in the Government Tenders and Procurement Law 
(STPL), the law aims to regulate procedures of “tenders and procurements carried 
out by government authorities”. Moreover, Article 6 cited that “all government works 
and procurements shall be put up for public tender” under the STPL regulations and 
procedures, “except those exempted under the provisions of this Law” (Royal-
Decree-No.M/58, 2006; BECM, 2009). However, applying the below law pyramid is 
not always the case for public construction projects, some of the public projects are 
exempt from the STPL and PWC which should be delegated by Royal Decrees. 
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Figure 17: Regulation order from general to specific. 
 
In the case of an exemption, the governmental laws and regulations, such as STPL 
and PWC, are not applied, and affected projects are usually undertaken by leading 
international contractors who do not accept the current projects’ procurement and 
risk apportioning. The exemption could be in response to public pressure, such as 
when the Jeddah flooding crises resulted in 83 dead (Ghabiri, 2017). The 
government has spent billions on anti-flooding systems in the city that seem not to 
be working, with one result being the opening of corruption investigation cases and 
arresting of hundreds of previous officials. Several Royal orders followed the crisis, 
instructing Saudi Aramco (an oil company owned by the government) to construct 
the flooding system for Jeddah city. Also, other projects have followed such as King 
Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), King Abdullah Petroleum 
Studies and Research Centre (KAPSARC), and King Abdullah Sports City (KASC) 
(Dahlan, 2014).  
Another trigger for exemption is to attract world-class contractors required for 
complex high-tech projects, which have been found to do a better job compared to 
the local competition (Medallah, 2015; Al-Otaibi and Nawab, 2016) such as in the 
railway projects constructed using the Engineering-Procurement-Construction 
(EPC) procurement vehicle.  
The third trigger for exemption has been introduced recently and is attracting the 
private sector direct investment using different of delivering methods such as PPP 
and BOT. This is supported by Biygautane (2017b) who argues that a new 
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procurement method involving a third party, such as the private sector, should be 
used more in Saudi Arabia as it benefits the country through: 
1. overcoming large financing project that government cannot support anymore, 
especially with the low oil price (overcoming a government’s financial 
constraints),  
2. overcoming the lack of owner experience with complex projects,  
3. avoiding the problem of cost overrun and delay (Hodge and Greve, 2005). 
Figure 18 and Table 4 show that Saudi public construction projects are using 
different types of contracts during their project lifecycle, but the awarding method is 
still the same - lowest price wins. Moreover, the contracts that are used between 
Saudi public agencies and each of designer, consultant, and contractor, are 
contracts of adhesion (“take it or leave it") that gives the designer, consultant, and 
contractor no ability to negotiate (Council of Ministers, 1988). The project will hand 
over to the client after the construction project is finished. 
 
Figure 18: Contract and procurement laws used for each stakeholder. 
 
Although the government has used different types of delivering methods, such as 
PPP and BOT, these are not the norms according to the law and need approval by 
the highest authority. Thus, the focus of the study will include projects appointed 
under normal circumstances, which means using the STPL and PWC. As the scope 
of the study includes focusing on construction projects in the Saudi public sector 
and contractors’ cost performance, the regulation that is used for appointing the 
contractors will be investigated further. 
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Between And Contract name Tender Form 
Awarding 
Method 
Public 
Agencies 
Designer 
Consulting 
engineering services 
contract (Design) 
(CESC Design) 
Close/Selective 
Tender 
According 
to the 
STPL 
Lowest 
Price 
Consultant 
Consulting 
engineering services 
contract 
(Supervision) (CESC 
Supervision) 
Close/Selective 
Tender 
Main 
contractor 
Public Work Contract 
(PWC) 
Open Tender 
Sub-
Contractor 
N/A 
N/A N/A 
Table 4: Type of contracts in Saudi Public Sector. 
Source: (Council of Ministers Decision No. (259), 2011). 
 
Although studies investigating the Saudi public projects performance have identified 
that the procurement regulations lead to poor performance, the why and how 
questions have never been addressed. Thus, the STPL and PWC limitations need 
to be identified, and the path that could lead to poor performance be explored. The 
research will face a limitation regarding the number of publications that discuss 
PWC conditions, which results in using primary data. To create more value during 
the evaluation, an investigation and comparison between the current PWC and 
FIDIC building and engineering works, designed by the employer (Red book) and 
what hinders implementing FIDIC. This is because there is a widespread belief in 
the Saudi construction industry that applying FIDIC is going to solve three-quarters 
of the issues related to the Saudi public sectors performance. Nevertheless, STPL 
shows that public projects are adopting a traditional procurement strategy. 
However, it is not clear how a public project is developed and what are the phases 
in their project lifecycle. Thus, the project development strategy needs investigation. 
2.6.1 Performance: 
Some studies claim that nine out of ten projects are suffering from poor 
performance (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a) and the Saudi construction sector, which is 
the most significant construction industry in the region (EDRT, 2010), is not out of 
the norm and suffers from serious problems leading to poor performance 
(Almahmoud et al., 2012; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006; Falqi, 2004). Cost and time 
performance is considered to be one of the most severe and frequent problems in 
the Saudi Arabian construction industry (Faridi and El‐Sayegh, 2006). 
Some websites have been monitoring public project performance (in specific areas) 
such as Medina area (MDA, 2017) and Jeddah (3adad.net, 2015). However, the 
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websites’ data at the time of writing are outdated so their performance data cannot 
be used. In this respect, several local studies have cited that over the four decades, 
public projects suffered from frequent and lengthy delays. In the 80s, two studies by 
Zain Al-Abidien (1983) and Al-Sultan (1987) studied different types of projects and 
mentioned that 70% of public projects are delayed. 76 water and sewage projects, 
which were built in the late 80s and early 90s, have been studied by Al-Khalil and 
Al-Ghafly (1999), who found 60% of them were delayed. In 2004, a study reported 
that 952 (40%) out of 2379 projects in Saudi Arabia were delayed (Falqi, 2004). 
Poor time performance continued, as a study in 2006 found that only 30% of 
construction projects in Saudi Arabia were completed within the specified cost and 
schedule (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006). Saudi construction projects built between 1992 
and 2009 scored little success, as 82% failed to meet their baseline time, cost and 
quality objectives with an average cost overrun of 40% (KPMG, 2010), and only 
25% of Saudi infrastructure projects were delivered at the estimated cost and time, 
according to Alguwaihes (2011). The Saudi national anti-corruption commission 
(2013) updated these figures and painted a worse picture: in 2013 over 3000 Saudi 
public projects were delayed. 
For cost overrun, comparing to delay, data about the cost overrun in Saudi public 
projects are insufficient, which is likely for privacy-related reasons as finance data 
are ordinarily sensitive for public and private sectors. However, newspaper and 
government reports mentioned that Saudi infrastructure projects are not immune 
from cost overruns. Studies reported that 41%-50% of infrastructure projects in 
Saudi Arabia overrun their budget (Althunian, 2010; Alguwaihes, 2011). Although 
the causes of cost overrun have not been studied thoroughly for the Saudi 
construction projects, Al-Khaldi (1990) examined factors contributing to poor cost 
estimation, and Bubshait and Al-Juwairah (2002) studied causes contributing to 
construction costs.  
Such poor performance has harsh consequences on the projects and all parties 
involved; project delay is considered to be one of the most severe and frequent 
problems in the Saudi Arabian construction industry (Faridi and El‐Sayegh, 2006). 
The consequences that result are beyond project failures and escalating costs 
which was reported by different authors (Al‐Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009; Fahad et 
al., 2012; Almajed and Mayhew, 2013; Ali et al., 2013). Besides the financial loss, 
other negative impacts of delay in the public sector are: confusion regarding public 
development plans; disturbance of the budget execution plan of the government 
authority involved, and public inconvenience. From the contractor’s viewpoint, delay 
merely is an additional liability as the construction period becomes longer; the more 
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extended period results in higher overhead costs and expenses; the entire 
contractor’s working capital may become trapped in one project. Delays also mean 
a loss of output and revenues, since the contractor cannot become involved in other 
projects (O'Brien et al., 2004). 
Assaf et al. (1995) identified and ranked the causes of delay in Saudi building 
projects. Out of the 56 causes, the financing causes score the highest, and 
environmental causes score the lowest. According to the contractors, preparation 
and approval of shop drawings, delays in contractors' progress payment by owners, 
and design changes by owners are the most important causes for delay. A study by 
Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly (1999) followed and identified the most important causes for 
the delay as: delay in payment for the client; financial difficulties by the contractors; 
difficulties in obtaining permits; and selecting the lowest bidder regardless of 
capabilities. Answering the question of who is responsible for the project delay, 
owners and consultants blame the contractor, and the latter blame the owner. 
Another study by Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006) identified the causes of delay in Saudi 
construction projects from different point views. As with the previous study, the 
results show the exchange of accusations between project parties. Owners 
specified that causes of delay are related to contractor and labours. The contractors 
on the other hand score owner-related causes the highest. 
Lately, a study by Al‐Kharashi and Skitmore (2009) summarised the causes of 
delay which are: lack of qualified and skilled staff; lack of coordination; 
communication gaps between contractor and designer; shortage of human 
resources in the design firms; lack of knowledge of the designers about the 
available materials and equipment; insufficient details in the working drawings, and 
incomplete drawings and specifications. It could be concluded that the most 
influential cause of delay in the Saudi Public Construction Sector is the lack of 
experts and qualified team members, especially those who can deal with developed 
portfolios (Al-Nuaim, 2011; Al‐Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009). 
Research in the previous studies used a survey research method to identify leading 
causes and measuring. One feature that is shared by Saudi public project 
performance studies is the disagreement between the primary stakeholders of the 
main poor performance causes as well as who is responsible. This could be a result 
of industry and national cultures, unclear contract boundaries and responsibilities, 
lack of experience of all parties, unclear identification of the phenomena and form 
which party’s point view, and the lack of a single system of measurement (Aziz, 
2013b). Such features could raise questions regarding the quality outputs as well as 
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benefits of investigating poor performance causes from different points of view if the 
disagreement is always appearing. Moreover, to decrease the effect of 
disagreement between the parties, it is appropriate to identify the system of 
measurement of progress or quality of work and compares it to the modern 
management methods so as to measure the range of intangible issues involved. 
To overcome the performance issue conferences, symposiums, and workshops 
about defaulted projects were held in Saudi Arabia. Although there was no clear 
definition of defaulted projects by the government and how they differ from delayed 
projects (Hanfi, 2012), a study by Brahmin (2012) shows that 13% of Saudi projects 
are defaulted projects. Improvements have been suggested, such as by Zain Al-
Abidien (1983) that different parties should work as a team to improve the 
regulations and contract. 
Considering the above, the majority of public projects in Saudi Arabia suffer from 
severe delay. For over 30 years, the portion of public projects suffering poor 
performance stayed the same, possibly indicating that the problem is rooted within 
the system, regulation, and method of public projects delivery. This is supported by 
the fact that regulation has not changed during those 30 years.  
Although some of the studies show that problems are accrued during the project 
development, it is not clear how a public project is developed, and what are the 
main triggers for these problems. Thus, an in-depth investigation within the project 
lifecycle is needed. Saudi Contractors’ performance will be discussed in section 
2.7.2. 
2.7 Contractors in the Saudi construction industry: 
In Saudi Arabia, contractors engage in public construction projects after the detailed 
design is finished. During the tender stage, contractors purchase tender 
documents, price BOQs, and the main contractor will be chosen based on the 
lowest price. Because of the high uncertainty nature of construction projects, main 
contractors face risks that could affect time and cost (Alfredo del and Cruz, 2002). 
Moreover, choosing a project’s contractors based on lowest price maximises the 
nature of risks in the industry (Creedy et al., 2010a) as the construction industry is 
generally more competitive than most other economic sectors (Enshassi et al., 
2006). Nevertheless, the country’s economy also increases the cost situation for 
contractors as it is affected by oil price shocks resulting in the construction industry 
have a boom-bust cycle (Table 5), as shown by the Saudi construction industry 
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during 2004 to 2014 when the oil price significantly increased. A boom in the Saudi 
construction industry is created and supported by a high oil price and the 
government’s subsequent approval for hundreds of infrastructure projects (Al-
Sedairy, 2001; Shash and Al-Amir, 1997). Simultaneously, the annual statistical 
reports show that the number of contractors doubled over the same period (Figure 
19). The rapid increase in contractors’ number is a sign of the urgent need for 
contractors, and there is a high demand for construction works that potentially 
makes the construction industry more profitable. 
A bust in the construction industry is typically followed a boom, such as those in 
1982 and 2014, which was resulted from the decrease in oil price and government 
cuts in construction projects (Shash and Al-Amir, 1997). Cutting or reducing 
spending on construction projects is the usual response taken by the Saudi 
government as most of the new income will be barely enough to spend on public 
employees’ wages and essentials as well as the regulation supporting such action. 
At this period, contractor companies start to show losses in their annual statements, 
such as for the Al-Khodari company (Alkhodari, 2011; Alkhodari, 2012; Alkhodari, 
2013; Alkhodari, 2014; Alkhodari, 2015; Alkhodari, 2016). With a high number of 
contractors and the small amount of work available, the Saudi construction 
environment becomes very competitive and less profitable, pushing contractors 
towards suicide bidding for survival (Al-Harbi et al., 1994; Shash and Zamel, 1993). 
As a result, small and medium contractors are more likely to announce bankruptcy 
within five years of starting the business (Grosskopf, 2004). 
Contractors who start and complete a project within a boom or bust phase can 
usually predict the types of problems they might face. However, it is not unusual 
that contractors submit their bid in one phase and construct the project in another 
phase. In such circumstances, contractors are more likely to face issues that did not 
exist in the industry when they made their estimation. To illustrate the differences 
between the two economic phases, Table 5 shows some aspects, characteristics, 
and risks that exist in each phase. For example, contractors who start their projects 
before an oil boom and construct part of the projects at the boom phase will face an 
increase in resources prices (material, labour, etc.) which could reduce the 
contractors’ profitability or lead to cost overrun. Although there are benefits that 
could appear in that situation those benefits do not cover the losses. To illustrate, 
contractors who start their project during the boom phase and construct their 
projects at the bust phase benefit from the low resources prices, however, the 
losses because of the payment delay overcome the benefits of low prices for 
resources (Al-Khudari, 2016). 
51 
 
Figure 19: Existing Commercial Register of contractors between 2004 and 2013. 
Source: (CDSI, 2014). 
 
Saudi contractors usually work only within the country and most likely within the 
public sector. This phenomenon is a result of there being an acceptable amount of 
work generally in the country as well as a Saudi contractor normally growing up 
under parental care from the state and government concessions (Abbas, 2016). For 
example, government regulation prefers local contractors and products over non-
local and, as a result, the experience that Saudi contractors gained is limited as 
they are not exposed to the external environment and therefore cannot mitigate the 
uniqueness of the Saudi construction industry where they usually work in by 
becoming familiar with other types of contracts. Thus, this diminishes their ability to 
compete outside their geographical area and means they rely on themselves 
(Abbas, 2016). Experts criticised the dependency of Saudi contractors on the 
country and their susceptibility to unexpected risks if they want to develop and grow 
to stay in the market (Bhatia, 2016). 
In general, the construction industry is behind other industries in using accepted 
approaches to assess and manage risks (Mulholland and Christian, 1999). 
Contractors rarely rely on statistical techniques and tools to make decisions that are 
risk-related, instead of individual knowledge and experience, and intuitive 
judgement is normally used by contractors. Such an approach has been found 
lacking by being neither prescriptive nor normative (Laryea and Hughes, 2009). 
Saudi contractors are not different from the norm, and the lack of use for modern 
risk assessment methods is accompanied by the lack of a sold data bank. 
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Transferring risks to insurance companies is not a popular option in Saudi Arabia, 
as the Saudi based insurance company is not providing options to the local 
contractors. The government as well seems not in favour of that option as is not 
enforcing insurance requirements to the Saudi contractors. According to Medallah 
(2015), the lack of legal regulation and technical ability are the main reasons behind 
the insurance companies not providing many options for contractors. Thus, 
contractors add risks generally to the price which could be challenged in a highly 
competitive environment. 
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Characteristics Boom (Oil price high) Bust After Boom (Oil price low) 
Country emphasis Government focus Focus on new building contracts. Focus on operation and maintenance contracts. 
Regulation implied 
Enforcement of existing laws 
Easier on enforcement of laws. Insist on enforcement laws such as competitive 
tendering (lowest price). 
Contractor financing Large advance payments provided by the 
government. Up to 20%. 
Less dependent on commercial banks. 
 
Small or no. up to 5%. Against financial guarantee. 
No financial assistance resulting in short-term 
loans with fee-bearing loans provided by 
commercial banks. 
Contractors 
Works availability 
Operating at full capacity Operating at low capacity 
Owner financial capability A significant portion of the annual budget on 
new buildings. 
Deferment / Cancelled / Suspended new projects. 
Payment No payments delay Payments delay 
Project consideration 
Process 
Lack of thoroughly planning. 
No consideration to life-cycle cost (operation 
and maintenance cost), the quality, and 
standards that fit the local environment. 
The design phase is less rush resulting in 
consideration to life-cycle cost (operation and 
maintenance cost), the quality, and standards that 
fit the local environment. 
Return on Investment (ROI) for 
contractor and Profit margins 
Due to the low competition: high ROIs and high-
profit margins. 
Due to the high competition: low ROIs and low-
profit margins. 
Trust Moderate trust environment Low trust environment 
Environment Contractor-friendly 
Enough projects for most contractors 
Aggressive competition among contractors (the 
purpose of survival and profitability). 
Resources (Material, Labour, and 
Equipment) 
High competition on resources by contractors. 
Low availability and high prices. 
No competition on resources by contractors. 
High availability and low prices. 
Fund Availability High because of high advance payment and 
payment on time 
Low because of no advance payment and 
payment delay. 
Access to loans High, banks consider the construction industry 
is not high risk 
Low, banks consider the construction industry is 
high risk 
Government expertise  Very low due to the construction boom. Very high to construction bust. 
Labour 
Skilled labour Availability/Price 
Low availability 
High prices (Higher wages). 
High availability 
Low prices (lowering wages). 
Table 5: Boom- Bust cycle characteristics. 
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2.7.1 Contractors' Cost Estimation: 
The client’s financial capacity has been found to be the most important factor 
affecting a Saudi contractors' decision to bid or not on a project (Bageis and 
Fortune, 2009) which could partly explain why contractors' still working with the 
government despite the harsh contract terms and payment delay. However, the 
study by Bageis and Fortune (2009) shows that the rest of other factors that affects 
bid/no bid decision differs depending on the contractors' size, classification status of 
the contractor and the primary client type. 
In a Saudi public project, a contractor's bid is the accumulation of items provided in 
the project’s BOQ, with a contractor estimating a unit price for each item. The total 
cost of each item is the multiplication of an items' unit price and some units (Table 
6). 
Item 
(Items’ specification and 
description) 
Number of 
Units 
(Provided by 
Owner) 
Unit Price 
(Provided by 
Contractor) 
Total Price 
(No. of item * Unit 
Price) 
Item 1 Integer 
number 
In SAR In SAR 
Item 2    
Item N    
    
Total Bid   In SAR 
Table 6: Contractors’ cost estimation contents. 
 
For contractors, cost estimating is the process of estimating the cost of resources 
needed to finish a project according to its plans and specifications (Yum, 2007). 
Contractors normally reach their estimation by accumulating base price, overhead, 
markup and contingency, and profit. Function-based cost estimating is an important 
element in the contractors bidding process, and provides a basis for the contractor 
to submit a tender price for a project (Akintoye and Fitzgerald, 2000). Base price is 
the cost of an item without including other surcharges such as an administering cost 
which includes the provision of general plant, site staff and site-based services. To 
mitigate projects’ risks and uncertainty, contractors add a contingency as the third 
component of the bid price. 
In competitive bid environments (contractors chose based on lowest price), such as 
Saudi Arabia, a contractor's estimation needs to be low enough to allow the 
contractor to become the lowest bidder and profitable at the same time (Kim et al., 
2008). In coping with this dilemma, the contractor will normally ensure that an 
appropriate cost estimate is determined with a fair markup. However, winning a 
project bid under such conditions is very difficult. Including the cost of all likely risk 
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events in the tender will take contractors out of the competition. Thus, it is not 
unusual for contractors to underestimate their bid price to win the competition 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). Beside tough competition, estimators are facing other 
issues such as unclear contract period, incomplete drawings and specifications, 
incomplete project scope definition, and unforeseeable change in material prices 
(Enshassi et al., 2005; T. et al., 2018). During the boom periods, it has been found 
that for Saudi contractors, providing detailed cost estimating is less critical 
compared to bust periods, as the high bid mark-up protects them against sensible 
estimate errors and misjudgements (Al-Harbi et al., 1994). 
Although an item base price is the main component of accurate estimation, 
neglecting other surcharges could lead contractors out of business. Thus, an 
accurate estimation of a bid's markup, contingency, and overhead are essential for 
any contractors as they serve as a profit centre for the contractor (Chan and 
Pasquire, 2002). Contractors usually calculate markup cost and contingency costs 
relying on their experience and as a percentage of the base project cost. This does 
not reflect the possible ranges of cost variations in cost estimation (Molenaar, 2005; 
Nabil and El-Riyati, 2015). Furthermore, the unstable construction environment 
contributes to the difficulty that a contractor faces when deciding on the optimum 
level of these costs. However, different factors could define this percentage, such 
as payment regularity, number of on-going projects, inflation and regulation. This 
could explain why, in Saudi Arabia, contractors' markup and contingency (greater 
than 10%) are slightly higher compared to other countries (Assaf et al., 2001). 
2.7.2 Contractors’ performance: 
For Saudi contractors, profitability is the most important factor that measures 
contractors’ performance (Ali et al., 2013). In any construction industry, 
irresponsible and unqualified contractors are part of the industry. However, in 
Saudi’s construction industry, the number of them could be higher, with one of the 
main reasons being that becoming a contractor is so easy with minimal financial 
requirements and no technical qualification or experience required, which could 
explain why less than 1% of contractors are classified. The absence of owners' 
evaluating of contractors whom they are going to work with, rather than choosing 
contractors on the lowest price, is another reason for poor contractor performance 
(Brahmin, 2012; Hanfi, 2012). 
Mosley and Bubshait (2015) compared cost growth between local and international 
contractors in Saudi’s construction industry and found that performance varies with 
project size. In projects costing less than USD 15 million, local contractors 
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performed better by almost 3%, whereas in medium projects costing between USD 
15-50 million both contractors performed almost the same, and in over USD 50 
million projects international contractors performed 50% better compared to local 
contractors. Such a difference could be related to the low number of international 
contractors who are involved in small and medium contractor because of the level 
of competition. Lack of experience among local contractors could be another 
reason for the poor performance in large projects which are normally unique and 
complex. The study also shows that although the Saudi construction environment is 
unique, international contractors have delivered projects successfully. 
Causes behind Saudi contractors' poor performance have been studied by Mosley 
and Bubshait (2015) who found that causes are more related to: management, poor 
cash flow, poor accounting systems and records, difficulties in attracting good 
personnel, dependency on a very limited customer base and lack of effective 
business plans. Similar results have been found by prior studies (Al-Barrak, 1993) 
and (Kivrak and Arslan, 2008). 
2.8 Summary of literature review: 
The Chapter highlighted and investigated the cost overrun issue and its causes. 
The literature shows that although the cost overrun has been investigated for over 
30 years, the problem still exists. The research also highlighted that the current 
causes identification studies and articulated some of their general limitations. Based 
on that the research suggested to include the effects of the contexts that a 
construction project developed in (External Environment) and the process of 
developing a construction project which was neglected in the previous studies. 
Although the construction industry considers being the second largest industry in 
Saudi Arabia financially after oil and the number of projects that are approved every 
year, the construction industry faces challenges in the Saudi public sector. 
Construction projects' performance in the Saudi public sector is inadequate. 
Research shows that 70% of the projects are delayed. 
As the Saudi public sector is context of this study and guided by the four profiles 
(lenses) – Business, Economic, Laws and Regulation, and Resources -, this 
chapter also investigated and evaluated the Saudi public sector as a context of 
construction projects development and their effects on the construction industry in 
general and the contractor in specific. Moreover, and because of the limitation of 
the literature, the chapter also identified the gaps in these four profiles which need 
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more investigation and their effects also need more investigation. This is a 
fundamental requirement for the new approach of investigating the causes of cost 
overrun. The literature shows that the Saudi public projects' poor performance 
seems to be a tag and not improved over the years. Although the contractors' 
capacity and capability have improved over the years as a result of the thousands 
of projects that they have been involved in, almost 70% of the projects are delivered 
delayed causing contractors' cost overrun. 
Moreover, illustrating and evaluating the process and steps that are used to 
develop a construction project is another fundamental reequipment for the new way 
to investigate the cost. Bothe investigation will illustrate the weakness in the context 
and the process which generally are the trigger for, contribute to, or/and leading to 
a cause of contractors’ cost overrun. 
Understanding the contractors' cost overrun in the Saudi public construction 
industry could also provide insights into other studies in another context similar to 
Saudi Arabia. The research will enrich the cost overrun and Saudi construction 
literature. However, the currently limited literature means investigating the limitation 
of the Saudi public context. Moreover, besides the benefits that contractors will gain 
from exploring the contractors’ cost overrun causes, the public sector will also 
benefit from such research. Reducing the number of abandoned projects is one of 
the examples of an area in which the public sector will benefit. As it has been found 
that one of the leading causes for projects abandoned in a study by Mac-Baranga 
(2017) is the bankruptcy of contractors, which is a result of cost increased from the 
contractor side. 
Based on this literature, the following gaps have been identified: 
- The current cost overrun causes literature need to be evaluated, and the 
primary schools of thoughts need to be articulated. 
- Cost overrun causes have been investigated for over 30 years of research, 
however, the problem still existing which suggesting that: first, the current 
literature does not articulate and investigate the cost overrun causes 
properly, second, the global findings of an investigation of the cost overrun 
cannot be used of specific country, and third, further research is needed to 
alleviate and avoid cost overrun causes.  
- A rethinking of the method of the identification of the causes of cost overrun 
id needed to overcome the current investigation of the causes of cost 
overrun such as: 
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o Methodology: move from listing individual (standalone) causes list 
and ranking to develop. Identifying and measuring the effect of 
individual causes are not reflecting the reality, which leads to 
inadequate assessing and managing causes leading to cost overrun. 
o Context: the lack of including the effect of the context, and the 
process of developing the project during the identification of cost 
overrun. 
o Stakeholders: cost overrun problem commonly investigated from the 
owner viewpoints instead from other stakeholders such as 
contractor. 
- To include the effect of the context and the process of developing the 
construction project, an investigation and deep understanding of the context 
and process is needed. 
- The Saudi public sector and its effect on contractors' performance have 
been investigated neither understood. 
- The process of developing a construction project in the Saudi public sector 
and its effect on contractors' performance have not been investigated. 
- The lack of a developed model that illustrates the complexity and dynamic 
connection between those causes and cost overrun. 
As the gaps have been identified the need for a new way into investigating the 
contractors’ cost overrun and its causes, the next chapter will illustrate, discuss, 
and justify the research methodology that has been adopted for this research. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology: 
3.1  Introduction: 
In this chapter the research methods used to achieve the stated aims and objectives 
are discussed, justified, and presented. This includes research methods in 
construction projects in general, research philosophies, strategies, techniques and 
the procedure for data collection, research time horizon, research validity and 
reliability, and relevant research ethics. 
3.2 Research and research methodology: 
Research has been defined as a systematic technique of knowledge-finding that 
aims to answer questions and explore an issue and its practice (Tayie, 2005). 
Therefore, any research should focus on problems needing to be solved, 
knowledge and conclusions that can be reached, and how the research is to be 
conducted (the methodologies) (Fellows and Liu, 2015). Research methods is 
therefore defined as a combination of techniques which are used to investigate 
the research problem as well as reach a conclusion (Easterby-Smith et al., 2018). 
To provide the best outputs, research needs to be guided by systematically 
designed processes that feed into each other (Yilmaz, 2013) which mainly 
depend on selecting the most appropriate research methods. 
To achieve the aim of the research and to provide solid and high-quality 
research outputs, choosing an appropriate research method(s) is fundamental, 
and this requires a suitable research processes design. According to Frankfort-
Nachmias et al. (2014), research design is considered as a roadmap for 
researchers that guides them in the process of collecting, analysing, and 
interpreting their research data and allows them, in most cases, to build 
inferences and causal relations among variables under investigation. Yin (2009) 
described it as a logical model which links research questions to the data that 
needs to be collected and ultimately to the research conclusion by identifying 
research questions and relevant data, informing data collection and data 
analysing mechanisms, and collecting and analysing the data to reach 
conclusions. 
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A number of research frameworks that could be followed to achieve the 
research aim and objectives include the nested model by Kagioglou et al. (1998) 
and the research onion by Saunders et al. (2009). In this research, the research 
onion (Figure 20) is most relevant and comprises the following layers: research 
philosophy, research approach, research strategy, research strategy choice, 
research time horizons and finally research techniques and procedures, where 
each step feeds into the next one. In this research, the same order will be used 
to clarify how the research questions will be answered. Saunders et al. (2009) 
framework has been chosen as it provides comprehensive instruction regarding 
research design and is a popular framework for construction projects 
management research. 
To follow the same steps and with the research problem explained in chapter 
one, the following section provides a justification for the chosen research 
philosophy. 
 
Figure 20: Research Onion. 
Source: (Saunders et al., 2009). 
3.3 Research Philosophy: 
Selecting the appropriate research philosophy is essential for any study as the way 
of looking into reality, and the nature of the problem should guide the research 
methods (Johnson and Clark, 2006). In other words, a research philosophy dictates 
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the relationship between a researcher and the research problem (Bryman, 1988) 
and will help clarify research designs and the making of best decisions about the 
research approach, strategy, data collection techniques and procedures to achieve 
the research aim and objectives. According to Saunders et al. (2009), different 
research philosophies comprise assumptions about the way that the researcher 
sees the world, including: 
• the nature of reality, being and truth (ontology), how it can be understood 
(epistemology), 
• the role of values in the enquiry (axiology), and  
• the process that will be used for studying it (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
Thus, initially, relevant terminology needs to be clarified. 
Terminology Explanation 
Ontology Ontology is a part of the research philosophy that concerns about 
the of nature reality (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). The 
research objectives have a significant effect on choosing the 
reality form. The school of the thought that is adopted by a 
researcher has profound effects on any knowledge created from 
the research. Researchers are divided about nature reality into 
two main schools of thoughts. There are the objectivists who 
recognise the reality as it is driven by unchallengeable natural 
laws, on the other hand, there are the subjectivists who recognise 
the reality is driven by the actions and interactions of social 
actors. 
Epistemology Epistemology is a part of the research philosophy that concerns 
about whether and how valid contribution knowledge about reality 
is achieved (Bryman, 2012; Scheurich, 1997; Willis, 2007; Lincoln 
and Guba, 2000; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). There are two 
main views about epistemology which are: positivist and 
interpretivist. For positivism researchers, the reality is illustrated 
by objects that are considered to be “real”, for instance, the 
following objects considered to be real objects: computers and 
machines. 
Interpretivism describes the social phenomena as they have “no 
external reality”, in their point view they cannot be seen, 
measured or modified like other objects such as computers and 
machines. They believe that the social world of business and 
management is far too complex to lend itself to theorising by 
definite ‘laws’ in the same way as the physical sciences. 
Axiology Axiology is the part of research philosophy which is related to 
how researchers see the value. Research could be value-free or 
value-laden research. In value-free research, the researcher 
and/or the research's respondent's feelings and past experiences 
have no contribution to the research (Hill, 1984). In value-laden 
research, the researcher and/or the research's respondent's 
feelings and past experiences have contributions to the research. 
Table 7: Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology explanations. 
Sources: (Runeson and Skitmore, 2008; Saunders et al., 2009; Halloway, 1997; 
Khazanchi and Munkvold, 2003; Bryman, 2012; Scheurich, 1997; Willis, 2007; 
Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
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As Table 8 shows, three philosophical schools of thought have been identified; 
positivistic, post-positivistic (relativistic), and constructivist. In the next section, the 
research will select the research philosophy for each objective. 
 Positivism/ post-
positivism 
(relativism) 
Interpretivism/ 
constructivism 
Pragmatism 
Ontology: the 
researcher’s view 
of the nature of 
reality or being 
External and 
objective 
(independent of 
social actors). 
Socially 
constructed, 
subjective, multiple 
Diverse viewpoints 
regarding reality. 
(Chosen to enable 
answering of research 
question best). 
Epistemology: the 
researcher’s view 
regarding what 
constitutes 
acceptable 
knowledge 
The objective point 
of view. Focus on 
causality and law 
like generalisations. 
The subjective point 
of view. Focus on 
the reality behind 
details situations. 
Either or both 
objective and 
subjective viewpoints 
can provide adequate 
knowledge dependent 
upon the research 
question and stage of 
the research cycle. 
Axiology: the 
researcher’s view 
of the role of 
values in research 
Value-free stand 
(researcher is 
independent of the 
data). 
Value-Laden stand 
(researcher is part 
of what is being 
researched) 
Values are essential in 
interpreting results 
(researcher adopting 
both objective and 
subjective points of 
view) 
Research 
Approach 
Deduction Induction Both deduction and 
induction 
Data collection 
techniques most 
often used 
Highly structured, 
large samples, 
measurement, 
quantitative, but 
can use qualitative 
Small samples, in-
depth 
investigations, 
qualitative 
Mixed or multiple 
method designs, 
quantitative and 
qualitative 
Table 8: Comparison of three research philosophies in management research. 
Source: (Saunders et al., 2009; Teddlie and Johnson, 2009; Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Easterby-Smith et al., 2018). 
 
In construction project management research, there is a debate regarding the most 
appropriate research philosophy and paradigm, with the primary debate being 
between Interpretivism/Constructivism supporters and Pragmatism supporters. 
Key for the interpretivism supporters is that people are considered a fundamental 
part of construction management and therefore, aside from the researcher, affect 
the meaning of the research issue. Interpretivists believe the main focus should be 
towards the understanding of meaning and context, rather than Positivism’s focus 
on establishing causal relationships and explanations (Rooke et al., 1997). 
Interpretivists support their argument by asserting that the main aim of construction 
management research is practitioner performance improvement through the 
developing of normative guides. This cannot be done without explicating the 
meaning to practitioners and developing performance improvement models that are 
more likely to be accepted first by practitioners. 
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Key for Pragmatism’s supporters is that construction management research 
involves other knowledge areas such as law, economy, and engineering. Thus, 
such multi-disciplinary research needs combined Positivism and Interpretivism 
philosophies. Furthermore, the nature of construction management research makes 
the Pragmatism philosophy the most appropriate basis for construction 
management research as different philosophies serve different objects and 
disciplines. However, this philosophy has been criticised by Positivists and 
Interpretivists who believe that Pragmatism could lead to a degeneration of rigour 
through its opening of space for “evading definable standards” (Runeson and 
Skitmore, 2008; Rooke et al., 1997). 
Regarding the investigating of the causality of cost overrun, previous studies such 
as Al-Agele and Al-Hassan (2016) adopt the positivism philosophical standpoint. In 
these studies, researchers believe that the problem under investigation (cost 
overrun) is not constructed within the realm of the context. By adopting objective 
points view, studies try to link (build a relationship) between the stand-alone causes 
and cost overrun using quantitative data and correlational analysis. In these 
studies, research does not differentiate between the correlation and causality which 
is, according to Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. (2015), a common misunderstanding and 
misuse by researchers in the mistaken belief that because data shows a correlation 
there is necessarily an underlying causal relationship. This misunderstanding could 
be one reason behind the lack of improvement in understanding cost performance, 
even though the problem has been investigated for over 30 years. As the previous 
studies show poor understanding of project systematicity and lack of demonstrable 
causality of cost overrun, it is argued here that a positivism philosophy is not the 
optimum choice to achieve the aim of this research.  
Although the ontological, epistemological, and axiological stands for this research 
lean towards the Interpretivism/constructivism philosophy, the research will adopt 
the pragmatism research philosophy. The reason that a pragmatism research 
sidesteps the contentious issues of truth and reality and focuses instead on what 
works as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation. In that 
sense, pragmatism rejects a position between the two opposing viewpoints. As it 
has mentioned earlier that the research aim and objectives are the main factors that 
affect choosing the research philosophy for any research besides other factors such 
as the type(s) of data and its availability. For this research, it aims to develop 
contractors' cost overrun causality model in the Saudi public sector that considers 
the effects of context and the practices and processes of developing construction 
projects. Such an aim needs to investigate different aspects of the context (in this 
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research four profiles are used) and identify their weakness (factors) that could lead 
to contractors' cost overrun. The evaluation and identification cross different 
knowledge areas such as social, law, and economy. Moreover, the management 
and business knowledge areas as the practices and processes will be evaluated 
which mainly based on management theories. Nevertheless, as this research 
adopts the contractors’ point of view and considers it as an organisation that 
contracts with another organisation (public sector), there is a need to consider 
relevant organisation theories. The multi-disciplinary research needs the 
Pragmatism philosophy which combines Positivism and Interpretivism philosophies 
as different philosophies serve different objects and disciplines. The research will 
also develop causality paths that are contain different causes that originated from 
different disciplines such as: economy, social, human behaviour and technical. 
Researchers propose that the science of project management differs from the 
natural and social sciences such as biology and sociology (Shehu and Akintoye, 
2009). Briefly, a researcher contend that project management is not only a scientific 
discipline; it is also a professional discipline (practice). In this perspective, theories 
of project management should in some way be relevant to professional practice. 
Like other scientific disciplines, such as engineering, clinical psychology, the 
nursing sciences, education, and architecture, which are fuelled by professional 
practice, the project management field attempts to develop a body of knowledge 
that is transferable to management skills, thereby advancing the practice. 
The researcher has concluded that the Pragmatism philosophy, due to being 
between the positivism and interpretivism philosophies and adopting both the 
subjective and objective points’ of views, fits this research more than other research 
philosophies. In addition, it provides a framework that focuses on different aspects 
which are human-related; construction project management is a multi-disciplinary 
field, and the research aims to improve that field by developing a framework (Korte 
and Mercurio, 2017). The philosophy allows a researcher to use the most suitable 
philosophy for researching an objective; another philosophy can be adopted if its 
use is justified (Jabareen, 2009) and use a triangulation data mechanism will be 
used to achieve some of the objectives, which will need multi-analysis techniques; 
only pragmatism provides that (Morgan, 2014). 
3.4 The research approach: 
Figure 20 shows the research approach as being the second layer of the research 
onion which is defined by Walliman (2005) as “a method of coming to conclusions 
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by the use of logical argument”. Three approaches are recognised: deduction, 
induction, and abductive. The deductive approach concerns designing a research 
strategy to test a theory or hypothesis, while the inductive approach concerns are 
collecting data and analysis leading to the development of a theory. Table 9 shows 
the differences between deductive and inductive approaches, in addition to which it 
can be argued that “deduction owes more to positivism and induction to 
interpretivism” (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Research projects that adopt an induction approach are considered generally to be 
better at providing understanding of the problem. Thus, a small sample of subjects 
might be more appropriate than a large number, as with the deductive approach. 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008b) research projects that adopt the 
induction approach are more likely to work with qualitative data and to use a variety 
of methods to collect these data in order to establish different views of phenomena 
and build a hypothesis. On the other hand, the deductive approach commonly uses 
quantitative data in order to test and validate a hypothesis (Bryman, 1988). 
Both approaches have negatives: 
• The deductive approach can handle only particular types of statement and is 
separated from observation and experience; hence, it can be limiting. 
Moreover, it was criticised for the lack of clarity in terms of how to select 
theory to be tested via formulating hypotheses 
• The inductive approach has been described as unmanageable and 
haphazard. Hence, it is rarely applied in practice. Also, it was criticised 
because no amount of empirical data will necessarily enable theory-building. 
Integrating both approaches (so as to be abductive) is set to address the limitations 
of inductive and deductive approaches and this is normally adopted with the 
pragmatism philosophy which forms a strong base for knowledge progress from 
Walliman (2005) perspective. Figure 21 below illustrates the reasoning differences 
between the main three approaches. 
When selecting the type of research philosophy to adopt, investigation nature and 
data availability are the main factors that affect the choice, but it is also essential 
that the problem under investigation, any concepts, assumptions and limitations are 
also clearly defined. 
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Deduction emphasises  Induction emphasises 
• Scientific principles 
• Moving from theory to data 
• The need to explain causal 
relationships between variables 
• The collection of quantitative data 
• The application of controls to ensure 
the validity of data 
• The operationalisation of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition 
• A highly structured approach 
• Researcher independence of what is 
being researched 
• The necessity to select samples of 
sufficient size 
• Gaining an understanding of the 
meaning’s humans attach to 
events 
• A close understanding of the 
research context 
• The collection of qualitative data 
• A more flexible structure to 
permit changes of research 
emphasis as the research 
progresses 
• A realisation that the researcher 
is part of the research process 
• Less concern with the need to 
generalise 
Table 9: Major differences between deductive and inductive approaches. 
 
For the problem under investigation (cost overrun causality), previous studies 
Adafin et al. (2016); and Al-Agele and Al-Hassan (2016) typically have adopted a 
deductive approach. The studies first create a list of causes using literature reviews 
and/or interviews and then measure the correlation of theses causes to the cost 
overrun before ranking them based on their correlation. Researchers in these 
studies seek to test their theories (hypothesis) quantitatively. However, such an 
approach has been criticised by recent studies as it is not the optimum approach to 
investigate the nature of cost overrun causality. According to Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. 
(2015) merely identifying and listing factors that may contribute to a cost overrun 
and testing their correlation does not provide evidence of causation and the ability 
to draw conclusions about the underlying dynamics that lead to their occurrence. 
Moreover, literature reviewed lacks a model that investigates the cost overrun and 
considers the effects of the context and process of developing construction projects 
(see section 1.2). Thus, a new model needs to be built to consider previous studies, 
which is the aim of this research. Based on that, a deductive approach is not the 
optimum research approach to achieve the research aim and objectives. 
This research adopts an abductive approach, as the study aims to build a causality 
model that represents the contractors’ cost overrun in the Saudi Arabian public 
projects context. The resultant model will provide explanation of the nature of 
causality; current theories do not explain the nature of this causality nor recognise 
the effects of the context, or the practices of developing construction projects. As 
the research scope is limited to four profiles (lenses) only (Economic, Business 
Environment, Resources, and Regulation) which are not claimed to represent the 
entirety of context profiles, and so are considered incomplete observations 
representing only the external environment part of context. Moreover, the model is 
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the best explanation of the contractors’ cost overrun causality rather than a full 
complete theory. The limitations of the study are related to the data availability as 
explained in sections (1.5 and 1.6). 
 
Figure 21: Reasoning difference between the three approaches. 
 
To build the model, an understanding of contractors' cost overrun cause 
mechanisms and how these develop from a very early stage of projects is needed. 
As such, any investigation requires to understand the context that a project is 
developed in, as well as the causes of contractors' cost overrun in other contexts. 
The research process starts with observations of the context (based on the four 
profiles) and of the practises used to develop projects. Links between the 
observations and the problem under investigation have been conducted which 
result in building of causality paths. These paths are considered the backbone of 
the model explaining the contractors’ cost overrun in the Saudi Arabian public 
projects context. The research approach decision then leads to the next layer of the 
research onion, which is the research strategy. 
3.5 The research strategy: 
The research strategy is a part of the research design which can be defined as a 
general plan including how the researcher will answer the research questions 
(Saunders et al., 2009). It is related to the fundamental process of collecting and 
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analysing data. The academic literature shows different types of research 
strategies; for construction project management research, the following types are 
typically used: 
• Experiments. 
• Surveys. 
• Ethnography. 
• Action Research. 
• Case Studies. 
• Literature Review. 
3.5.1 Experiment: 
The experiment was defined by Jupp (2006) as “a research design used to draw 
causal inferences regarding the impact of a treatment variable on an outcome”. The 
experiment is used to study causal links; in other words, it studies the possibility of 
a change in an independent variable creating a change in another dependent 
variable (Creswell, 2009). Such a strategy requires a controlled environment; 
therefore it is not considered the most suitable strategy for management and 
business studies (Creswell, 2009).  
3.5.2 Surveys: 
The survey is a research strategy that can test a social phenomenon for large 
populations using a sample of that population so as to justify a reasonable 
inference and then draw a general conclusion about some characteristic(s) or 
behaviour(s) of a large population. It should be mentioned that a survey strategy 
needs a relatively large representative sample (Babbie, 2011; Fellows and Liu, 
2008) of the targeted population, and uses questionnaires or interviews to draw 
general results to the larger population (targeted population) (Crabtree and Miller, 
1999; Creswell, 2009; Fellows and Liu, 2008). Quantitative and qualitative data can 
be collected when using a survey as the research strategy (De Vaus, 2002) 
therefore allowing quantitative data, for example, to be used to measure 
relationships between variables and to test models of these relationships. 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), the survey strategy is widely used in 
management and business research. Additionally, it is usually used to answer how 
much, how many, who, where, and what types of questions. 
3.5.3 Action Research: 
Action research can be defined as the process of finding solutions for an 
organisation’s problem by the organisation’s members (Eden and Huxham, 1996; 
Punch, 2005; Fellows and Liu, 2008). McCutcheon and Jung (1990) describe action 
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research as “systematic inquiry that is collective, collaborative, self-reflective, 
critical and undertaken by the participants of the inquiry”, whose aim to understand 
and articulate the practice to improve it. Bryman and Bell (2007) believe that 
researchers should be a part of the contributing organisation to understand the 
problem and the process being studied fully. Additionally, generalisation is another 
limitation as this strategy is focused on a single organisation. 
3.5.4 Case Study: 
The case study is a strategy focused on a single or more ‘case’ (Tesch, 1990). As 
with other strategies, it could be conducted alone or in combination with another 
strategy to give it strength (Yin, 2003; Stake, 1995). 
Case studies are valuable in determining a knowledge base of different individual, 
organisational, social and political phenomena, often with a real-life context (Yin, 
2009), and are particularly helpful in any research related to human aspects 
(Gillham, 2000). In case studies, the researcher explores in depth a programme, 
event, activity, process (Creswell, 2009) and multiple sources of evidence are often 
utilised, allowing the researcher to examine a wide body of knowledge. Case study 
research also has the benefit of providing a tool for description and explanation of a 
variety of real-life phenomenon (Fellows and Liu, 2008; Yin, 2009) and can be 
quantitative or qualitative in nature. This form of research seeks to generate 
answers to questions such as ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ (Yin, 2009). 
3.5.5 Literature review: 
The literature review is established as an essential research strategy and a vital 
step for any research. It comprises the reviewing of available material relating a 
specific topic or field, typically carried out by other researchers, and usually 
containing evidence that could be used to develop the current research (Hart, 
2018). To improve the quality of the strategy outputs, different guides have been 
developed to be followed by researchers (Cooper, 1998). 
A general purpose literature review is used to identify the knowledge gap(s) as well 
as a research aim, objectives, and questions (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Additionally, it is used to develop new ideas for the existing literature, assess and 
evaluate the literature, and develop concepts and frameworks (Saunders et al., 
2015; Whittemore and Knafl, 2005). 
There are different types of literature review: 
• Background literature review, 
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• Integrated literature review, 
• Systematic review, 
• Meta-analysis, and 
• Qualitative reviews (Whittemore and Knafl, 2005). 
Although all types need a clear research statement before starting, the width and 
depth of the target literature are some of the factors that differentiate between the 
types. For example, the target literature of the integrated literature review is broad 
and less deep compared to the systematic review, which reviews a more specific 
topic in-depth. 
Systematic reviews, meta-analyses (for quantitative data), and meta-synthesis (for 
qualitative data) are combining the outputs of multiple resources after these 
resources had been evaluated (Whittemore and Knafl, 2005). Thus, the results of 
these literature review types are beyond reporting only as it allows comparison and 
synthesis of the results and conclusions of different resources. 
In contrast to the integrated review, the systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
synthesise results from studies that use similar variables and methodologies. Such 
methods have been found useful to improve the generalisation of qualitative 
research (Whittemore and Knafl, 2005). 
3.5.6 Ethnography: 
Ethnography is two Greek words combined ‘ethnos’ meaning people and ‘graph’ 
meaning describe (Punch, 2005). It is the process of making notes and writing up 
about daily life group activities as part of studying people’s lives or culture (Patton, 
2002; Bryman and Bell, 2007). This requires the involvement of the researcher in 
the daily process of the contributing organisation to get full insights (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007; Fellows and Liu, 2008) which might not suit an outsider researcher.  
3.5.7 Adopted research strategy: 
It has previously been noted that the research aim, objectives and questions all 
affect the choice of research philosophy, and have a strong effect on choosing a 
research strategy. Thus, the clarity of a research problem is vital in choosing the 
most appropriate research strategies as they underpin the nature of the enquiry. 
As presented in Chapter One, the major objectives of this research are exploring 
and evaluating the commercial context of the Saudi public construction projects 
procurement, establishing the link between the commercial context of the Saudi 
public construction projects procurement and contractors' performance, with the 
aim of developing a causal model to explain contractors’ cost overrun. These 
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objectives, at a general level, call for descriptive explorations and an explanatory 
investigation of the nature of the Saudi construction industry environment, as well 
as of the public project delivery practice to establish interdependency and causal 
links leading to contractor cost overrun. 
All of the above research strategies have been analysed for appropriateness to 
achieve the research objectives, as some of the strategies are more suitable than 
others. The sensitivity of the research strategies to the research objectives also has 
been analysed, with one key factor being that the strategy artefacts do not hinder 
phenomenon trait reflection on the research output, as suggested by Jick (1979). 
As a result, experiment, action research, survey, and ethnography have been 
eliminated as appropriate research strategies on the basis of: 
• Experiment. The nature of the construction project management field, 
which involves people, as well as the project environment which does not 
allow the control of only one variable within the construction industry so as 
to measure its effect(s) on other variables. 
• Action research. The study must be conducted on more than one 
contractor for the sake of generalisation. Furthermore, the researcher is not 
a part of any of the construction contractor organisations working with the 
Saudi public sectors. 
• Ethnography. The researcher will not be able to be involved in any of the 
contractor’s daily processes. 
Table 10 shows methodologies that have been used by previous studies seeking to 
identify the cost overrun causality. As discussed earlier (research philosophy and 
approach), previous studies mainly tr to build a theoretical model then test its 
correlation to cost overrun using quantitative data. As such a research design 
needs a large population and the main research strategy that has been used is the 
survey. Such a strategy is usually used to answer how much, how many, who, and 
where types of questions which are not related to the research question, objectives, 
nor aim. As explained earlier, previous studies do not tackle the aspect of cost 
overrun causality and suggesting a rethinking in the method of identifying the 
causes of cost overrun by using a new research strategy that seeks to measure the 
correlation with stand-alone causes cannot give a deep understanding to the cost 
overrun causality problem and does not illustrate the complexity and dynamic 
connection between those causes and cost overrun. For the Saudi public context in 
specific, survey strategy has been used to investigate the causality of project delay 
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in (Shash and Abdul-Hadi, 1992) and (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006). Researchers 
measures the correlation between the causes and projects delay. However, the 
studies do not achieve their goal in identifying the real and root causes of delay and 
projects in the Saudi public sector still suffer lengthy delay (Mhamed et al., 2018). 
Study Country Methodology 
(Memon et al., 2012) Malaysia Preliminary study (interview). 
Analysis 97 questionnaire survey. 
(Ameh et al., 2010) Nigeria Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 53 questionnaire survey. 
(Durdyev et al., 2012) Turkey Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 79 questionnaire survey. 
(Azhar et al., 2008b) Pakistan Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 24 questionnaire survey. 
(Rosenfeld, 2013) Israel Identified root factors from the existing 
literature and from local experts. 
Analysis 195 questionnaire survey. 
(Allahaim and Liu, 
2015) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 160 questionnaire survey. 
(Koushki et al., 2005) Kuwait Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 450 personal interview survey. 
(Enshassi et al., 2009) Gaza Strip Identified factors from literature review, 
personal interviews. 
Analysis 66 questionnaire survey. 
(Jackson, 2002) UK Analysis 141 open-ended questionnaire. 
(Kaming et al., 1997a) Indonesia Identified factors from literature review. 
Analysis 31 questionnaire survey. 
(Alinaitwe et al., 2013) Uganda Identified factors using interviews. 
Analysis 247 questionnaire survey. 
(Baloyi and Bekker, 
2011) 
South Africa Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 22 questionnaire survey. 
(Mansfield et al., 
1994) 
Nigeria Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 37 questionnaire survey. 
(Frimpong et al., 
2003) 
Ghana Identified factors from the existing literature. 
Analysis 72 questionnaire survey. 
Table 10: Previous studies research strategies. 
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As it has been explained earlier in this section, case study is considered one of the 
best strategies to investigate deeply and provide a deep understanding of the cost 
overrun causality, so as to allow the researcher to examine a wide body of 
knowledge (required for this study). Moreover, case study has the benefit of 
providing for description and explanation of a variety of mechanisms of the 
causality, and also establishing the links between the context and process in one 
hand and the cost overrun in the other hand. The strategy also captures the 
complexity and dynamism within the process of delivering Saudi public-sector 
projects and provides analytical generalisation. Nevertheless, another reason to 
choose this strategy is its ability to be tailored to context (Yin, 2003). Thus, the 
strategy will enable contextualisation of the construction processes adopted, and 
the weaknesses of the process under which they are experienced. 
As not all the causes are context and process related, the research needs to 
include other possible causes to the causes pool and link them to the context and 
eventually to cost overrun. For this, a systematic literature review is considered the 
best strategy as it allows the researcher to include all the previous studies that have 
investigated cost overrun causality. Based on that, the main strategies which have 
been selected are systematic literature review and case study. One of the main 
advantages of the systematic literature review is its flexibility; it could be used to 
report only and/or go beyond reporting and allows for synthesising the outputs and 
conclusions of multiple resources. 
3.6 Research Design: 
In this research, the main idea behind developing a research design is to clarify the 
rationale and logical tie between the research's problem, questions, and adopted 
data collecting and analysis tools (Checkland and Holwell, 1998). Moreover, the 
research design will help the researcher to collect and analyse the important data 
that is related to the research problem and avoid any irrelevant data. In other 
words, the research design is an assuredness tool that the data (evidence) 
collected are related to the research questions and link between the research 
problem, findings, and conclusions. It goes without saying that in order to collect the 
right data the right questions must be asked which could reflect the importance of 
the research design on the reliability and validity of the research. Regardless of the 
adopted research strategy, the research design will increase quality and the 
trustworthiness of the research outputs. In this section, the research design for the 
SLR and case study will be presented a general view are presented in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22: Research Design. 
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3.6.1 Systematic Literature Review Research Design: 
According to Okoli and Schabram (2010) reviews of research literature are 
conducted for a variety of purposes: 
• Providing a theoretical background for subsequent research;  
• Learning the breadth of research on a topic of interest;  
• Answering practical questions by understanding what existing research has 
to say on the matter. 
Different types of literature review have been identified (Kitchenham et al., 2009; 
Hart, 2018; Brereton et al., 2007; Okoli and Schabram, 2010), with the degree of 
rigour being one the main features differentiating them. This also links to the depth 
and breadth of the literature review. For example, two types of literature review 
were used in this research; narrative or simple literature review (generally used to 
build a background about the subject being investigated), and the Systematic 
Literature Review (SLR), defined by Fink (2005) as "a systematic, explicit, and 
reproducible method for identifying, evaluating, and synthesising the existing body 
of completed and recorded work produced by researchers, scholars, and 
practitioners". The first type was used for each objective during the early stage of 
research where a context is needed (less depth, more breadth). As a research 
objective was found to need more in-depth investigation, SLR is used (more depth, 
less breadth). It is worth mentioning that the research objective clarity affects the 
breadth of the literature review. 
At the beginning of the research, a narrative literature review was conducted 
regarding the context of Saudi public projects and cost overrun. After the research 
statement and purpose became clearer, the literature search was directed by 
keywords in relevant databases and other sources using inclusion and exclusion 
criteria to maintain the focus of the search. This evidences the importance of the 
narrative literature review and its difference from SLR; it allows the inclusion of 
multiple methodologies to capture the context, processes, and subjective elements 
of studies addressing a problem (Whittemore and Knafl, 2005). 
Systematic Literature Review (SLR) is the second data gathering technique for this 
research which was used with other techniques to achieve mainly Objectives One, 
Two, Three, and Four. In this method, a researcher collects data from resources 
authored by others. Gill and Johnson (2010) criticise the focus of such technique on 
the descriptive aspect of the previous literature rather than assessing the narrative’s 
quality, strength and source of data. To overcome these drawbacks and enhance 
76 
the scientific process of the reviews (Evans, 2002), the researcher identified 
inclusion and exclusion criteria to assess the quality of data. A variety of guides 
relevant to this are available (Davis and Parker, 1997; Rowley and Slack, 2004; 
Fink, 2005). Planning, Selection, Extraction, and Execution are the main heading 
steps followed in all guides, although there are slight differences between the 
guidance in the number and naming of the sub-steps. Generally, the main steps are 
presented in Table 11. 
Step No. Name Description 
First step Formulating 
the problem: 
The researcher needs to identify the purpose of the 
review and the problem under investigation. 
Second 
step 
Building a 
detailed 
protocol: 
The protocol will be built which includes defining the 
search terms, defining Inclusion and Exclusion 
Criteria, and identifying the databases that the 
research will utilise. 
Third Step Perform the 
search: 
The search will be conducted on the databases 
using the terms which have been identified in the 
previous step. 
Fourth 
Step 
Evaluate 
(Quality 
appraisal): 
The researcher will use the Inclusion and Exclusion 
Criteria, which are identified in Step Two, to identify 
the resources needed for the next step. The final 
resources normally will be analysed based on 
different factors such as the year of publication, type 
of the study, methodology ...etc. 
Fifth Step Extraction 
and 
Analyses: 
The applicable information will be identified for the 
resources required, and then analysed and 
combined using different techniques depending on 
the type of data. 
Sixth Step Writing the 
review: 
The output of the previous steps will be written-up 
and documented following research standard 
principles and including enough details that the SLR 
process can be independently reproduced. 
Table 11: SLR steps. 
 
In SLR, the qualitative data are normally evaluated using approaches that code 
studies and data based on factors such as the methods of studies, theoretical 
basis, and relevance of the data reported (Fisch and Block, 2018). SLR has been 
used successfully in construction project management research, e.g.(Viana et al., 
2012; Chai et al., 2013); (Sun and Meng, 2009), and (Roehrich et al., 2014). 
However, none of the databases provided evidence that SLR has been used in the 
context of Objectives One, Two, Three, and Four. 
Reasons for choosing literature review as a research method and SLR as a data 
collecting technique for achieving (fully or partly) Objective One, Two, Three, and 
Four, which were originated from either the nature of the method itself or from the 
nature of the objectives, were: 
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• To expand knowledge of a search on practices of delivering projects and 
contractors' cost overrun in Saudi Arabia which allows the researcher to 
identify and analyse the current state of knowledge on a topic. 
• Less bias within a literature review: SLR resources are selected depending 
on a scientific selection process. 
• Providing a deep understanding and yielding truths: The analysing of and 
combining between outputs of different resources will provide a deep 
understanding of the issue under investigation. Moreover, the different 
research methods, samples, and outputs across studies will expand the 
understanding of the researcher about the issue under investigation and 
identify the theoretical background of the current research. 
• Less severe constraints: the issues that constrain other research methods, 
which generally relate to sample, time and money, are less severe for SLR. 
• The complex nature of the topics under investigation, which are: practices of 
delivering projects and contractors' cost overrun. 
• The nature of the current researches on practices of delivering projects and 
contractors' cost overrun are repetitive of, rather than built on, previous 
work. 
3.6.1.1 Step One: Formulating a problem: 
In order to identify data which will be used in SLR analysis, primary research on a 
topic must exist before synthesis can be conducted. This could be done by 
formulating review questions using the following factors: Population, Interest, and 
Context (PIC). Table 12 shows the first step for the objectives. 
PIC feature Objective One and Two Objectives Three and Four 
Population Nature and weaknesses Nature and Causes 
Phenomena 
of interest 
Process and practices of 
project delivery  
Contractors' cost overrun 
Context Saudi public projects Construction projects 
The 
research 
question 
What are the process and 
practices that are used to 
deliver a project in the 
Saudi public sector? 
What is the nature and causes of 
contractors' cost overrun in 
construction projects? 
Table 12: Formulating a problem for objectives. 
 
 
78 
3.6.1.2 Step Two: Building a detailed protocol: 
To build a SLR protocol, the inclusion and exclusion criteria, databases, and the 
search terms and query need to be identified. The research identified the three 
requirements discussed under three sub-heading below. 
 Identify Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria: 
Table 13 and Table 14 explain and identify the exclusion and inclusion criteria to be 
conducted on the two reviews relevant to Objectives One, Two, Three, and Four. 
Criteria Explanation 
Source 
Type 
Academic Journal and conference proceedings - a good 
representation of the breadth and depth of research achievements 
and they usually have been scrutinised through a peer-review 
process. 
Published Wither it is primary, secondary, reference, or literature materials. 
Peer-
reviewed 
A peer-reviewed published study normally means that the study is: 
A research’s question(s), method(s) are clearly stated.  
A research’s approach, data collection, sampling, and analysing 
method are appropriate and have been described. 
Research claims are supported by sufficient evidence. 
Sources 
location 
In recent years, most academic journals began to provide online 
access. The emergence of some publication index databases has 
dramatically assisted the literature search task. As for the date of 
publication, no explicit restriction was set. However, a small 
number of pre-90s publications are covered by online databases. 
Thus, the number of papers could be small compared to recent 
years. 
Language In English or Arabic Languages; the researcher is fluent in these 
languages. It would be beyond the researcher’s ability to include 
resources in other languages. Moreover, technical translation such 
as Google translation is limited and not accurate. 
Aim Cost overrun issue is well known in the construction industry and 
could be a result of other issues within the industry such as change 
order, labour, or financial issues. Thus, the researcher decided to 
include only the studies that aim to investigate, identify, or 
understand the causes of cost overrun. Some of the studies focus 
on the effect(s) of cost overrun. Such a decision excluded papers 
on cost management systems, methods, and techniques from the 
review. 
Project 
type 
As this study focuses on construction projects, the study of cost 
overrun in construction projects will be included. 
Owner type The owner could be public or private. 
Project 
lifecycle 
level 
Project lifecycle level only, as the contractor is generally involved in 
the late stage of the project life cycle. There is a large body of 
literature on cost overrun at a business or organisational level. 
These are also excluded unless they also discuss implications at 
the project level.  
Table 13: Explanation of the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
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Criteria Included Excluded 
Type Academic Journal and 
conference proceedings. 
Other types of resources. 
Published Published resources. Unpublished resources. 
Peer-reviewed Peer-reviewed resources 
only. 
Not Peer-reviewed 
resources.  
Sources location Online. Offline.  
Language Resources in Arabic and 
English Languages. 
Resources in other 
languages. 
Geographical 
location (Objective 
1 and 2) 
Saudi Arabia Other geographical 
location 
Research 
aim (Objective 1 
and 2) 
Resources that aim to 
evaluate, investigate the 
process and practices of 
developing a public 
construction project. 
Resources that not aim to 
evaluate, investigate the 
process and practices of 
developing a public 
construction project. 
Research 
aim (Objective 3 
and 4) 
Resources that aim to 
investigate, identify, 
understand the causes of 
cost overrun. Some of the 
studies effect of cost overrun. 
Resources that are not 
aiming to identify, 
understand the causes of 
cost overrun. 
Projects type Construction projects only. Other types of projects. 
Procurement type Traditional (Design-Bid-Build) 
(DBB). 
Other types of 
procurements. 
Owner type Public projects, governmental 
owner. 
Other owner’s types. 
Project life cycle 
level 
Project level. Business and 
Organisational levels. 
Table 14: Inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Some of the criteria have been excluded,and the reasons are given in Table 15: 
Criteria Explanation 
Geographical 
location (Obj
ective 3 and 
4) 
No restriction was set. It has been found from other studies that 
the causes of cost overrun are different from a region to another. 
If the location was set as a criterion, then the causes identified 
will be limited to that geographical location. 
Duration  No restriction was set. However, a small number of publications 
are allowing search on pre-90s sources on their online 
databases which is going to effect on the number of papers 
identified for that period is very small. 
 Rating The quality of the studies is varied. However, the criteria that are 
used to rate the quality is more subjective, especially for 
qualitative study. There is a lack of guidance that could be used 
to build quality criteria within the construction project 
management research. Thus, the researcher decided not 
excluded the less quality studies as long as they are empirical 
studies and been peer-reviewed. The main reasons to include 
these studies that they are from a different context (country, type 
or/and size of the project, and data sources) which usually 
results in different outputs from other studies. Thus, excluding 
this type of studies will decrease the number of causes, 
classification, and the understanding of cost overrun. 
Table 15: Excluded criteria. 
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 Define Databases: 
Literature sources search engine can be divided into a journal search engine and a 
database search engine. Journal search engines usually are limited to one or a few 
numbers of journals which generally share the same field, while a database search 
engine searches within a more significant number of journals. Although several 
systematic review studies in the field of construction project management identify a 
specific number of journals to search within (the studies), the researcher decided to 
search within relevant databases rather than use a journal-specific search engine. 
This decision was taken to reduce the bias within a chosen literature review, as well 
as gain access to other resources outside these journals. The following databases 
(Table 16) have been recommended by library staff at the Robert Gordon University 
and been recommended by other educational bodies that provide construction 
project management courses: 
Database Years Access Limitations 
ABI Complete (ABI Global) All Years No Limitations. 
Business Source Premier All Years No Limitations. 
Science Direct – Elsevier All Years No Limitations. 
SAGE journals All Years No Limitations. 
Emerald All Years No Limitations. 
Wiley online library All Years No Limitations. 
Scopus – Elsevier All Years No Limitations. 
Institution of Civil Engineers 
Digital Library 
All Years Limited support to advance 
search. 
IEEE EXplorer Digital Library All Years Limited support to advance 
search. 
Springer Link All Years Limited support to advance 
search. 
Taylor and Francis Online All Years Limited support to advance 
search. 
Engineering Village None No access to the database. 
Construction information 
service 
None No access to the database. 
Table 16: SLR Databases. 
 
Multiple index databases were used to ensure that no significant sources were 
missed, even though there are considerable overlaps between different databases. 
 Define the search terms and formulate a Query: 
After the process has been investigated and illustrated (as a result of achieving 
Objective One), Objective Two adopted SLR alongside interviews as data gathering 
techniques. The literature review regarding Saudi construction projects and the 
nature of the Saudi construction industry has been gathered. Achieving the first 
objective produces indicators for the selection of keywords for the primary key 
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weaknesses of the current practices in delivering public construction projects in 
Saudi Arabia. However, because of the limited number of publications about Saudi 
construction project delivering practices, the researcher decided to use general 
keywords to cover more publications about Saudi construction projects. The 
keywords used are “construction projects in Saudi Arabia”. 
As the researcher is attempting to identify all or most of the relevant literature, a 
search query needed to be constructed/formulated based on the aim of the 
systematic literature review using the keyword terms. The sources of the keyword 
terms are: Contractor, Causes, Cost, Overrun, and Construction. Using both an 
English language dictionary and a specialised dictionary ( online Oxford dictionary 
of construction, surveying and civil engineering). 
The keywords’ synonyms identified from the main question are in Table 17. 
Moreover, the related terms and words are identified (Table 18) by using one of the 
oldest controlled vocabularies which is provided by the United States Library of 
Congress (Library of Congress, 2019). 
It should be mentioned that some of the controlled vocabularies/thesauri do not 
recognise the term cost overrun such as the UK Archival Thesaurus (UKAT) 
(UKAT, 2019). However, using the hierarchy browsing, the only controlled word(s) 
that have been identified which relate to cost under the Main Thesaurus (civil, 
military and mining engineering) are "Building costs". 
Keywords Synonyms 
Contractor Contractor OR Main contractor OR Constructor 
Causes Cause, root cause, factor, reason, Source, Root, origin  
plural phrases will be much less competitive 
Cost cost OR budget OR price OR tender OR bid 
Overrun over-run OR overrun OR increase OR performance OR exceed 
OR run over 
Construction construction OR infrastructure OR building OR project 
Table 17: Keywords' Synonyms. 
Sources: (Gorse et al., 2012), (Dictionary, 1997), and (Harris, 2006). 
 
Controlled 
Vocabularies/Thesauri 
Related Terms/ Narrower Term 
Cost overrun Construction costs, Contracts, Cost accounting, 
Cost effectiveness, and Production control 
Contractors Government contractors, Subcontractors, and 
Employee leasing 
Construction Building construction, and Engineering 
Table 18: Controlled Vocabularies and Related Terms. 
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3.6.1.3 Step Three. Conduct the Search: 
 First attempt: 
As a result of step two, the first search enquiry attempt is: 
((Contractor OR Main contractor OR Constructor) AND (Causes OR cause OR root 
causes OR factor OR reason OR Source OR Root OR origin) AND (cost OR budget 
OR price OR tender OR bid) AND (over-run OR overrun OR increase OR 
performance OR exceed OR run over) AND (construction OR infrastructure OR 
building OR project))  
Use of more than one database or resource (including the Web) as illustrated in 
Table 19. 
Database  Number of search results 
(Basic search) (Anywhere)  
Number of search 
results (Advance 
Search)  
ABI Complete 
(ABI Global)  
20,817 (Peer-reviewed 
inactivated). 
4,516 (Peer-reviewed 
activated). 
5 (in abstract) (Peer-
reviewed activated). 
0 (in title) (Peer-reviewed 
activated). 
Science Direct - 
Elsevier  
29,206 (Peer-reviewed 
activated). 
51 (in abstract) (Peer-
reviewed activated). 
0 (in title) (Peer-reviewed 
activated). 
Business Source 
Premier  
1105 (Peer-reviewed 
inactivated). 
79 (in abstract) (Peer-
reviewed activated).  
0 (in title) (Peer-reviewed 
activated). 
Table 19: Results of the first search enquiry attempt. 
 
While there is no absolute right or wrong on building a search enquiry, a trial search 
enquiry was conducted to ‘test’ the process and this made use of three databases. 
The results show three contrasting findings: 
• A search of entire documents produces result in the thousands of ‘hits’ for 
the search terms.  
• A search only of the abstract section of documents produces a more limited 
number of “hits”. 
• A search of the title only produces zero “hits”. 
A large number of results when using a basic search is beyond the researcher’s 
ability to review without adding to the duration of the research project. The 
researcher, therefore, reviewed the smaller number of results of the advanced 
search and found that none of the studies aims to identify contractors. It could be 
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seen clearly that the search enquiry needs to be improved because of the limitation 
of the sources (empty syntheses), and a systematic review cannot be performed 
without data. The following steps were taken: 
• Remove the keywords that are related to the contractors. It worth knowing 
that the results will include some causes which are for owners' and/or 
projects' cost overrun, although this research aims to identify the causes of 
contractors' cost overrun only. However, the nature of the construction 
industry (complexity and aggregated) means that causes affect or are 
affected by other causes (strong links), thus studying the causes of projects' 
cost overrun will build a deep knowledge and understanding of the causes 
of cost overrun in general and contractors' cost overrun specifically. 
• New Synonyms were identified while reviewing the abstract of sources from 
the previous search which are presented in Table 20. 
• New Keywords: Cost escalation. 
Keywords New Synonyms 
Causes Risk 
Cost Estimation OR costing 
Overrun Escalation OR Variation OR Change OR deficiency 
Construction Structure 
Table 20: New keywords’ synonyms. 
 
Thus, the new search query is: 
(Causes OR cause OR root causes OR factor OR reason OR Source OR Root OR 
origin OR Risk) AND (cost OR budget OR price OR tender OR bid OR costing OR 
estimation) AND (over-run OR overrun OR increase OR performance OR exceed 
OR run over OR Escalation OR Variation OR Change OR deficiency) AND 
(construction OR infrastructure OR building OR structure OR project)) 
 Second attempt: 
The second search query was applied to two search engine databases identified 
earlier: 
Database Number of search results (Advance Search) 
ABI Complete (ABI Global) 5,966 (in abstract) (Peer-reviewed activated). 
25 (in title) (Peer-reviewed activated). 
Business Source Premier 5,537 (in abstract) (Peer-reviewed activated). 
20 (in title) (Peer-reviewed activated). 
Table 21: Number of results for the second search enquiry attempt. 
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The researcher assessed the results of the search (focused only on the title) then 
decided whether the query needed to be changed. 
Database Assessment 
ABI 
Complete 
(ABI 
Global)  
15 resources aim to identify the causes of cost overrun in projects.  
2 resources aim to evaluate and to manage the cost overrun in 
construction projects. 
8 resources investigation other issues in the construction industry. 
Business 
Source 
Premier  
13 resources aim to identify the causes of cost overrun in projects. 
3 resources aim to evaluate and to manage the cost overrun in 
construction projects. 
4 resources investigated other issues in the construction industry. 
Table 22: Assessment of the result of the second search enquiry attempt. 
 
As it can be seen (Table 22) the number of resources when a search focuses on 
the abstract is higher than when focused on the title. Ignoring the resources from 
the abstract would lead to missing some of the important articles. So, the 
researcher sought to reduce the resources results when a search is focused on the 
abstract by: 
• Using the truncation technique: Truncation is a technique that allows 
researchers to search for different forms of a keyword in their search 
queries by adding a truncation symbol (normally "*") to the end, beginning, 
or middle of the keyword. 
• Limiting the search to articles that contain the keywords “Cost” and 
“overrun” and their synonyms in resources title: It has been found from the 
previous easements that all the resources titles that aim to identify the 
causes of cost overrun have these keywords in their titles. 
Thus, the new search query is: 
Condition in Title: ((cost* OR budget* OR pric* OR tender* OR bid* OR estimat*) 
AND (over-run OR overrun OR increas* OR perform* OR exceed OR run over OR 
escalat* OR Var* OR Change OR deficien*)) 
Condition in Abstract: ((caus* OR root* caus* OR factor* OR reason* OR Source 
OR Root OR origin OR Risk) AND (cost* OR budget* OR pric* OR tender* OR bid* 
OR estimat*) AND (over-run OR overrun OR increas* OR perform* OR exceed OR 
run over OR escalat* OR Var* OR Change OR deficien*) AND (construction OR 
infrastructure OR building OR structure OR project)) 
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 Third Attempt: 
Table 23 shows that the number of results for the first database is relatively high. 
However, for the ABI and Business source databases, the combined number of 
results is within the researcher’s ability to apply the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
For the Science Direct database, the number of results is beyond the researcher’s 
ability to process within the research time frame. 
Database  Number of search results 
ABI Complete (ABI Global) 1037 
Business Source Premier 436 
Science Direct – Elsevier 25,092 
Table 23: Result of the third search enquiry attempt. 
 
Thus, a new keyword needed to be added to the search query. As one of the 
criteria is including only the sources that aim to identify the causes of the cost 
overrun, the new keyword that will be added is: 
Keyword Synonyms 
Identify Identif* OR understand OR analyz* OR analys* OR classif* OR 
describ* OR diagnos* 
Table 24: New Keywords Synonyms. 
 
Thus, the new search query is: 
Condition in Title: ((cost* OR budget* OR pric* OR tender* OR bid* OR estimat*) 
AND (over-run OR overrun OR increas* OR perform* OR exceed OR run over OR 
escalat* OR Var* OR Change OR deficien*)) 
Condition in Abstract: ((caus* OR "root causes" OR factor* OR reason* OR Source 
OR Root OR origin OR Risk) AND (cost* OR budget* OR pric* OR tender* OR bid* 
OR estimat*) AND (Identif* OR understand OR analyz* OR analys* OR classif* OR 
describ* OR diagnos*) AND (over-run OR overrun OR increas* OR perform* OR 
exceed OR "run over" OR escalat* OR Var* OR Change OR deficien*) AND 
(construction OR infrastructure OR building OR structure OR project)) 
 Fourth Attempt: 
Table 25 shows the results of applying the third search query on the recommended 
search engines databases. 
Some of the databases identified earlier were excluded from the search for the 
reasons in Table 26: 
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Database Number of search results General Information  
ABI Complete (ABI 
Global) 
324 Duration (1967 - 2017) 
Business Source 
Premier 
235 Duration (1973 - 2017) 
Science Direct – 
Elsevier 
3,290 Duration (1978 - 2017) 
SAGE journals 62 Duration (1983 - 2017) 
Emerald 42 Duration (1995 - 2017) 
Wiley online library 106 Duration (1978 – 2017) 
Scopus – Elsevier 887 Duration (2008 – 2017) 
Institution of Civil 
Engineers Digital 
Library (1) 
233 Duration (1847 – 2017) 
Total 5179 Oldest: 1847 Newest: 
2017 
Table 25: Result of the final search enquiry attempt. 
(1) Although there is limited support to advance a search provided by ICE 
Library, the researcher decided to use the basic search with one keyword 
“cost overrun”, as the ICE is a specialised institute and is not covered by 
general search engines. 
 
Database Reasons 
IEEE Xplorer 
Digital Library 
Limited support to truncation technique. The total number of 
wildcards that is supported in a search query is 5. The last 
search query contains “*” symbol is 27 keywords. 
Springer Link Limited support to advance search. The Advance search 
does not support search in a specific location of sources. 
Taylor and Francis 
Online 
Limited support to advance search. No advanced search is 
available on the database website. 
Engineering 
Village 
No access to the database. 
Construction 
information 
service 
No access to the database. 
Table 26: Excluded Databases. 
 
Although there are some limitations for the databases identified earlier, a second 
source for the data will mitigate this. Moreover, adding a second source for the 
literature will add more accuracy and value to the output of the literature review as 
any primary source that has been missed by the first method will be identified in the 
second source. The second source relies on finding new sources through reference 
lists of the papers that were identified from the databases identified previously. 
The rest of the steps are illustrated thoroughly in data analysis (Chapter Four 
section 4.4.1). 
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3.6.2 Case study research design: 
For the research case study design, the research adopted the instrument that has 
been expressed by Yin (2018) as being well known in reflecting the case study 
research design and has been adopted by other researchers such as: (Muya et al., 
2013) and (Okeyo et al., 2015). According to Yin, five components need to be 
illustrated in order to establish a case: 
First: study's question(s), 
Second: propositions, if any, 
Third: unit of analysis, 
Fourth. logic linking the data to the propositions, and 
Fifth: criteria for interpreting the findings. 
The research will present each of the five points individually so as to increase the 
trustworthiness and rigour of the research process. Moreover, the section will be 
used to be used as a map to conduct the research process as well as the data that 
will be needed to collect and analyse (Yin, 2009). Besides the five points that have 
presented by Yin, case selection and sampling are other important parts of the 
research design which also important for the design process and establishing the 
trustworthiness of the research. 
3.6.2.1 The study’s question(s): 
As it has been explained in section (3.5.4), case study is more suited to research of 
an explanatory nature and could be used in exploratory and descriptive nature 
researches. 
Regarding this point and as presented in section (1.4), this study’s aim is to build a 
causal path that is extracted from the weaknesses in the context and the process 
and practices so as to develop a construction project tailored to the Saudi Arabian 
public sector projects, and develop a causal model that illustrates the connection 
between all identified causes. 
Based on that, a case study research approach, guided by the four profiles 
(Economic, Business, Resources, and Regulation) international best practises and 
appropriate selection of the cases, creation of unit of analysis, data collecting and 
analysis techniques, is the most suitable strategy to achieve the research aim and 
objectives. 
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For this study, and influenced by the question in section (1.3), the research 
questions are: 
 
01: How the context and the process of developing a construction project affects 
the contractors' cost performance leading to contractors’ cost overrun? 
02: How the causes of the contractors’ cost overrun interact within the context of 
the Saudi public sector leading to the cost overrun? 
 
The explanatory nature of the central questions for this study is one of the triggers 
for choosing the case study as the main research strategy. It is useful in the 
process of developing the research design to review the questions as they are 
considered the basis of developing the research design. 
3.6.2.2  The qualitative study’s proposition: 
Identifying the research proposition for this qualitative study is very important for the 
research design in order to direct the design process and identify the data 
(variables) that research will focus on. In other words, if the proposition is correctly 
formulated, it will guide the researcher by narrowing his focus onto the specific 
problem and reduce the temptation to cover everything about a phenomenon. 
Moreover, the proposition will work as a blueprint in guiding the research during the 
data collecting process (Leiringer, 2003). 
For this research, the previous studies on cost overrun causation are argued to 
have ignored the effect of the context and the process and practises of developing 
construction projects leading to cost overrun. Thus, guided by the fours profiles 
(Economic, Business Environment, Resources, and Regulation), the research 
proposition is “Establishing the cost overrun causality links and mechanism of the 
effect between the Saudi public sector context, the process and practises of 
developing construction projects, and the contractors’ cost overrun”. 
The proposition will help this research to design the research and analysis and 
interpret the data. The proposition also has been used to develop the themes which 
have been used to obtain the evidence and build the model by the end of the 
research. 
3.6.2.3 Unit of analysis: 
The third point that needs to be illustrated for the case study research design is the 
Unit of analysis which is directly linked to the study's question(s) and 
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proposition/theory. According to Yin (2018), it will be used as an instrument where 
the research output will be applicable and data is collected from. Moreover, the unit 
of analysis also identifies what the case is about, as well as draw the borders of the 
research, which is very important for any research. 
As a rule of thumb, identifying the unit of analysis should not be difficult if the 
previous two steps (research's question and proposition) are cleared. For this 
study, given the fact that the research focuses on explaining the effect of the 
context and the process of developing a construction project on the contractors' 
cost performance as well as the interacting between the causes of the contracts' 
cost overrun, it is believed that project is the most appropriate unit of analysis. 
Thus, project is adopted as the unit of analysis for this research. 
3.6.2.4 The logic linking the data to the proposition: 
One advantage of using the case study strategy is its ability to generalise the 
research output of the study towards/against a proposition (Yin, 2009). Thus, a 
strategy and/or technique linking the collected data and the theory/proposition is 
needed. In other words, the analytic strategy broadly explains how the evidence is 
to be analysed which according to Yin (2018) is used to interpret the evidence 
(data) and link it to the theory/proposition. According to Yin, the analytic strategy is 
developed based on the proposition and case description. For this research, the 
research methodology is built on the abductive approach which aims to explain the 
causality mechanism of contractors' cost overrun. Based on that, an analytic 
strategy that developed on case description is the most suitable for this research. 
The case developing will be used to focus on the data that needs to be collected 
and ignores unrelated data. The codes that have been used to analyse the data will 
be explained later in this chapter. 
An analytic technique has been used to link the data to the proposition. For this 
research, an analytic technique called pattern matching logic has been used (Yin, 
2009). The technique is one of the most analytic techniques used with the case 
study strategy (Yin, 2003) and compares the proposition pattern to the predicate 
ones which increases the internal validity of the research and helps to draw the 
research conclusion about the problem under investigation. Moreover, the 
technique will help to generalise the findings for qualitative data which is the case 
for this study. This study used the four profiles for the context (Economic, Business 
environment, Resources, and Regulations and Laws), and cost overrun causes 
classification system (see section 4.5.7) as guides to match any similarities with the 
cases under investigation. 
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3.6.2.5 The criteria for interpreting the findings: 
The fifth point for the research design is to identify the criteria for interpreting the 
output of the collected data after being analysed. As a continuation of the previous 
steps and based on previous choices, the research will use a comparative 
approach. The criteria will compare the four profiles, and cost overrun causes 
classification system (see section 4.5.7) with the selected cases for the problem 
under investigation. 
3.7 Research Sampling: 
In this section, the researcher will explain the process that has been conducted and 
applied for the research sampling activity. The primary data collecting techniques 
used in this research, as explained earlier, are documents, SLR, and interviews. 
For documents and SLR, the process of choosing the documents and literature will 
be explained in 3.10.1 and 3.6.1. In short, for documents, all the public laws and 
regulations were chosen, rather than take a sample. For SLR, no sampling 
procedure has been conducted as well. However, some criteria for inclusion and 
exclusion were set up so as to choose useful documents. 
3.7.1 Case selection: 
The case study strategy is normally conducted by selecting a number of case 
studies that best fit the problem under investigation. The cases highlight the 
contextual details where it would be possible to analyse sequence events and the 
relationship between them. Researches have criticised the generalisability and the 
reliability in the case study strategy as they based on a small number of cases (Yin, 
2009). However, in their defence researchers have explained that the case study, 
similar to experiment strategy, is not representing a sample (statistical 
generalisation) as its aim to generalise the theoretical proposition (analytical 
generalisation). Thus, selecting the most appropriate cases is an important step for 
analytical generalisation 
With the qualitative studies especially when the case study is used, the sampling 
process are generally purposive and normally guided by the theory (Kuzel, 1992; 
Huberman and Miles, 1994). Moreover, it is not unlikely for such studies to be pre-
defined as the studies are developed and under progress. As a role of thumb, multi-
cases usually needed, although, it is possible to include only one case in a specific 
situation (i.e. critical case) 
91 
Some researchers have suggested a specific number such as Eisenhardt (1989) 
who recommended to use 4 to 10 cases to increase the validity and reliability of the 
results. Yin argued that Eisenhardt's number of cases might be needed in the case 
of theoretical replication, and he cited that 2 cases are enough in the case of literal 
replication. 
Regarding which cases are the most suitable for a research, this will be based on 
the nature of the research and the problem. For example, in a study aimed to clarify 
as much as it could, extreme cases are the most suitable for this nature of research 
(Kuzel, 1992). 
As it was illustrated in section (1.1.2), the Saudi construction industry is the largest 
in the region with billions of USD are invested in construction project every year. 
The public sector is the main owner of the construction projects with over 70% are 
owned by the public sector. Although literature emphasises on the uniqueness of 
each individual construction project, different types of construction projects are 
developed and procured using the same development process, regulations, and 
laws (see section 2.6). Thus, Although the public sector is developed and procure 
by different public agencies (ministries), the development process, practise, and 
procurement are the same are the under fixed strict regulations and laws and no 
room for self-reflection which is not the international norm. 
As this study focus on explaining the affecting of the context, process, practises of 
developing project in the Saudi public sector, the case selected for the research 
inclines to the ‘best case scenario’ in terms of understanding the effect of the 
context, process, and practises on the contractors' performance. However, all the 
Saudi Arabian public authorities are following a unified approach (standardised 
approach) to develop and delivered a construction project. Moreover, it has 
explained in section (4.2.2.1) for the project conception phase, the Saudi Arabian 
public sector devises and manages its processes in projects pool and programmes 
rather than specific project so that making the individual project invisible to be 
picked. This research will not develop any case study selection criteria as any 
Saudi public construction will fit the purpose of this research. 
3.7.2 Interview Sampling: 
For the Interviews, a sampling procedure was followed to identify the experts to be 
interviewed (further discussed later in this section). The stakeholders were chosen 
from mainly owners and contractors involved in Saudi public projects. The 
interviewees included the owners, contractors and consultants. Since the 
consultants were employed by the owners to take care of the owners’ interests, and 
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also the consultants’ responses were not significantly different from that of owners, 
they were merged with the owners’ responses. As owners and contractors in the 
Saudi public sector are organisations, and more than one individual works in both 
organisations, a pool of representatives was created. As owners and contractors 
play a key role in a construction project, it is essential to interview them and 
investigate their responses so as to achieve a better understanding of the Saudi 
public projects’ delivery mechanism and contractors’ cost overruns. The reasons for 
adopting two groups are to verify the construction company's view from a different 
perspective and to give the study more objectively. 
According to Marshall (1996), the choice of an appropriate sampling technique is 
usually affected by the type of strategy and interview structure adopted. In general, 
there are two types of sampling techniques: non-probabilistic and probabilistic 
sampling (Merriam, 1998). According to Sandelowski (1995) and Walliman (2005) 
some of the methods of non-probabilistic sampling are: 
• Purposive sampling (judgmental or expert): using expert knowledge to 
produce a sample that logically representative. 
• Haphazard sampling: produce a representative sample by choosing sample 
haphazardly. 
• Quota sampling: produce a sample by choosing representatives from a 
specific sub-group. 
On the other hand, some of the probabilistic sampling methods are: 
• Simple Random: produce a sample where each representative has an equal 
probability of being chosen. 
• Stratified: produce a sample by dividing the population into sub-groups. 
• Systematic: produce a sample where each representative is selected 
according to both a random starting point and a fixed. 
• Cluster sampling: the total population is divided into clusters then apply a 
Simple Random approach on each cluster. 
Theoretical or purposive sampling is the sampling technique chosen for this 
research which, as it has been noted by Walliman (2017), is a form of non-
probabilistic sampling that targets a population having adequate (to answer 
questions) knowledge and experience. The technique provided an advantage for 
the interviewees to be chosen based on their experience and profession, although 
one of the drawbacks for this technique is the bias in measuring the choosing 
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criteria. Guided by studies from the construction management field (Kikwasi, 2013; 
Baccarini and Love, 2013; Cheng and Li, 2002; Begum et al., 2007) relevant 
persons were chosen based on: accessibility and availability for the interview; 
extensive working experience in Saudi public projects and having current and direct 
involvement in the management of construction projects in the Saudi public sector. 
One of the most critical aspects of interviews is the selection of interviewees 
(Johnson and Turner, 2003) as their knowledge about the topic under investigation 
has a vital bearing on the information relayed (Alalshikh, 2010). For this study, the 
key interviewees were selected from pools of experts who are well informed about 
the issue under discussion and who worked for the same public organisation so as 
to reduce the effect of different internal procedure bias. The interview process 
provided an opportunity for the contractors and clients to express their opinion 
towards a delivery mechanism as well as whether it could lead to contractors’ cost 
overrun and how. The pool included the clients’ representatives of the major 
processes as well as contractors. 
The research samples in qualitative research are generally smaller compared to 
those in quantitative research. One of the principal reasons for this is that in 
qualitative research more data does not necessarily mean more outputs, as the 
frequency of themes, data, or codes is less critical in qualitative research. One 
occurrence of that information, code, or theme allows it to be part of the analysis 
stage, as qualitative research is more concerned with meaning and less with 
generalising of the research outputs (Ritchie et al., 2013; Crouch and McKenzie, 
2006). Nevertheless, gathering qualitative data is very labour intensive, and 
analysing a large sample can be time-consuming and possibly impractical. 
The number of informants needed to be interviewed was determined by the 
literature showing that sample size varies depending on complexity. For this 
research, the theoretical saturation, which means that data collection reaches a 
point where further data collection becomes “counter-productive” (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008), was the primary guidance to choose the number of experts needed 
to be interviewed. After having conducted a series of interviews, there is a point 
when the researcher starts receiving very repetitive responses from the 
interviewees, and no new themes emerge. For this research, the number of experts 
interviewed was 11. 
94 
3.8 The research choice: 
The academic literature uses the terms quantitative and qualitative to describe data 
types: quantitative focus on numeric data (numbers) and is thus used as a synonym 
for any numerical data collection techniques, while qualitative focuses on non-
numeric data (words), which is used as a synonym for any non-numerical data 
collection techniques. Non-numerical data is a term that describes more than 
words; for instance, pictures and video clips are considered as non-numerical data 
(Saunders et al., 2009). 
Figure 23 shows that when it comes to choosing the research method(s), a 
researcher will choose a single data collection technique (mono method) or more 
than one data collection techniques (multiple methods). 
 
Figure 23: Research choices. 
Source: (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
Multi-method research is a phrase that describes a research activity using more 
than one data collection technique and analysis process, but these are restricted to 
either quantitative or qualitative techniques (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Mixed-
methods research differs in that, while it uses more than one data collection 
technique and analysis process, these can be mixed between quantitative and 
qualitative techniques. There are two types of mixed-methods research (Figure 23). 
Mixed method research uses “quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques 
and analysis procedures either at the same time (parallel) or one after the other 
(sequential) but does not combine them” (Saunders et al., 2009). Whereas mixed-
model research “combines quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques 
and analysis procedures as well as combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches at other phases of the research” (Saunders et al., 2009). 
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Smith (1981) argued that each data collecting techniques has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. As a weakness might affect the validity of the result, the researcher 
aims to use more than one data collecting technique. Hence, the strength(s) of one 
technique covers the weakness(es) of the other technique. Along with that and the 
nature of the research aim and objectives, the research has mentioned earlier that 
the type of research approach is purely abductive which, normally works with 
qualitative data. Moreover, three research strategies have been adopted. 
Therefore, the research choice for this research is multi-method qualitative 
research. 
The next layer of the research onion is the time horizon. 
3.9 Time horizon: 
For any research, a researcher could study the research topic over a specific 
period, comprising what are described as cross-sectional, or over-extended points 
of time, which is considered as longitudinal (Saunders et al., 2009). Survey and 
case study research strategies are normally conducted over short periods; thus, 
they are normally considered to be cross-sectional research. Other strategies such 
as action research, grounded theory, archival research, and experiments are 
conducted over extended time. Thus, these strategies normally adopt longitudinal 
research (Saunders et al., 2009). 
For this research, a cross-sectional time horizon is adopted. The research time 
frame, along with the research strategy that has been adopted earlier, as well as 
the nature of the research’s aim and objectives, are the main reasons for this 
choice. 
3.10 Data Gathering Techniques: 
The sixth layer, which is the core of the research onion, comprises the research 
technique. In this section, the research will introduce the data gathering techniques 
that have been used and justification for those techniques. Table 10 shows the 
previous studies’ tools to collect the data which are mainly questionnaire. This tool 
is normally used to collect data from a large population which is tailored to the 
approach for testing hypothesis for theoretical models. However, the questionnaire 
is not the best tool to collect data for this study as it aims to move from listing 
individual causes and ranking them, to develop a model that illustrates the 
complexity and dynamic connection between those causes and cost overrun. 
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Identifying and measuring the effect of individual causes do not reflect the reality 
which leads to inadequate assessing and managing causes leading to cost overrun. 
Nevertheless, the limitations of questionnaires as used in previous studies have 
been identified, which are: 
• Poorly designed survey instruments. The respondents have to answer so 
many questions that this raises a concern about the quality of the answers. 
• Focus on independent, single-cause identification and traditional net-effect 
correlational analysis. 
• Questionnaire tool has three types of bias: observation by the individual, 
bias in the structure of the questionnaire and bias in the sample (Lind and Brunes, 
2015). Although it is difficult to prevent these biases, none of the studies reviewed 
mentioned these biases nor provided any evidence to prevent them. 
• The respondents are from mixed professional, etc. groups which will lead to 
misleading output as each group will give feedback of the causes from their point of 
view. 
• The large difference in number from different respondent groups. In one of 
the studies, the number of respondents from contractors’ groups is 4 times the 
number of respondents from clients’ groups. This difference affects the output of the 
study as it depends on the average of all the groups. 
• Poor causes impact measuring tool. The studies used tools such as RIW 
score which does not represent the statistically significant measurement of any 
instance. 
There is a small number of restrictions about the data collection techniques that 
could be used for the case study strategy. Moreover, most of the techniques are 
used to collect both quantitative and qualitative data as the strategy normally 
combines both types of data. As a result of the research proposition developed 
earlier, the evidence that was used to support the proposition, the need to 
investigate the nature of the context and their effect on the contractors' cost overrun 
are criteria in the process of selecting the most suitable data collection techniques. 
Thus, the techniques used to collect the data are literature review, documents, and 
interviews. Using more than one source will contribute to the research validity and 
data triangulation. 
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3.10.1 Document: 
One form of research data is termed document. A document, which could be 
internal or external to the organisation under investigation, is usually produced by 
an organisation (public or private) or individuals, and could be in the form of hard 
or/and soft (electronic) copy. Examples of document data are public law/regulation, 
reports, project contract, etc. 
One of the main advantages of collecting data from documents is the effort and 
time needed is less compared to other data collecting methods. By assuming the 
data, a researcher requires is available and in the form of up-to-date documents 
there is an advantage as the data already exists (as a document) and there is no 
need to go to the field to collect it. 
As with any data gathering technique, Yin (2018) identified some of the document 
technique’s disadvantages such as availability, accessibility, and bias in reporting 
and selectivity. To reduce the effect of disadvantages, another data source 
recomended be used alongside other data source(s) (data triangulation) (Patton, 
1987; Flick, 2004), although it could be used a mono data source. 
The documents sourced for this study consisted of information relating to the 
procurement, process, and regulation used to deliver a construction project in the 
Saudi public sector. The source of the documents is a Saudi government bureau of 
exports (Bureau of Exports, 2019) 
As section (3.6.1) shows, the data from the documents provided a deep 
understanding of the context of the Saudi public sector as well as the process of 
developing and delivering a construction project. This information also allowed the 
research to develop detail concerning the project life cycle phases and identify the 
potential weakness in the process of developing and procuring the project. 
Prominently, there was a widespread lack of documents (regulation and laws) that 
clearly outlined the process steps to be followed at the project level, which led to a 
decision not to include the project level (see4.2.2 and 4.2.3). Furthermore, the 
documents source explained how the projects are chosen at the strategic level. 
There were also documents that explained the process used to develop and deliver 
construction projects at the organisation level which is the main focus of this 
research. The absence of such information encourages the research to use another 
source of information to fill the resulting gaps and reduce their effects in 
consolidating the explanations derived from the data. 
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Moreover, to reduce the drawback effects and produce more coherent outputs, the 
research will collect documents that contain data. Documents needs will be 
progressed through number of steps which are: evaluating document; obtaining 
access; analysis of the document, and summarising output. 
Initially, the researcher needs to assess the available documents and identify which 
one(s) will help to achieve the objective. The next step is to obtain access to the 
identified document(s) so as to establish only the relevant document(s). This step 
will be repeated, as some of those documents initially appearing to be relevant, 
may be found later not to be. Analysis is the next step, where the relevant 
document(s) will be analysed. Finally, the output of the analysis will be documented 
and presented. 
This data collecting technique is one of the techniques for supporting a case study 
strategy which was recommended by Yin (2003), along with archival records, 
interviews, observations, physical artefacts. Indeed, this research has chosen 
another data gathering technique, which is interview, so as to get ridge output for 
Objective One. The nature and the scope of Objective One is the main reasons for 
choosing this data gathering technique, in addition to the research strategy, 
approach, and philosophy that have been adopted before. 
Documents will be the primary data sources to achieve Objective One, while 
interviews will be used to fill the gap identified within documents (the most suitable 
data sources for this objective), where formal steps are expected to be taken by a 
public organisation. A project's documents are expected to be sanctioned, 
administered and closed formally by the public organisation responsible for that 
project, through regulations related to public projects (see section 2.6), and usually 
are generalised for all public projects, resulting in a formal status that could reduce 
any adverse effects. Nevertheless, interviews will also be used to test and elaborate 
on sources for the documents which, within the factors of availability and relevance 
(to the case), were collected, and relevant data was retrieved. 
For a Saudi public agency (see Chapter Two), the extent of regulatory flexibility and 
freedom are minimal. The regulations and laws used to deliver services are 
generally authorised by the highest authority in the country which is The Council of 
Ministers (CoM). Thus, to identify the relevant regulation and laws related to 
delivering public construction projects, the researcher had to review all the 
regulations and laws issued by CoM. A useful source is the Saudi Laws 
Compendium issued by the Bureau of Experts within CoM. The Bureau of Experts 
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website provides the total number of laws, which are categorised in 7 volumes 
(folders) as summarised in Table 27. 
Folder 
No. 
Category 
Number of 
laws included 
Total number 
of laws 
1 
Basic Laws 5 
336 
Media, Culture and Publication Laws 17 
National Security, Civil Status and 
Criminal Laws 
27 
2 
Commerce, Economy and Investment 
Laws 
53 
3 
Diplomatic Corps, Protocol and 
Ceremonies Laws 
5 
Education and Science Laws 10 
Hajj and Islamic Affairs Laws 8 
Municipal Services and Urban Planning 25 
4 
Military Service Laws 7 
Civil Service Laws 10 
5 
Laws of Agriculture, Water and Biota 27 
Judiciary and Human Rights Laws 19 
Tourism and Antiquities Laws 7 
Youth and Sports Laws 4 
6 
Health Laws 25 
Energy, Industry and Mining Laws 19 
Labour and Social Care Laws 26 
7 
Finance and Audit Laws 23 
Transportation and Communication 
Laws 
19 
Table 27: Saudi Laws Compendium. 
Source: (Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, 2002). 
 
To identify the relevant laws and regulations based on the scope of the research, 
the researcher reviewed all 336 laws and regulations and determined the following 
as most relevant to the focus of this research: 
• Basic Law of Governance. 
• Organization of the Saudi 
Contractors Authority. 
• Organization of the National 
Commission for the regulation of 
operation and maintenance and 
standardisation. 
• Labour Law. 
• Saudi Building Code Application 
System. 
• Road and building system. 
• Law of the Council of Ministers. 
• Engineering Practice System. 
• Government competition and 
procurement system. 
• Contractor Classification System. 
• Arbitration system. 
• Commercial Registration System. 
• Competition system. 
• System of the Saudi Organization 
of Engineers. 
 
This study first presents a description of the Saudi construction industry’s nature as 
well as cost overrun issues worldwide as a precursor to developing a model that 
explains the current practice of delivering a public sector construction project in 
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Saudi Arabia. Explaining the process and its context is vital to the investigation of 
the cost overrun issue. The analysis was based on the content of the regulations, 
laws, and contract documents as well as interviews aimed at identifying all of the 
main processes used to deliver a public sector project in Saudi Arabia. Out of the 
14 regulation documents initially identified in Table 28, some of the documents 
were excluded as they were found to be either insufficiently related to the 
construction works or out of the research scope. All the documents and people 
interviewed are listed in Table 28. 
The investigation was guided (framed) by international best practice frameworks. 
Initially, the main process and phases to deliver a public construction project were 
identified. Following that, each core process was inspected separately for further 
detailed exploration. Any unclear process was further discussed and investigated 
using interviews. 
Group type Data Source 
Government 
Regulation 
Basic Law of Governance. 
Law of The Council of Ministers. 
Labour Law. 
System of The Saudi Organization of Engineers. 
Government Competition and Procurement System. 
Contractor Classification System. 
Arbitration System. 
Commercial Registration System. 
Competition System. 
MoF Approved Projects 
Projects Documents Tender Documents 
Acceptance Offer Letter 
Start Work Letter 
Basic Condition Contract Documents 
Special Condition Contract Document 
BoQ 
Interviewees Head of Design Department 
Head of Construction Department 
Head of Financial Department 
Owner’s Representative Engineers 
Contractors’ Project Manager and Representative 
Engineers 
Table 28: Objective One’s data sources. 
 
3.10.2 Systematic Literature Review (SLR): 
Objective Three requires a systematic review and evaluation of the cost overrun 
literature and identification of the main issues within the body of cost overrun 
research. The systematic review strategy was adopted for this objective, and data 
was collected by applying the SLR technique. 105 studies were the sources for 
these objectives, and were analysed based on different factors such as their 
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geographical location, year of publication, research strategy, data collecting and 
analysing techniques …etc. As a result, the main schools of thought were identified, 
as well as the weaknesses of the current studies, and then synthesised. Themes, 
categories, and relationships of causes, concepts, or outcomes are identified 
through the data analysis. Tables illustrating the resulting themes or outcomes are 
provided for constant comparison in the data analysis phase of the review. The 
results and discussion go beyond reporting, and allow for the synthesis of multiple 
comparisons and conclusions. Throughout each of the steps of the integrated 
literature review, steps to assure trustworthiness are adopted (Whittemore and 
Knafl, 2005). 
By collecting data from the literature review and interviews, the main causes of the 
contractors’ cost overrun in Saudi public projects were identified to fulfil Objective 
Four. This needed an explanatory analysis to identify causes that affect contractors’ 
cost performance and allow predictions of possible improvements. Thematic 
analysis was used, based on the theme developed in Objective Three. To fulfil the 
objective, both literature and interviews were used as sources of data. Causes 
identified from the literature were the starting point; a pool of causes identified from 
the literature contained over 500 causes. For the sake of concision, causes deemed 
similar were combined, with two industry experts subsequently reviewing this 
activity, deleting any causes deemed irrelevant to the context, and this resulted in 
further modifications being applied, resulting in a revised causes list. The causes 
passed through sieves that were based on the explanation in Objective One, as 
well as the nature of the industry as explained in Chapter Two. The final causes list 
was confirmed as a result of the interview as well as other causes that had been 
identified. 
The researcher used causes of cost overrun themes (identified in Objective Three) 
as a starting point for the analysis. This is further particularised to the Saudi Arabian 
public sector context by using the explanation identified in Objective One, as well as 
literature about the nature of the construction industry (Chapter Two). The causes 
of contractors’ cost overrun were thematically categorised under (Procurement, 
Regulation, Country’s economy, Force majeure, Uncertainty, Fraudulent practices, 
Social, Process, and Behaviour) which are the blocks that will be used to build the 
causes path. 
3.10.3 Interviews: 
Literature shows that there are different types of interviews such as: Active, Oral 
history, Group interview, Debate and Confrontation, Long interview, Mutable 
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interviewers, Projective, and Narrative (Kvale, 2008; Mason, 2010; Drever, 1995; 
Britten, 1995). In such techniques, through face to face or distance interviews, 
experts answer specific questions, prepared by the interviewer earlier, related to the 
topic under investigation. 
The third data collection technique for this research was the use of interviews, and 
this covers Objectives One, Two, Four, and Five. Interviews were found to be the 
best data collecting technique for these objectives for the following reasons: 
• In general, interviews provide an opportunity to interact with experts about 
the topic under investigation, and as this is usually on face to face basis, this 
gives an opportunity to analyse non-verbal communication for more 
information. 
• For purely qualitative research, interviews handle such data well and are 
normally considered as the foundation of a successful investigation 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008a). 
• This technique is flexible and usually is lengthy, compared to other 
techniques, as it gives the researcher the opportunity to dig into the 
narrative answer using follow-up questions. 
Although some disadvantages have been raised, such as being less standardised, 
time and money consuming, and difficult to get co-operative respondents, this data 
gathering technique is the most suited technique for the stated research objectives. 
For Objectives One and Two, interviews are the most suitable data techniques to 
be used to fill the gaps found within the documents and literature. Moreover, it will 
also help to evaluate current practice(s) of developing construction projects and 
whether it has been followed in a real-life situation. Nevertheless, interviews also 
help by looking at the problem under investigation through different stakeholders’ 
lenses which eventually provides deep understanding. 
The researcher argues that using the existing literature as a starting point and base 
on which to build interview questions with informative interviewees could lead to 
deep understanding of cost overrun causes. This technique has been useful in 
situations where little is known about the subject under investigation. Such a 
technique also will be used to gather information to build causes paths after 
investigating the context intensely (Objectives One and Two). A causal model will 
be built after the paths have been gathered and combined. This will then be 
evaluated through using interviews to determine respondents’ views about the 
developed model. 
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Other data gathering techniques such as projects’ documents, for example, are not 
suitable to build the model, a considerable amount of documented data on 
completed projects is required, and this is not available to the researcher due to the 
sensitivity of cost data for contractors and the generally poor quality of contractor 
documentation. Questionnaires also have some limitations: bias in observation by 
the individual, bias in the structure of the questionnaire and bias in the sample (Lind 
and Brunes, 2015). 
In this research, individual interviews have been used because of the sensitivity of 
cost data for contractors. Individuals could be more willing, in an interview 
environment, to share information, especially regarding any negative experience. 
Moreover, individual experience is a vital resource in this investigation. Figure 24 
shows the different types of interviews. 
 
Figure 24: Types of interviews. 
 
In this research, semi-structured (focused) interviews were adopted, in which the 
interviewer prepared questions to guide the interview. As the research objectives 
were sufficiently precise at the time of conducting the interviews, this type was 
chosen, rather than open-ended interviews which are usually used when there is 
little known about the research focus. Closed-ended interviews, on the other hand, 
are normally used when a short answer to test a developed theory is needed. 
Objective one, for example, is going to be used to explore the parts of project 
delivery practices that are not covered by documents, as well as to test whether the 
same practice written in documents is used in reality. Semi-structured questions are 
the most suitable type that could help to achieve research Objectives three and 
four. This type provides flexibility to the interviewee to aim for a short (shallow) 
answer and or dig for in-depth answers (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008a). 
Semi-structured interviews were used for this research in two rounds, allowing the 
researcher to collect data that illustrated how the projects are developed in the 
Type of interviews
Respondent interview 
(interviewer in charge)
Structured interview 
(Questionnaire)
Semi-structured 
interview
(Check list )
Informer interviews (the 
interviwee is more in 
charge)
Unstructured interview 
(in-depth, broad area, 
devlops as the 
interview progresses)
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Saudi public sector, and how the context effect on the contractors' cost 
performance. Semi-structured interviews are flexible and allow the interviewer to 
explore deeper and explore topics related to the problem under investigation. The 
interviews took around 45 minutes each and, in a location, agreed with interviewees 
prior to the interviews. 
The interviews also allowed the research to develop the codes related to 
construction projects development and procurement that were to be labelled across 
all interviewees within the data analysis. Moreover, it allows the researcher to use 
the pre-assigned codes related to the cost overrun causes identification and paths. 
Based on the literature review the aide memoir around the questions based on a list 
of topics that need to be covered was developed. 
The research used a protocol for the interview which describes the engagement of 
the researcher and the approach of collecting and documenting the pieces of 
evidence. Moreover, it allows the researcher to achieve consistency over the 
interviews. Nevertheless, the protocol is infused by the research problem, 
questions, aim, and objectives. 
The research method literature shows that different types of questions could be 
used in interviews. For example, Mohamad (2014), mentioned that a qualitative 
interviews’ questions are mainly divided into: introduction: follow up; probing; 
specifying; factual and descriptive; structural; contrast, and generative questions. 
Moreover, a sequence of events within an interview has been suggested by 
experts: 
• Introduction is the first part of an interview; the researcher needs to 
introduce himself (name, background, and current research status) and 
explain the aim of the research in general and the aim of this interview. 
Nonetheless, an ethics form was signed by each interviewee, which 
explained to them their rights, and who has access to data as well as 
anonymity, and the boundary of confidently. 
• Following that, the type of the earlier questions are warm-up and 
straightforward questions. 
• After that, the interviewer will move to the main body of interview where the 
interviewer tries to extract information about the investigated topic.  
• Cool-off questions are used to diffuse tension possibly caused by the main 
part of the interviews. 
• Finally, comes closure, where interviewees are thanked and made sure they 
are happy to continue as part of the research. 
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Using the above guides, and based on gaps raised during the literature review 
stage (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), the interview questions were developed (Table 
29). In these interviews, the researcher aimed to achieve more than one objective. 
Thus, for Objective One, for example, the questions were intended to fill and 
explore the gaps that had been found in the document regarding current practices 
of delivering Saudi public projects, as well as confirm/discard document practices in 
the real-life situation. Two rounds of interviews were conducted. 
Besides these questions, researchers use phrases such as “tell me about it” or “can 
you give me an example” to keep interviewees talking and providing information 
about a specific point that needs to be investigated further. 
Before conducting the interviews, the researcher attended online classes that 
provided skills and tips for interviews. Moreover, a pilot study was conducted with 
relevant experts and which pertained to testing and improving the quality of the 
interviews’ questions before the real data interview take place (De Vaus and de 
Vaus, 2013). 
A pilot study for the semi-structured interview questions was carried out with five 
respondents. The feedback led to some adjustments in the questions. Experts from 
Saudi Arabia with a background in construction cost management were involved in 
the pilot study during which irrelevant questions were eliminated from the initial list. 
This facilitated a quicker understanding and shorter response time from the 
respondents. The pilot study then led to the data collection process and analysis. 
Also, the issue of trustworthiness had to be considered by the researcher in order to 
enable a higher number of participants to be involved in the research. This was 
achieved by following standard guidance: 
• The design of the interview should be well considered, and avoidance of 
unclear, lengthy, confusing questions should be applied. 
• Avoid leading question and being judgmental as well as give the 
interviewees time to answer.  
• The use of additional information whenever needed. 
• Emphasising the purpose of the research to the participant; this carries 
great value in respect to the issue of the trustworthy.  
• Finally, making it clear to the participants that they can withdraw at any point 
of the interview or the questionnaire will undoubtedly increase their trust in 
both the research and the researcher. 
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Topics Question, Sub-Question, and/or 
tasks 
Objectives from the 
question/ Sub-
Question/tasks 
Introduction Researcher introduced himself and his 
background. 
Explain the research aim and 
objectives, how the research output 
could benefit the Saudi construction 
industry, why they have been chosen, 
the process of the interview and their 
right to withdraw at any point of the 
interview, why I record the interview 
and who has access to the data, and 
how their identity will be anonymous. 
Sign interview consent form. 
To build a trust relationship 
with the interviewee, as he 
should feel comfortable, and 
understand the research to 
give the best possible 
answer. 
Warm-up 
Demographic 
Info 
Would you please introduce yourself? 
Degree? Possession? Experience? 
Would you please tell me about the 
company you are working for? 
Classification? Size? Experience? 
Type of projects? Number of staffs? 
What is your department and 
responsibilities? 
Warm-up and 
straightforward questions to 
build trust and confidence 
with the interviewee. 
Demographic information 
about the interviewee. 
Introduction Would you please tell me about the 
characteristics of the projects that your 
company is generally involved with? 
Projects’ ownership? Type? Size? 
Are they different? 
Why do you prefer this type? 
To know whether the 
interviewees are familiar 
with public projects. 
To understand owners’ and 
contractors’ point of view 
regarding preferring public 
projects over private 
Project life cycle How you are usually involved in such 
projects? 
How does that differ from a project to 
another? 
How projects’ designer is usually 
involved in projects? 
What are the tender documents? 
What the process and duration to study 
and price projects? 
What happens after you submit a 
tender? 
How does the law deal with a sudden 
material price change after submitting 
the tender and start construction 
phase? 
To what extent do you think public 
agencies usually follow the STPL? 
As a contractor, do you have an idea 
about the estimated budget by owner? 
To investigate interviewees 
familiarity with tendering 
process and STPL? 
Investigation public projects 
life cycle: at which milestone 
contractors are usually 
involved in projects? 
Moreover, how could that 
affect projects performance? 
To test whether the tender 
and procurement law is 
applied? 
What are the shortcomings 
of applying the STPL? 
Is the contractor is covered 
if the material prices change 
during the construction 
phase start? 
Cost-related How you usually deal with pricing the 
BOQ table for public projects? 
How a material price database could 
help contractors to price BOQ? 
In the absence of a national database 
for the material price, how do you 
estimate? 
An Item price analysis. 
To what extent is the 
absence of a national 
database for material/labour 
price would affect public 
projects contractors 
estimating/claims? Any 
alternatives? 
How contractors usually are 
build-up their price? What is 
the method of estimating? 
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Different type of projects is 
going to effects pricing? 
Issue facing 
public projects 
In 2009, the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission (NAC) issued a report 
about public construction projects and 
stated that there are 3000 stalled 
(defaulted) public projects, from your 
point of view what leads to such 
situation? 
In your opinion, to what extent the 
current project delivery mechanism is 
involved in such phenomena? 
How would the Saudi context affect? 
To investigate the main 
issue that faces public 
construction projects in 
Saudi Arabia? 
To what extent does the 
Saudi tendering law affect a 
contract? 
Relationship 
between client 
and contractor 
How would you describe: 
the relationship between client and 
contractor, contractors and sub-
contractor, contractor/clients and 
Suppliers within the Saudi construction 
industry? 
How could a long relationship between 
you and other parties in the Saudi 
construction industry be conducted?  
How and how often do you contact the 
owner during the construction stage? 
To understand the 
relationship type between 
public projects’ parties in 
Saudi Arabia. 
To what extent is the Saudi 
tendering law and contract 
is affecting the relationship 
between projects parties 
especially between 
contractors and owners? 
Are projects’ parties 
planning typically to conduct 
a long relationship? 
Public work 
contract and 
problem-solving 
mechanism 
What sort of contracts are generally 
applied within public projects? 
How could you describe the risks 
allocation with the SPC? 
What about the rewards for the party 
holding the risks? 
Within the Saudi construction industry, 
how problems are solved? 
Literature shows that that 
public work contract 
allocates most risks to 
contractors: 
To investigate and test the 
mechanism of risks 
allocation in public projects 
contracts? 
Why would contractors hold 
the most risks? 
lesson learnt 
mechanism 
Within the Saudi public sector, how 
does the lesson learned mechanism 
work? 
Is there any lesson learnt 
mechanism within the owner 
department? 
Cost overrun Q: Are you familiar with the phrase 
"cost overrun"? Would you be able to 
define it? 
Q: From your point of view, what are 
the factors that would lead to a 
contractors’ cost overrun? 
Q: From your point of view, how would 
a contractor avoid cost overrun or 
reduce its effects? 
To test contractors’ 
understanding of cost 
overrun 
To identify the main causes 
of contractors’ cost overrun 
from different parties’ point 
of view 
To understand what would 
help to reduce the 
contractors’ cost overrun. 
Cool off Thank the interviewees  
Contact information for future contact 
Still happy to take part in research 
 
Table 29: Two rounds of interview questions. 
 
Table 30 shows the interviewees, who are mixed from both the owner's and the 
contractor's sides. During the selection process of who was to be interviewed, the 
focus was on the individuals involved in the process of development and 
procurement construction projects from the owner side, and the individuals who are 
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managing the construction projects from the contractors' side. This was also 
affected by the availability of the interviewees. To avoid over-relying on one source, 
multi-interviews were conducted several individuals who hold the same position. As 
Table 30 shows a total of 22 interviews were conducted across the case study. 
During the analysis and to ease the analysis for the research, the content of the 
interviews was presented in tables that contain paragraph text to link the 
relationships between the eleven interviewees. 
The interviews involved 11 highly experienced personnel from the owners’ and 
contractors’ sides (Table 30) with between 7 and 39 years in the industry with 
qualifications from BSc to MSc. This is important as the sampling for this research 
is theoretical sampling, which does not depend on the random larger population but 
rather on a smaller number of experts with in-depth views about the subject. 
Inter. 
Code 
Position Degree Experience 
Organization 
Experience 
Organisation 
classification 
Project 
budget ($ 
US) 
normally 
involved in 
C1 PM BSc. Eng. 12 Y. 
21 years’ 
experience in 
building, 
mechanical, and 
electrical work. 
2nd in Building 
3rd Electrical 
4th mechanical 
10-40 M 
C2 PM BSc. Eng. 39 Y 
45 years’ 
experience in all 
projects type. 
1st in all 
categories. 
15 M and 
over. 
C3 PM BSc. Eng. 35 Y. 
21 years’ 
experience in 
building, Electrical 
work. 
Building 2nd, 
Mechanical 2nd 
Electrical: 2nd 
10.6- 37.3 M 
C4 PM Msc.Eng. 12 Y 
30 years’ 
experience in 
building, Electrical 
work 
Building: 3rd 
Mechanical 4th 
Electrical 5th. 
1.2-10 M 
C5 PM BSc. Eng. 22Y 
Around 16 years’ 
experience in 
Roads. 
Roads 3rd, 
building 5th, 
sewage 5th. 
Up to 40 M 
C6 PM BSc. Eng. 11 Y 
35 years’ 
experience in 
Roads only. 
Roads 2nd Vary 
C7 PM BSc. Eng. 30 Y 
41 years’ 
experience in 
Roads mainly 
Roads 1st, 
building 1st, 
swage 1st. 
Vary 
O1 
Owner Rep. 
(Vice 
Presidency for 
Projects) 
BSc. Eng. 8 Y 15 Years 
Public 
Organisation 
All projects 
sizes and 
types 
O2 
Owner Rep. 
(Vice 
Presidency for 
Projects) 
BSc. Eng. 11 Y 15 Years 
Public 
Organisation 
All projects 
sizes and 
types 
O3 
Owner Rep. 
(Finance 
Department) 
BSc. 
Accounting 
16 Y 15 Years 
Public 
Organisation 
All projects 
sizes and 
types 
O4 
Owner Rep. 
(Studies and 
Designs 
Department) 
BSc. Eng. 7 Y 15 Years 
Public 
Organisation 
All projects 
sizes and 
types 
Table 30: Interviewees’ Backgrounds. 
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3.11 Data analysis: 
Literature shows that there are different types of data analysis techniques for 
qualitative data which could be classified based on different categories, such as 
whether a technique is based on coding or interpretation, or based on interpretive 
or sequential analysis (Moerman, 2017). Content analysis and thematic analysis 
most common forms of analysis within qualitative research Content analysis is 
defined as “the process of organising information into categories related to the 
central questions of the research” (Bowen, 2009), while thematic analysis is based 
on recognising and identifying patterns (themes) within the data as well as 
emerging themes becoming the categories for analysis (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). Within the literature, different analysis guidance have been 
identified, with Schmidt (2004), for example, offering a five-step guide to conducting 
thematic analysis: 
First: Material Categorisation; the researcher categorises the collected data by 
going through data such as a transcribed interview and identifying individual 
aspects that could be related to the investigated topic. 
Second: Themes Developing; the different identified aspects are developed as 
themes based on the research objectives and aim. 
Third: Nodes Developing; themes divided into nodes (smaller codes) that contain 
more detailed information than themes. 
Fourth: Linking codes; the codes will be linked to form Cases. 
Fifth: Interpretation; the cases are interpreted to give meaning to the research. 
Thematic analysis was used as the main tool for analysing the data. The reason of 
choosing this toll that thematic analysis goes beyond simply counting phrases or 
words in a text (as in content analysis) and explores explicit and implicit meanings 
within the data (Guest et al., 2011). Moreover, according to Braun and Clarke 
(2013), thematic analysis can be used to explore questions about real-life 
experiences, behaviour and practices, the factors and social processes that 
influence and shape particular phenomena, the explicit and implicit norms and 
'rules' governing particular practices, as well as the social construction of meaning 
and the representation of social objects in particular texts and contexts. Based on 
that, thematic analysis is the best analysis tool to achieve this research aim to build 
a cost overrun causality model that include the effect of the context and the process 
of developing construction projects. 
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As a result of the large amount of the qualitative data collected, there was a need to 
use an appropriate tool to manage the data. The litreature, documents, and 
interviews were printed and managed manually, and all of the data coded manually. 
The previous studies were used to draw a background of the Saudi public sector 
(four profiles in chapter two) and the schools of thought regarding cost overrun 
causes (objective three). The laws and regulations, on the other hand, have been 
used to illustrate the process and procedures used to develop and procure 
construction projects. Finally, the interviews are used to fill any gaps that need to 
illustrate the process and procedures, the mechanisms of the context affecting the 
contractors' cost performance, and build the paths of the causes. Before the 
analysis started, the data were presented in tables. For example, for the interviews, 
under each of interview's questions follwed by all of the interviewees' answers. 
In the beginning, and as a result of the volume of the qualitative data, the textual 
data were reduced and presented in a more suitable way using tables to help to 
draw conclusions. The data reduction step is a continuation of the previous 
reductions which are inherent in decisions taken during the research design, such 
as the type of framework and data collecting techniques (Miles and Huberman 
1994). It is worth mentioning that the main aim of data reduction through coding in 
qualitative research is to organise the large amount of data in a way it would be 
possible to draw research conclusions. 
However, the choices for the codes and coding mechanism cannot be totally 
objective, which is one of the critiques of qualitative studies. Unbiased choices have 
been conducted by the researcher which are based on the case study design and 
the propositions illustrated in section (3.6.2.2). 
Thus, the codes fundamentally are apprised by: first, for the context investigation, 
the themes mainly guided by the theories that have been discussed in section 
(1.1.4) as well as in section (4.5.7) for the causality path. In according with that, the 
main themes for the context investigation the main four lenses are used which are 
Economic, Business environment, Resources, Regulations and laws. On the hand, 
the main themes for the causality chains building are Procurement, Regulation, 
Country’s economy, Force majeure, Uncertainty, Fraudulent practices, Social, 
Process, and Behaviour. 
Although the above results in a significant number of pre-defined codes for each 
objective, through the analysis activity some of the codes merged with others and, 
as a result, the number and the contents of the codes changed over the analysis 
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process. A good example of the merging of codes are the causes codes where their 
number started with hundreds and ended in a smaller number (see section 4.4.4.3). 
By using the codes described above, the data has been reduced and arranged in a 
formalised way. As a result, the data has been rearranged under the defined codes. 
The researcher has used tables to arrange the textual data.Those codes are 
considered to be the main part of the analysis stage. Both types of codes 
(descriptive and interpretive) (Miles and Huberman 1994) are used in the analysis 
phase for this research in order to obtain the supportive data explaining the context, 
and how construction projects are developed, and their effect on contractors' cost 
performance. 
As illustrated earlier, codes could be either pre-defined or developed from the data 
through the process of analysis. Thus, and more than one time, the researcher 
repeated the coding procedure. the repetition of the procedure allows the 
researcher to be closer to the collected data and understand it more, as well as the 
codes to become more accurate in representing the problem under investigation. 
The researcher put significant care and consideration into the development of the 
codes so as to keep them in the short-term memory through the analysis phase. To 
manage that, the researcher has analysed each of the objectives separately, with 
the total number of codes for the whole study being over 200 codes. The maximum 
number of codes that could be manageable by a researcher, according to Miles and 
Huberman (1994), is 50 codes. Conducting the analysis for objectives individually is 
arguably better for the research and results in more accurate results, since 
conducting over 50 codes at the same time could lead to missing some of the 
coding and wrong coding. This was also found by Blismas and Dainty (2003) who 
encourage researchers to self-control during coding and highlight the drawbacks of 
using an over-large number of codes beyond a researcher’s ability. 
After four times going through the data, no new codes appeared to the researcher. 
The first passing through the data produced over 200 codes for the objectives, 
however, going through the data again the number of codes had been reduced after 
refinement where a number of codes were merged. The new list was used in on the 
second pass and as a result, the list was refined. The same process was done for a 
second and then third time until the final codes were developed. 
Assigning a piece of text to a number of codes is another method that is used to 
refine and reduce the number of codes which is recommended by Blismas and 
Dainty (2003). 
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During he initial identification of codes through the text it was found that a number 
of codes were similar, which resulted in merging similar codes together or 
combining under one category (node). To avoid overlap between codes which 
would result in inaccurate analysis, the researcher put an effort throughout the 
analysis phase to distinguish between the different categories. The total final 
number of codes is 32 which are used as the base for the analysis and how the 
data will be presented. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), data presentation 
is part of the data analysis as it helps in extracting the finding from the data and 
construct conclusions out of data. 
The analysis in this research is presented in tables where the individual codes are 
linked to text from the collected data and the relationship between the codes is also 
illustrated. Data presentation (displaying), nevertheless, increased the robustness 
of the conclusion and discussion as well allowed codes analysis to be informed by 
relevant variables. 
3.12 Causal Loop Diagram (CLD): 
The discussion of the previous studies in sections (3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6) shows 
that the majority of studies frame the cost overrun problem in a manner that ignores 
the complex and highly dynamic context of projects, as well as not evidencing that 
traditional net-effect correlational analysis has been taken. Moreover, previous 
studies lack examination of the impact of interrelationships/causalities between two 
or more factors. The causes are listed as stand-alone causes, thus ignoring any 
interaction between causes. Researchers used statistical methods to rank the 
contributing factors according to their impacts without considering the interactions 
among/between these factors. Moreover, the studies suggested solutions and 
remedies without identifying the root causes of the overruns. Any attempt to 
address the cost overruns would be futile unless the root causes are identified 
because cost overruns are a net result of complex relationships between two or 
more factors. Based on these limitations, this research uses a tool called causal 
loop diagram (CLD) that allows the researcher to present the 
interrelationships/causalities between causes. A causal loop diagram (CLD) is a 
diagram that aims to represent the interrelation between variables visually 
(Sterman, 2001). It was also described by Schaffernicht (2010) as "qualitative 
diagramming languages". Some of the advantages that attract researchers to use 
the tool are the non-complex, uncomplicated, easy way to represent the 
interrelation and interference between the variables, thereby allowing ease in 
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understanding by people who have little l knowledge about the research. CLD is 
also used as a tool to expose a problem or model in a way to be understand by a 
team (cost overrun for this research). 
The causes identified in an earlier stage of the study will be used to develop causal 
paths leading into a causal network. The paths are categorised thematically under 
the themes developed in Objective Three. To build the model, data from the 
literature, documents, as well as interviews are used. The causal path used 
relevant literature as the starting point for further discussion with the interviewees to 
both identify further causes and paths that are not incorporated, and to modify 
interrelationships.  
In this model, the paths and relationships between causes are established without 
concentrating on the degree of relationship (influence) or even indicating whether 
the relationship is a reinforcing one or a negating one. In addition, and for the sake 
of brevity and reduction of network complexity, an initial mini network of paths from 
the early stages were developed. Thus, the new path will start from these mini-
networks rather than directly from a single cause. 
The causal model diagrams prepared were presented to key informants as well as 
presented at a national construction conference in Saudi Arabia for further 
discussion. Based on these discussions the causal model was further refined. 
According to Lane (2008), a CLD consists of the three main components which are: 
• A variable: This component is representing the factors (for this research 
causes) which affect each other in real life. For the sake of this research, as 
it will be explained thoroughly in section 4.6.1, the variables (causes) are 
divided into three types which are: Root causes, Intermediate Causes, and 
Direct Causes. 
• An Arrow: This component is representing the causal connection between 
variables (causes). Normally, an arrow in the CLD is represented along with 
(+) or (-) which represents the influencing between variables by a direct (+) 
and indirect (-) relationship between variables (causes) between variables 
(causes).  
• A Loop polarity: This component represents the type of the loop, whether it 
is reinforcing (+) or balancing (-). 
For this research, the CLDs are used as a thinking development tool of the cost 
overrun causality as represented by the understanding by the researcher and 
interviewees, non-Saudi and Saudi, of the contractors' cost overrun causes. The 
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main focus in this model is the chain development of the causes that needed to fully 
understand the system more than focusing on the comprehensiveness of the 
causes as recommended by (Lane and Husemann, 2008). 
Although one of the main features of CLD is it being presented in closed loops, the 
diagram in this research is not a fully closed loops' diagram. The main reasons for 
this difference being that the CLD is not representing the whole system for 
contractors' cost overrun causality rather than part of it which are limited by the 
research limitation (section 1.6). For example, the final CLD presented in section 
4.6.3 represents the CLD started by the contractors' involvement in the project 
(tender phase). Moreover, construction projects are considered as an open system 
which affects and is affected by external factors. 
One of the disadvantages that have been identified for this approach (CLD) is the 
"polarity confusion " between the variables or the loop (Lane and Husemann, 2008). 
To overcome such a limitation, the polarity for arrows and loops will not be used for 
this research model. Instead, during the CLD development, an explanation of the 
relationship between the causes will be provided. 
3.13 . Research Trustworthiness: 
One of the main differences between daily observations and research is that 
research is more believable than observation. Thus, knowledge resulting from 
scientific research should be more defensible by critically examining and testing the 
processes of choosing a research philosophy, approach, strategy, and data 
collecting and analysis to assure the rigour of research processes and the 
inferences made. The main criteria used in providing a defensible knowledge are 
validity and reliability (Cook and Campbell, 1979; Kidder and Judd, 1986; Seale, 
1999). Research philosophy and strategy play a major role in choosing the 
processes, adherence, and rigour required to be followed to satisfy these criteria. 
Table 31 explains the trustworthiness criteria implemented in the research: 
 
Major measure of 
Trustworthiness 
The study’s approach to comply for 
the trustworthiness requirement 
C
o
n
te
n
t 
v
a
li
d
it
y
 Ensures that the interviews’ 
questions are related to the 
interviewees’ level of 
knowledge. 
This research uses the judgement of 
experts with a high level of experience 
for validation and pilot study for the 
interviews questions as well as the 
synthesis literature review. 
C
ri
te
ri
o
n
 
v
a
li
d
it
y
 Evaluate the effectiveness of 
the instrument to measure what 
is designed to measure. 
The sample population and size, as well 
as level of knowledge, were considered 
during the process of designing semi-
structured interview questions. 
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Major measure of 
Trustworthiness 
The study’s approach to comply for 
the trustworthiness requirement 
The pilot study was used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the research 
instruments. 
A brief introduction which includes 
explanation was used prior to the 
interviews. 
C
o
n
s
tr
u
c
t 
v
a
li
d
it
y
 
Translation validity  Although the evaluation mainly based on 
previous literature and personal 
experience, the research methods must 
be designed to reflect the theoretical 
research background. Moreover, the 
pilot study was used to evaluate 
translation validity. 
Data triangulation (multiple 
sources of evidence) 
The research uses a multi data source 
(different documents, literature review, 
and interviewee) and collection strategy 
by employing literature synthesis, 
document analysis and interviews as its 
data sources. 
Review of transcripts and draft 
by peers, key informants, etc. 
The summarised outputs (Causality 
Model) was presented in the biggest 
Saudi conference as well as it was 
reviewed by key informants and 
contractors in the public sector. 
Present cases systematically 
(from research question to a 
conclusion and vice versa) 
The links between research objective 
(and questions), research conceptual 
framework and analysis output were 
established. 
Explanation of data analysis 
(clarification of data analysis 
procedure) 
Content analysis of documents and 
interviews guided by international best 
and accepted practices is used. 
Theory triangulation The study heavily relied on other 
research and international cost overrun 
causes as its part of the analysis in 
identifying causes of cost overrun as 
well as building the causes paths.  
Multi-analysis techniques have 
been used 
Content analysis, as well as thematic 
analysis, were used as the major 
analysis techniques. 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
v
a
li
d
it
y
 
Rationale for case study 
selection  
The rationale for selecting the Saudi 
public project delivery mechanism is 
presented. 
Details on case study context  Details of the nature and main feature of 
the Saudi public project context are 
presented. 
Comparison with other 
literature/study  
A comparison with the literature and 
other contexts is conducted when it is 
applicable (especially for the cost 
overrun part). 
R
e
li
a
b
i
li
ty
 Case study protocol (report of 
how the entire case study was 
conducted) 
A summarised presentation of how the 
study is conducted is presented in the 
above section. 
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Major measure of 
Trustworthiness 
The study’s approach to comply for 
the trustworthiness requirement 
Case study, literature review, 
and survey databases (contain 
all available documents, 
interview transcripts, archival 
data, etc.) 
Database of the documents analysed, 
and interviews conducted is maintained 
and can be accessed upon request. 
Maintain chain of evidence  As much as possible, chain of evidences 
from research question to the 
conceptualization to the data analysis 
and conclusions and recommendations 
made are established. 
Table 31: The study’s approach to complying with the trustworthiness requirement. 
3.14 Ethical considerations: 
Participants’ personal safety and data confidentiality are the main ethical issues, 
with confidentiality being a key factor in participants being more willing to participate 
in a research project if their identity and data is kept confidential. This factor also 
affects data accuracy and validity. To reduce such effects, and using the literature 
as guidance, the following action was taken: 
• Personal questions kept to the minimum. 
• Securing access: the main researcher is the only one who has access to the 
raw data. 
• To keep participants anonymous, a coding system has been used during the 
data analysis and output presenting. 
• The research data bank was stored in an encrypted electronic server 
(university server). Another copy has been stored in a private storage cloud. 
Both data locations are compliant with the United Kingdom Privacy Act. 
• The data will be kept for five years in case it is needed. Data will then be 
deleted from all stored locations. 
Besides ensuring confidentiality, some actions were taken to cover relevant legal 
matters for the research participants’ privacy. A consent form was signed by all the 
research participants before the interview was conducted. Moreover, the interviewer 
made it clear that: 
• They have the option to withdraw from the study at any point during the 
interview or after. 
• Data will be used for only a research purpose. 
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• Illustrate to them the aim of the research, interview stages, expected time, 
as well as the process of data collecting method. 
• The coding protocol used during the analysis stage was fully explained. 
• Any participant in this research (either an individual or an organisation) had 
the process of the data collection, analysis and distortion illustrated to them. 
3.15 Summary of the research method: 
The research onion model has been used for this research as guidance. As shown 
in Figure 25, a Pragmatism research philosophy was adopted. The second layer of 
the onion shows an abductive approach as the research is purely qualitative. As 
illustrated earlier, different research strategies have been adopted for different 
objectives: Figure 22 shows that Systematic Literature Review, and Case Study, 
have been used as research strategies. In the beginning, documents and interview 
were used to develop a model exploring the current practice for developing public 
projects in Saudi Arabia. Evaluating that, the main weaknesses were illustrated and 
identified. Synthesising the literature review was used to identify and evaluate the 
cost overrun literature. Finally, the survey and literature used to develop causes 
paths and model using CLD as a tool. The finding(s) of the data collection were 
validated using four expert interviews.  
 
Figure 25: The research onion for this research. 
Pragmatism 
Philosophy
Abductive Approach
Literature Review, Case 
Study
Multi-method Qualitative 
Research
Cross-sectional
Project Document, 
Interviews, 
Systematic 
Literature Review, 
Thematic Analysis.
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction: 
This chapter includes the analysis and discus of data gathered to achieve the 
research objectives and aim. The data gathering, sampling, and analysing 
techniques for each objective were detailed in chapter three (section 3.10). Based 
on section Research Design: (research design), the data gathering techniques used 
for this research are: Interviews, Documents, and Systematic Literature Review. 
The data analysis and discussion for each objective will be presented individually; it 
will be shown how each objective contributes to the final result; the contractors’ cost 
overrun causal model. 
4.2 Objective one: 
Chapter Two explained the context of the Saudi construction industry. The country’s 
economy, business environment, etc. are examples of the context exploration. As a 
continuation to achieve objective one, the process and practices of projects 
development will be explored. 
For this objective, the current practices and processes used to deliver a public 
sector construction project in Saudi Arabia are explored and described. This 
includes the presentation and evaluation of organisation structure, project phases, 
and development process. Data has been extracted from the project and 
government documents as well as interviews and analysed by using the content 
analysis technique. The final output was presented to experts in the Saudi public 
sector for verification, and the output was refined in response to their comments. 
4.2.1 Organisation structure: 
Since Saudi Arabia was established on 23 September 1932, public authorities have 
gone through different development and structures changes, often aligning with the 
country's strategic planning. For example, between 1964 and 2003, most of the 
public projects were under the Ministry of Public Works, which was revoked in 
2003, and their responsibilities moved to other ministries. A public organisation 
structure is typically approved by the council of ministers. Although the public 
organisations in Saudi Arabia vary in their responsibilities, their project organisation 
structure is similar especially in the higher stages. The regulations presented in 
section 3.10.1 authorise a public agency to deliver construction projects but for this 
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objective, only the Saudi public sector (owner) side has been explored — the main 
reason being that all the public authorities in the Saudi public context follow the 
same laws and regulations, thereby resulting in similar organisational structures, 
unlike contractors (private sector) who are not acting under such rules and can, 
therefore, adopt diverse institutional structures. Moreover, the focus of the study is 
more on understanding the effects of the owner side in creating contractors’ cost 
overrun. 
Figure 26 shows the whole structure of a Saudi public organisation and the 
departments that are contacted directly with projects. Beside other divisions that are 
not responsible for projects directly, such as human resources, projects are 
developed and delivered usually under a separate main division called Project 
Division which links directly to the Minister and Vice Minister for projects. The 
division is not only responsible for implementing new projects but also for 
maintaining existing projects. The division works in a project-based manner to 
conduct, oversee, and manage the planning, designing, execution, and maintaining 
all types of projects. In this context, a project is a primary unit for all the tasks such 
as production, organisation, innovation, and competition (Hobday, 2000). Moreover, 
the structures, strategies, and capabilities of that organisation build around projects' 
needs (Hobday, 2000). The General Administration of Projects is the department 
responsible for implementing new projects, with sub-departments of Planning and 
Contracting Department, Implementation Supervision Department, and Studies and 
Design Department. The full responsibilities for these departments are shown in 
Table 32. 
Although the organisation structure has been identified as one of the factors of 
project success (Walker and Vines, 2000), it has limited functionality (the 
hierarchical relationship among the departments/teams/personals). The 
organisation structure, for example, does not present how the project organisation 
actually works. To overcome such limitations, and based on the same information 
gathered from projects’ document and interviews, the researcher has built a figure 
(Figure 27, page 123) that shows supply and demand chains which include money, 
material, and information flows. 
To be clearer about the organisational structure of a Saudi public sector, the 
structure has been divided into three levels based on Parsons' institutional levels 
(Morris and Geraldi, 2011) as in Figure 26 (page 122). 
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Responsibilities 
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 • Review the general plan of the ministry 
• Work on long-term plans of the ministry 
• Follow-up and supervision of all operations and maintenance of all 
facilities 
• Supervision of all projects. 
• Hand over projects to beneficiaries (End-user). 
• Providing technical consultation to the ministry. 
• Developing the technical and administrative workforce. 
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• Receipt of project's documents (drawings, technical specifications, 
and BoQs) that have been scheduled for implementation. 
• Identify project resources and supervision. 
• Communicate and coordinate with approved contractors to 
implement the projects. 
• Prepare the pre-construction meeting and provide all the 
clarifications and answer inquiries. 
• Study, review and approve plans submitted by contractors 
• Monitor progress of all projects' implementation activities and 
ensure compliance with the terms and documents of the contract. 
• Study and review the proposed amendments to the projects by the 
project manager or the beneficiaries and submit them for final 
approval. 
• Study, review, and approve contractors' and suppliers' executive 
plans, materials, equipment, and equipment. 
• Prepare daily, weekly and monthly workflows reports. 
• Provide technical advice to the ministry.  
• Participate actively with the Department of Studies and Design in 
the advanced stages of the project development. 
• Participate in initial and final handovers. 
• Communicate and coordinate with the Finance Department to 
renew financial commitments for projects under implementation or 
to increase financial engagement in accordance with the approved 
amendments to the scope of the contract. 
• Closing contracts. 
• Arrange and organise files, records and documents of executed 
projects. 
• Release bonds. 
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• Developing and updating the procedures followed in overseeing the 
implementation of projects. 
• Address the problems and obstacles that may arise during the 
project execution period. 
• Define the responsibilities of the implementation supervision teams. 
• Monitor and supervise the implementation of projects. 
• Control cost during the implementation phase within approved 
funds. 
• Follow up the projects implementation programs and verify the 
progress of work according to the approved. 
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• Follow-up all studies and design for the ministry's projects. 
• Increase efficiency and invest in human resources and develop 
their capacities. 
• Identify the design teams and devices. 
• Preparation of lists of approved designers. 
• Study and analyse the design stage bids. 
• Participate in preparing the annual budget for new projects and 
projects under design. 
• Quality control of project design documents. 
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t • Monitor the completion of the contracting procedures of all tenders 
and direct purchase. 
• Preparing, auditing, and signing contracts from both parties. 
• Ensure that the STPL is applied. 
• Declaration of the results of opening envelopes and competitions 
• Completion of the procedures for the contractors' payment. 
Table 32: Departments’ Responsibilities. 
 
The three levels are: 
• Technical level (Micro Level): Operates within the project, representing the 
delivery-execution core, strategic setting up this core (the project) and 
shielding it from environmental disruption (to manage in them). 
• Strategic level (Meso Level): Operates within the project (to manage in 
them). 
• Institutional level (Macro Level): Outside and around the project (to work on 
or for projects). 
The data from the interviews further clarified the limitations of such a structure and 
it has been found that: 
• The Saudi public authorities are based on a traditional organisational 
structure usually used by bureaucratic systems. 
• The administrative and relations levels and regulations build vertically and 
divide into departments, so power flows vertically from the top downward. 
• The degree of complexity and length of the structure increases as the size 
of the ministry increases. 
• This leads to increasing of the gap between the various departments and 
the top of the management hierarchy, thereby adding difficulty in 
communicating with the top of the administrative hierarchy. 
• Such a structure does not follow the principles of the modern organisation 
structure which aims to reduce power lines. 
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Figure 26: Organisational structure of a typical public agency. 
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Figure 27: supply and demand chains in Saudi public sector. 
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4.2.2 Construction public project phases in Saudi Arabia: 
Literature shows that there are different project life cycle phases. Projects’ type, 
technology, and delivery mechanism affect the project life cycle phases such as 
their number and sequences (Wideman, 2004; Turner et al., 2009). 
Based on relevant regulations, laws, and interviews, a Saudi public project 
operating under normal situation, where a ministry does not jump some phases 
because of external factors, can be shown to pass through four phases: 
4.2.2.1 The project planning phase: 
Data availability was limited to this phase. Neither the documents nor the 
interviewees show, for example, whether there are specific steps, forms, regulation 
to be followed. This phase involves the identification of pools of potential projects 
for implementation. Although planning could be implemented by the Planning and 
Contracting Department (bottom level of the organisation structure), planning is 
based on Ministry long, medium, and short plans as well as the need for projects 
from other departments. The planning process goes up the organisation structure 
for approval based on different factors such as the country’s economic situation that 
year, which determines the number of approvals by the Council of Ministries and 
thereby the ministry’s annual budget. The output of this stage is normally provided 
to the designer during the design service tender sub-phase. 
4.2.2.2 Design Phase: 
According to relevant laws and regulations, the Saudi public sector adopts the 
traditional delivery strategy; the development phase is executed sequentially to the 
implementation phase. To fill the experience and technical gap of designing and 
supervising construction projects, government agencies appoint an external 
consultant office beside the General Administration of Projects' departments (see 
the organisation structure Figure 26 (page 122)). However, the regulations 
consider, financially approve, and procure each service to the projects separately. 
Thus some of the sub-phases are repeated as Figure 28 shows. 
This phase involves the development of the project design (drawings, 
specifications, and BOQ). In this phase, 70% of the final product’s cost is typically 
defined (Kochan, 1991). This phase can be divided into three sub-phases: 
A. Financial Approval sub-phase: The financial regulation deals with any 
service such as designing, consulting or constructing separately. Thus a 
financial approval is needed for each service. Financial approvals are 
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normally included in the ministry’s annual budget. Failure to sign a contract 
for the approved services within the fiscal year will force the government 
entity to refund the money back to the Ministry of Finance (Saudi Ministry of 
Finance, 2006). 
B. The design procurement sub-phase: As each service is treated separately, 
procuring the service is the second step after it was financially approved. As 
Figure 28 shows, this sub-phase comprises seven steps and ends with the 
contract being signed with the appointed designer office (see Table 36). 
C. The design sub-phase: Although the data collected does not provide steps 
to be followed for the design sub-phase, which could be understood as 
projects are unique and each design could be treated to the Studies and 
Design Department best judgement, it involves the development of a 
detailed design. According to the Saudi Government Tenders and 
Procurement Law, a detailed design, set of specifications, bills of quantities 
(BOQ) and the estimated costs must be prepared for the intended project 
before the implementation stage take place. This document will be provided 
to the contractor(s). 
4.2.2.3 The implementation phase: 
Similar to the Design phase, the regulations consider, financially approve and 
procure projects construction separately; thus, similarly, to design this phase is 
divided into three sub-phases: 
A. Financial Approval sub-phase: No difference from the design financial 
approval. 
B. The construction procurement sub-phase: Similar to the design phase 
procurement. However, in the implementation phase, only the contractors' 
who are classified and qualified could be part of the process (refer to the 
contractors' classification system in chapter two) 
C. The construction sub-phase: this sub-phase involves the procedures and 
actions that reflect the development outputs and produce the physical 
structure to achieve the objective the project is planned for. 
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Figure 28: Project life cycle phases. 
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4.2.2.4 The project closure phase: 
After completing all construction tasks, the contractor will hand over the initial 
project to the client initial. A committee will hand over the project and sign an initial 
handover form. After a year, the final handover will take place, and the final 
payment (not less than 10% of the contract value) will be paid to the contractor. 
However, the financial guarantee will not be returned to the contractor until the 
maintenance period, which runs from provisional acceptance to final acceptance is 
finished. 
The project responsibility will move from the General Administration of Projects to 
the General Administration of Maintenance. 
4.2.3 Saudi Public Project Processes: 
In this section, the main processes of a construction project delivery are presented 
as practised by a Saudi public agency (extracted from the project document and 
interviews). To ease the understanding of the processes, they are presented in a 
table (Table 33). The processes are divided based on the main four phases being 
similar to the project phases in Figure 28. For each main process and sub-process, 
the Input Resource(s), Government Bodies Involved, Major Control(s), and 
Output(s) will be presented. As the process at the operation level could change 
from one agency to another, and the case study is the Saudi public sector, the 
process will not include the operation level. The table is presented hierarchically 
from general information to detailed information. 
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Process and 
sub-Process 
Input Resource(s) Government Bodies 
Involved 
Major Control(s) Output(s) 
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Five-Year plan 
development 
• Feedback of the previous 
plan. 
• Country Long-term 
Strategy. 
• Country vision and 
objectives for five years. 
• Council of Ministers 
(CoM). 
• Ministry of Economy 
and Planning 
(MoEP). 
• Ministry of Finance 
(MoF). 
• Council of Economic 
and Development 
Affairs (CoED). 
• Country future 
strategy. 
• Finance-Ability. 
• Country’s Capacity. 
• Five-Year country plan. 
• Programs and projects to 
be implemented during a 
five-year plan 
Annual plan 
development 
• Five-Year plan 
• Programs and projects to 
be implemented during a 
five-year plan. 
• The minister. 
• Vice-ministers for 
different divisions. 
• The ministry project 
division. 
• Planning and 
contracting 
department (PCD). 
• Five-Year Plan. 
• Ministry prioritisation 
and strategy. 
• Stakeholders’ need. 
• Annual budget. 
• Annual plan. 
• Programs and projects 
approved to be 
implemented that year. 
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Design service 
procurement 
• List of approved projects 
for design. 
• Project Development 
Plan Strategy. 
• Studies and Design 
Department (SDD) 
• PCD. 
• Tender analysis 
Committee 
• The Minister 
• MOF 
• STPL. 
• Implementing 
regulation STPL. 
• Budget 
• Capacity 
• Urgency 
• A singed design services 
contract. 
Project design • Singed design services 
contract. 
• Annual plan. 
• End-user requirements. 
• SDD  
• End-users. 
• Consulting 
Engineering Services 
Contract (Design). 
• Design standards. 
• End-user 
Requirements. 
• Design Report. 
• Tender Documents 
(Drawing and BOQ). 
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Supervision 
service 
procurement 
• List of approved projects 
for design. 
• Implementation 
Supervision 
Department (ISD). 
• PCD. 
• Tender analysis 
Committee. 
• The Minister. 
• MOF. 
• STPL. 
• Implementing 
regulation STPL. 
• Budget 
• Capacity 
• Urgency 
• Consulting engineering 
services contract 
(Supervision) 
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The project 
coalition setup 
and design 
review 
• Design Report. 
• Tender Documents 
(Drawing and BOQ). 
• General 
Administration of 
Projects (GAP). 
• SDD 
• Contractor. 
• Consulting engineering 
services contract 
(Supervision) 
• The ministry standards 
and manual. 
• Market Forces. 
• Revised design. 
• Revised tender document. 
The project 
quality 
assurance and 
monitoring 
• Project recourses. 
• Land 
• Project Documents 
(Drawing and BOQ). 
• The MOF. 
• GAP 
• SDD 
• Consultant. 
• Contractor. 
• Consulting engineering 
services contract 
(Supervision) 
• Revised design. 
• Revised tender 
document. 
• Public Work Contract 
(PWC). 
• Annual allocated 
budget. 
• Capacity. 
• Urgency. 
• The accepted Construction 
projects (initial handover). 
• Unsettled contractual 
issues. 
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The project 
commissioning 
and contract 
closure: 
• Finished projects. 
• Initial handover report. 
• Hand over 
committee. 
• The MOF. 
• General 
Administration of  
• Projects. 
• Consultant. 
• Contractor. 
• Public Work Contract 
(PWC). 
• Final Handover Report 
Table 33: Public Construction Projects Process. 
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4.2.4 Procurement method evaluation: 
Construction projects are often implemented using a temporary alliance of different 
organisations brought together to develop and construct the project. The 
procurement system affects project governance, transaction cost, productivity, and 
coordination and interrelations of processes (Tookey et al., 2001). Moreover, it has 
been argued that the right choice of the procurement method will lead to 
construction project success (Bennett and Grice, 1990; Tookey et al., 2001). 
Over the years, different procurement approaches to deliver construction projects 
have been developed (Table 34), and each approach has its advantages and 
drawbacks. Some of the approaches are design-bid-build, design-build, and 
construction management (Gordon, 1994; Konchar and Sanvido, 1998; Dell'Isola, 
2002; Gransberg and Molenaar, 2004; Gruneberg et al., 2007). 
Scope 
Separate design and 
construction 
Design-
Build 
Design-Build-
Finance 
Organisation 
Prime 
Contractor 
Construction 
Manager 
Multiple 
Primes 
Design-Build 
Team 
Turnkey 
Team 
BOT Team 
Contract 
Lump Sum 
Unit Price 
Cost Plus 
GMP 
Fixed Fee 
Cost Plus 
GMP 
Lump Sum 
Unit Price 
Cost Plus 
GMP 
Lump Sum 
Unit Price 
Cost Plus 
GMP 
Lump Sum 
GMP 
Unique to 
Project 
Award 
Bid. 
Cap. 
Negotiate. 
Qual &Price 
Time & Price. 
Qual, Time 
and Price 
Bid. 
Negotiate. 
Qual &Price 
Time & Price. 
Qual, Time and 
Price 
Bid. 
Cap. 
Negotiate. 
Qual &Price 
Time & Price. 
Qual,Time 
and Price 
Bid. 
Cap. 
Negotiate. 
Qual &Price. 
Time & Price. 
Q, Time and 
Price. 
Des & Price 
Bid. 
Cap. 
Negotiate. 
Qual &Price. 
Time & 
Price. 
Q, Time and 
Price. 
Des & Price 
Bid. 
Cap. 
Negotiate. 
Qual &Price. 
Time & Price. 
Qual,Time 
and Price 
Des & Price 
Table 34: Type of construction contracting methods. 
Source: (Gordon, 1994). 
 
The regulation and laws that are analysed to explore the procurement approaches 
in delivering a public-sector project in Saudi Arabia are: Government Tenders and 
Procurement Law (STPL); Implementing Regulations of the STPL; Consulting 
Engineering Services Contract (Design); Consulting Engineering Services Contract 
(Supervision); Public Work Contract (PWC), and Contractor Classification Law 
(CCL). 
4.2.4.1 Procurement Method: 
The STPL regulate procedures for tenders and procurements carried out by 
government authorities. This includes any product and services of any amount 
where a Saudi government agency will be the beneficiary. Thus, services such as 
design, consultant, and construction are under the law. 
In 1977, the Saudi government and procurement law was published for the first time 
by the highest authority in the Kingdom (Royal Decree Number M/14). This system 
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has been republished with minor changes in 2006 (Royal-Decree-No.M/58, 2006). 
In 2007, the Implementing Regulations of the STPL document were published by 
the MOF. Both documents have been analysed by the researcher. 
As seen in Figure 29, according to Article 6 of the STPL "All government works, and 
purchases shall be subject to public competition except for those exempted from 
competition under the provisions of this Law". This includes designer, consultant, 
and construction services. The other two purchase methods are direct purchase 
and specific purchase which used in cases for emergency and specific purchases 
such as weapons and mechanical parts. 
 
Figure 29: Types of purchases in the Saudi public sector. 
Source: (Royal-Decree-No.M/58, 2006). 
 
Although there is no direct mention in the STPL about the procurement approach 
that should be used in Saudi Arabia to deliver construction projects, as it is used to 
procure all government works and services, Article 29 states: “In the preparation of 
contracts, government agencies are obliged to use approved contract forms”. The 
formal contracts, which should be used for any construction services that are 
funded by the government, show a separate contract between the design, 
consultant, and construction services, and there is no other formal contract that 
combined between the design and construction services. Moreover, the law in multi 
Articles is explicit that an agency should prepare "detailed technical specifications" 
for the projects before a tender takes place. To confirm this, the researcher has 
reviewed construction projects’ tender announcements in the multi-agencies 
websites and can confirm that all the announcements mention drawings and BOQs 
to be purchased. Saudi public agencies use a quadripartite governance structure 
Government 
Tenders and 
Procurement 
Law
Public Procurement 
competition
All government works and 
procurements shall be put up 
for public tender except those 
exempted under the 
provisions of this Law.
Direct Purchase
In urgent cases, a 
Governement Authority’s 
procurements and works 
may be carried out by direct 
purchase, provided that the 
value of purchase does not 
exceed US $ 270,000 
Specific Purchase
The following works are excluded from public 
tenders even if their cost exceeds the eligibility of 
direct purchase ($ 270,000):
Weapons and military equipment
Consultancy and technical works
lawyers and legal advisors
Spare parts of mechanical, electrical and electronic 
machines and equipment
Goods, constructions or services available only 
through one supplier, contractor or producer and 
with no alternatives
Medical requisites in case of outbreak of epidemics.
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(client-contractor-consultant-Designer). However, the dispute resolution party is not 
existing in the governance structure. 
Based on the above facts, the procurement approach uses a traditional approach 
(Design-Bid-Build) DBB. For contractors in Saudi Arabia, based on the Gordon 
classification, the contractors’ scope is construction, using prime contractor 
organisation and unit price contract, and chosen based on bid award. These will be 
investigated thoroughly in the next sections.  
Focusing on the approach used in the Saudi Public sector (DBB), the main feature 
of this approach is: the public agency will be in an individual contractual relationship 
with the other three parties (designer, consultant, and contractor). The contracts 
used with each party will be discussed further in section (4.2.4.3). The design, 
tendering, and construction processes in this approach are conducted sequentially. 
Thus, the processes and parties responsible for this approach are fragmented. The 
sequential delivery raises one of the main positive points about the DBB where the 
scope definition and Design at the commencement of construction are fully 
developed. Thus, the owner’s requirements are transmitted, as well as the parties 
involved (owner and contractors) being more aware and able to measure risks 
involved in the projects at construction stages. The disadvantages are that projects 
are constructed over a more extended period as well as the coordination being 
weak because of the fragmented process. Nevertheless, the certainty and 
predictability in this approach might be abused or lost which is more related to the 
nature of the construction industry where the factors that could affect projects 
during development and construction cannot be entirely anticipated. 
The procurement process, which is applied to appointed designers, consultants, 
and contractors separately, and to different stages as Figure 28 shows, are 
summarised in Table 35. 
4.2.4.2 Awarding practice: 
The selection of appropriate service provider (supplier) that is capable of 
successfully developing and delivering the project is one of the important decisions 
faced by clients and affect the project success (Holt, 1995; Yang et al., 2003). 
According to the STPL, a government purchases provider could be chosen based 
on three types (Figure 30), based on which, construction services are delivered 
using Close/Selective Tender and Open Tender forms. However, the criteria for 
choosing providers remains the same, which is the lowest price (Table 36). 
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Name Requirement and explanation 
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• The competition should be announced in 2 local newspaper and the 
public agency website. 
• The announcement of competition should contain clear and 
comprehensive information about the product/services, with the 
following minimum information: 
• Name of the organisation 
• Competition number, description and purpose 
• Classification area 
• price of tender documents and place of sale 
• Time and place to submit bids and open envelopes. 
• Minimum 30 days between the announcement day and submit bids 
day. 
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 • The only service provider who purchases the documents could 
submit their bid. 
B
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• Bids should be submitted in writing on the original forms that have 
been purchased from the government agency and placed in stamped 
envelopes. 
• Tender Submission Documents are: 
• Bid bond (1% of the total bid). 
• Classification in business. 
• Certificates (Commercial Register, Zakat or tax payment, Social 
Insurance, affiliation to the Chamber of Commerce). 
• Achieve the minimum percentage of jobs nationalization. 
• Official tender letter with the total amount. 
• Priced BOQ (in case of construction service). 
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 • The envelopes are opened by a committee. 
• The envelopes are opened at the specified hour and day. 
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 • The tenders are analysed by a committee which has the authority to 
include and exclude tenders and recommend which offer should be 
awarded. 
• The committee recommends that the offers be awarded to the lowest 
bidder.  
• The committee cannot exclude bids on the grounds of low prices 
unless it is 35% or more below the estimates of the government 
authority and prevailing prices. 
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 • The Minister has the power to award the winning bid. 
• An official Awarding letter will be handed to the winner. 
• The winner should submit a Performance Bond equal to 5% of the 
total bid within ten days. 
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• In case the service contract costs more than USD 1.3 M or is over a 
one-year duration. 
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• Use the formal contracts that are issued by the MOF. 
• The contract is between governmental authority and the business 
owner. 
• The contractor is responsible for reviewing all engineering and 
technical designs and must notify of any technical errors affecting the 
safety of the establishments or find errors in specifications or 
drawings. 
• The Contractor cannot refuse or minimize their performance in 
providing his obligations, based on the breach from the Government's 
side. 
• The Government Authority may increase the obligations of the 
Contractor within the scope of the contract by not more than 10% of 
the total value of the contract or reduce these obligations by not more 
than 20%. 
Table 35: Procurement process in Saudi public sector. 
Source: (Royal-Decree-No.M/58, 2006). 
 
Service Providers Tender Form Awarding Criteria 
Designer Close/Selective Tender 
Lowest Price Consultant Close/Selective Tender 
Main Contractor Open Tender 
Table 36: Service providers tender forms and awarding criteria. 
 
Focusing on the contractors’ tender form, construction projects’ contractors are 
selected on an open tender approach, and the lowest bid is awarded even if bidding 
is less than the estimated budget by up to 35% (Royal-Decree-No.M/58, 2006). A 
positive point about the Open Tender form is that service providers are selected on 
an unbiased base. Moreover, the owner will gain the lowest price because of the 
extensive competition. It is also considered as a safe mechanism, as suppliers will 
be less likely to collaborate in raising their bids. On the other hand, the open tender 
mechanism is less attractive for experienced suppliers because of high competition 
and that the lowest price wins. Furthermore, analysing a large number of bidding 
documents might consume a significant amount of time and money. 
The STPL claim that the approach is chosen to protect public funds from corruption 
and to execute projects at the lowest possible cost, however, the approach might 
lead to the choice of unqualified contractors or not deliver projects on the best value 
for money. This could explain the unanimous answer by all the interviewees (owner 
and consultant) which repeatedly mentioned "the unqualified contractors". 
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Figure 30: Types of purchases in the Saudi public sector, according to the tender 
forms. 
 
The STPL and its Implementing Regulations’ articles ensure that financial criteria 
should be the main ones to be applied at the analysis step, and that the lowest 
price should win (even if it is lower than the 35%) the competition, which could be 
partly explained by the fact that the implementing regulation are issued by the MOF. 
According to the law “No offer may be excluded on the grounds that it is technically 
unsuitable as long as it complies with the conditions and specifications established 
and is consistent with the provisions of the Regulation.” In fact, before the analysis 
committee can recommend excluding a bid on the base of low price (lower than 
35% of the estimated price), capability, or capacity, the committee must: 
• Review the estimated price by the client and ensuring the moderation of the 
estimated indicative prices and their compatibility with prevailing market 
prices at the time of bidding. 
• Assess the technical expertise of the bidder and similar works carried out by 
him. 
• Assess the financial position of the bidder to ascertain his financial ability 
and potential. 
• Discuss the bidder to clarify the bases and criteria for estimating bid prices. 
• A total agreement from the committee members that prices are very low. 
Otherwise, the committee should recommend awarding the lowest price bid. The 
process according to interviewees is lengthy and time-consuming and it 
unreasonable to be done within the time frame given by the law (within 30 days). 
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rs Open Tender
In this type of tender the Employer 
announces the project (Normally in 
newspapers), and allows any 
contractors to apply for the tender 
documents.
All government works except those 
exempted under the provisions of this 
Law.
Close/Selective  
Tender
In this type of tender the Employer 
inviteds a selected list of Contractors 
to bid for the project.
Consultancy and technical works.
Lawyers and legal advisors.
Spare parts of mechanical, electrical and 
electronic machines and equipment.
Negotiated
In this type of tender the Employer 
invites a contractor of his choice to 
submit a price for the project.
In urgent cases, goods or works cost less 
than US $ 270,000.
Weapons and military equipment.
Goods, constructions or services 
available only through one supplier, 
contractor or producer and with no 
alternatives.
Medical requisites in case of outbreak of 
epidemics.
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Moreover, the accuracy of excluding the lowest price bids is questionable as each 
ministry procures hundreds of bids each year. 
Another example; the regulation that the “MOF Representative” should be a 
member of the committee but not mentioned any other experienced member of any 
main technical field. Thus, the technical analysis for the committee is questionable, 
especially for consultant and design services where the negative outputs of the 
products do not appear until the construction phase. 
Bajaber and Taha (2012) claim that using the open tender method without 
contractors’ prequalification will result in schedule delays, cost overruns, very low 
quality, and many disputes. This also supported by other authors who believe that 
no matter which awarding approach is adopted, analysing the provider’s technical 
and financial capability is critical to project success (Merna and Smith, 1990; 
Moselhi and Martinelli, 1990; Herbert and Biggart, 1993). However, for the Saudi 
public sector, there is no formal classification system for design and consultant 
services. For the construction sector, there was no one until 2006. 
In 2006, the Saudi government introduced its contractor's classification system 
(SCC). The system aims to classify contractors, who want to work on public 
projects that cost more than USD 1.1 Million, to a level which is commensurate with 
their financial, technical, administrative and executive abilities. The system divides 
works into twelve categories, and ranks contractors into five grades in each 
category, from 1, which is assigned to large companies, to 5, which is allocated to 
small firms. The government specifies a minimum grade for each proposed 
project,and only contractors at that level or higher are allowed to bid. According to 
the law, the total of the contractor’s bid will not be accepted if it is higher than his 
range in Table 37. For example, if a contractor is classified as 3rd in the building 
field, his bid will not be accepted if it is more than USD 18.6 million. 
There is an argument as to whether the classification system is enough as a tool for 
classifying contractors. According to the interviewees, the lack of classification 
system or tools that reflect the designer and consultants capabilities are more likely 
to lead to poor design and consultancy, especially when chosen based on lowest 
price — this relates to the lack of awareness of the importance of the designer and 
consultant by the decision makers. The data from the interviews show that the 
decision makers are tricked by the small cost of design and consultant services 
(compared to construction) and focus on solving the problem at the construction 
stage with the contractor, thereby ignoring the real trigger of the issues which is 
before the construction phase. 
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The classification system has been criticised by all the interviewees from the owner 
side. The contractors’ classification system, according to the owner interviewees, is 
limited and does not reflect the contractor’s actual capabilities. Nevertheless, the 
system is not including all types of projects, for example, small projects (less than 
USD 1.1 M) are not included in the classification, i.e. any contractor could apply for 
projects’ tender. The owner side interviewees mentioned that the classification 
system is outdated and not reflecting the rising complexity in construction projects. 
Moreover, they mentioned that the classification certificate, which is provided during 
the tender stage to the owner to asses tenders’ technical abilities, is only mentioned 
in the degree but is not clear about the exact technical ability and records of his 
previous jobs. i.e. the technical abilities of contractors in the same degree 
classification vary, but a contractors classification certificate does not reflect that. 
Construction Fields 
Contractors’ classification degree and the highest 
contract’s value in (US $ millions) 
 Without 
Classification 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Buildings Budget More than 74 74 18.6 5.6 1.8 1.1 
Roads Budget More than 112 112 37.3 11 3.7 1.1 
Water & 
Sanitation 
Works 
Budget 
More than 112 112 37.3 11 3.7 1.1 
Electrical 
Works 
Budget 
More than 74 74 18.6 5.6 1.8 1.1 
Mechanical 
Works 
Budget 
More than 74 74 18.6 5.6 1.8 1.1 
Electronic 
Works 
Budget 
More than 74 74 18.6 5.6 1.8 1.1 
Industrial 
Works 
Budget 
More than 112 112 37.3 11 3.7 1.1 
Marine Works Budget More than 112 112 37.3 11 3.7 1.1 
Dams Budget More than 37 37 11.2 5.6 1.8 1.1 
Landscaping Budget More than 37 37 11.2 5.6 1.8 1.1 
Well Drilling Budget More than 3.7 3.7 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.03 
Table 37: Contractors’ classification categories and degrees. 
Source: (Contractors classification agency, 2010). 
 
From the owner perspective, owner representatives (Engineers who represent the 
ministry) believe that the system should not replace the technical analysis by the 
technical committee form of the different engineering departments, but be used 
along with it, which is not the current method used right now, in order to get the best 
qualification tool for bids. 
4.2.4.3 Public Work Contracts with Designer, Consultant, and 
Contractor: 
As mentioned earlier, a public authority uses different contracts to engage with 
each designer, consultant, and contractor (Table 38). The main point identified is 
that the three contracts are used for all type, size, and complexity of projects. 
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Moreover, the contracts do not allow service providers (designer, consultant, nor 
contractor) to negotiate conditions (contracts of adhesion “take it or leave it” that 
gives no ability to negotiate) (Council of Ministers, 1988). As this study is about the 
contractors’ cost overrun, only the contract that relates to contractors (PWC) will be 
further investigated. 
In 1988, the Saudi Government adopted a standard form of contract for all public 
works, known as a Public Work Contract (PWC). Although the source of PWC has 
not been disclosed, Cowling (2011) and Al-Qassem (2004) claimed that the PWC is 
based on the 3rd edition of the FIDIC conditions of contract (1977). The PWC is 
used for all kinds of projects (civil, mechanical) and all degrees of project 
complexity. 
Between And Contract name 
Public Agencies 
Designer Consulting engineering services contract (Design) 
Consultant Consulting engineering services contract (Supervision) 
Main contractor Public Work Contract (PWC) 
Table 38: Public work contract with different service providers. 
 
There are some benefits to using one form contract for all public works, such as 
getting more experience in the use of that form and developing it. However, it 
seems that the PWC has not benefited from that, as small modifications were made 
to it only once, in 2007 (Gulman, 2012). 
This contract comprises the following documents: basic contract document and 
general conditions. Moreover, there are appendixes to the contract which are part 
of the contract: special conditions (if any); special specifications (if any); plans and 
drawings; general specifications; BOQ, letter of award. 
The basic document contains seven articles that illustrate the following: contracting 
parties, the purpose of the contract, contract documents, contract duration, contract 
value, contractor responsibility, payment method, and that the contract is subject to 
the laws of Saudi Arabia. 
The general conditions contain sixty-one articles covering: general obligations, 
rights and duties, powers of the engineer; assignment to others and subcontracting; 
suspension of work and change orders; fines; preliminary and final handovers; 
maintenance, and finally, withdrawing the work from the contractor. 
The general conditions were evaluated by Ibn-Homaid (2006) based on eleven 
factors that have been ranked by owners, contractors and consultants, and it was 
concluded that the PWC general conditions are “barely adequate”. 
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Different studies identify the PWC as one of the primary reasons for the 
underachievement of government projects in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi National 
Anti-Corruption Commission analysis of 800 governmental defaulted projects 
ranked the PWC as one of the common leading causes of defaulted projects (Al-
Rabiah, 2013). A document was issued by the contractors’ committee in the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry stating that the PWC is one of the main 
reasons for the underachievement of public project performance and emphasising 
that using fair and balanced contracts, such as FIDIC, would decrease the number 
of defaulted Projects (Alshele, 2013). 
Broadly, the PWC general conditions were evaluated by owners, contractors and 
consultants in Ibn-Homaid (2006) study and it was again concluded that the PWC is 
“barely adequate”. From the documents and interviews the following points have 
been identified: 
 Contract Clarity: 
The basis of the relationship between two parties in construction projects are the 
terms of the contract, and the more contractual clauses between the owner and the 
contractor are clear, balanced and fair to the parties, the better the relationship, 
leading to a successful project. However, the PWC is full of articles that are not 
clear, nor complete. For example, Article 10.2 states: “The Contractor shall be 
responsible for reviewing engineering and technical designs in full detail and shall 
notify the Work Owner and the Engineer of any errors or observations it discovers 
in the plans and drawings during work execution”. Several questions might be 
raised because of the article’s incompleteness including but not limited to: Is there a 
time limit? When does it start and end? Would an extension to the contract duration 
be considered? What is the procedure to notify the owner? What is the limit of these 
mistakes? If errors lead to redesigning, who should be responsible for the 
redesign? Based on this limitation, a project’s owner and the contractor might 
assume different answers for the above questions, a dispute between them will 
accrue, and project performance will be affected. Moreover, contractors’ pricing is 
going to be less accurate as their responsibility and risks are not fully clear. This 
agrees with Ibn-Homaid (2006) study which found that only 45% of contractors and 
owners think the PWC’s general terms are complete.  
 PWC Risk Appropriation:  
Literature shows that a contract should be balanced when apportioning risk, and the 
best practice for managing risk is allocating it to the party that can best control it. 
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The imbalanced contract is the main cause for tension between parties, project 
abandonment, drop in the building activities, lousy reputation and inability to secure 
project finance or securing it at higher costs due to added risks (Mbachu and 
Nkado, 2004). 
Beside the PWC ambiguities, reviewing the 65 PWC articles found the PWC does 
not follow ‘balanced’ practice, as most of the projects’ risks are assigned to 
contractors, even the ones which are under the owners’ control such as payment 
delay for completed work. Moreover, there is a full and overstatement of the 
contractor's responsibilities and obligations; in all the PWC articles, contractors’ 
duties and responsibilities are clearer than their rights. Most of the articles state the 
contractors’ responsibilities (the contractor is responsible for …) and limit the 
statement of rights (the contractor has the right to ................). Contractors’ 
interviewees confirm that some of the government agencies develop “unfair special 
conditions” by using a special conditions appendix to allocate risks to contractors 
that have not been mentioned in the general conditions, thereby passing the 
problem to contractors. In some cases, contractors have been asked to redesign a 
building’s foundations depending on the soil test, and re-update the technical 
specification to suit the civil defence specification. 
Literature shows an agreement with this finding; Abbas (1998) described the PWC 
as a “one-sided” contract that allocates too many risks to contractors. Cowling 
(2011) also believes that the PWC risk allocation mechanism is different from the 
one that the international construction industry may be used to. 
The data suggested that an imbalanced contract is related to it having been written 
by the MoF. It is assumed that the documents are prepared by a team from different 
majors such as Engineering, Law, and Finance. However, the PWC is produced by 
MoF, which arguably provides contracts’ texts and conditions that protect the owner 
and may contribute to any extra cost. For example, one of the risks that shift to the 
contractors is the payment delay, where according to PWC, contractors are 
expected to produce work and should not suspend work based on payment delay 
(Article 59). 
However, data shows that owner representatives are unaware of the fact that most 
of the risks are allocated to the contractors and also of their effects on project 
performance and relationship. Interviews evidence that the interviewees from the 
owner’s side believe that the risk appropriation is balanced in the PWC and in their 
opinion risks are not mainly held by the contractor. Contractors, however, believe 
that they hold all of the risks and not the owner. Similar positions are found in Ibn-
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Homaid (2006) study which found that the “contract fairness” factor is the only 
factor that both owners and contractors disagree on. 65% of owners in the sample 
believe that PWC is a fair contract compared to only 33% of the contractors’ 
sample. 
From the interviews with both contractors and owner, there were agreements and 
disagreement regarding which risks contractors should be holding. Both parties 
believe that technology risks should be held by the contractors as he is the most 
experienced. However, there is disagreement in the risks related to payment delay 
and decision-making delay, as contractors believe these should be held by owners. 
Interestingly, when contractors were asked which risks an owner should be 
responsible for, they allocated only three risk categories (delay of payment, change 
of design, and lack of works’ scope and definition). From the interviews, contractors 
believe that owners, which is meant by that the engineers who represent the owner, 
are less knowledgeable than them which is logical as contractors interact with 
technical challenges. This was clearer during the interview as contractors 
mentioned “knowledge of owner/representative” as a risk should be considered 
during the pricing tenders. 
Although allocating all technical risks to the contractors might not be the best 
practice in another context, In Saudi Arabia, Khaliluddin (2010) and AL-Salman 
(2004) show that this is normal practice. Both studies show unfair risk allocation in 
that the projects’ risks allocated to owners is either a minuscule number or none, 
while contractors are holding more than half of the risks categories (Table 39). 
Study Alslman (2004) Khaliluddin (2010) 
Type of contract Lump sum General 
Responders Contractor Project managers 
Total number of risks 25 36 
Type of risk allocation 
 Perception Practice Perception Practice 
Contractor 6 17 10 14 
Owner 3 0 3 2 
Shared 4 2 10 7 
Undecided 12 6 13 13 
Table 39: Risk allocation in the Saudi construction sector. 
 Unequal party: 
The contract signed between the parties should give the contractor the right to be 
an equal party with the employer and the consultant. However, most Saudi laws 
and regulations maximise the role of the State and put it in a higher degree in 
comparison to another party because the state manages public interests. 
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Therefore, there is no room for equal rights between the ministry, which manages 
public utilities and affairs, and the other three parties (designer, consultant, and 
contractors) who are considered as the private sector. The PWC review shows that 
contract articles give the hegemony to the owner and his representatives over other 
parties (designer, consultant, and contractor). 
The contractor is under the full control of the owner, and this power is often 
exploited to pressure the contractor to waive his rights in the contract, and the 
contractor is always worried that the loss of his rights would happen if any dispute 
occurred, no matter how simple, and is often forced to implement things outside the 
contract (requested by the owner) in order to avoid what the owner can exploit in 
these contracts. Although not all the corresponding contractors’ identified 
exploitation by the owner, they agreed that the contract allows such exploitation. 
This could explain the acceptance by contractors of the unfair contract which is not 
accepted by most of the contractors in Saudi and other countries in normal 
condition, however, the general conditions of the PWC are fixed and are not 
negotiable. 
 Encourage bad bids: 
The procurement approach encourages two types of bids: suicide bidding and over-
price bidding, neither of which are beneficial to the client/public. The Saudi 
construction market is competitive with more than 3500 classified contractors and 
1.2 M construction enterprises (CDSI, 2014) and the STPL awarding projects on the 
base of the lowest bid even if bidding is less than an estimated budget by 35%, 
which increases the likelihood of choosing unqualified contractors and/or suicide 
bidding. Combining this selection approach with ambiguous contract conditions that 
allocate most of the risks to the contractor, results in projects usually not finished on 
time and/or to quality, and endless claims from both sides. This is challenging for 
contractors, as one of the main contractors’ successes criteria is to finish the project 
on price or achieve a lower figure to make a profit (Elattar, 2009). Contractors might 
face bankruptcy or/and abandon that project, triggering the process of re-tendering, 
which has a negative impact on all the project’s parties. In this lose-lose situation, it 
should not be a surprise that the Saudi national anti-corruption commission 
reported 3000 defaulted construction projects in 2013 (SNAC, 2013). On the other 
hand, contractors cover the unusually high number of allocated risks with very high 
markups (Shash and Abdul-Hadi, 1992) and end with over-price bidding (Alhzaha, 
2013). Under the above conditions, contractors of Saudi public projects are more 
likely to suffer from cost overruns. 
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4.3 Objective Two: 
The Saudi public construction project delivering process has not previously been 
explored nor assessed. Nevertheless, the weaknesses of the context and process 
in leading to contractors’ cost overrun has not been discussed in the literature. In 
this objective, the key weaknesses within the context and current practices that are 
affected the contractors' performance will be identified.  
Problems and issues in the construction industry in developing countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia, have been studied since the 1960s and it has been found that they 
are complex, fundamental, and embedded in the context system, as well as 
increasing in extent and severity over the years (Ofori, 2004). 
According to Ofori (2000a) the common problems that face construction industries 
in developing countries, and which are out of the industry’s control, are related to 
construction materials (shortages, etc.), technology (low level of technological 
development), lack of technical skills, and complex procedure regulations and 
contracts. In line with this, the Saudi construction industry faces considerable 
challenges from the various forces that are embedded within the context and the 
process of delivering construction projects (as explained in Objective One).  
Objective Two aims to identify and explain weaknesses within the process and 
practises of delivering a public construction project that could affect the contractors’ 
performance. To add value to the identification of the weaknesses in the processes 
and practises, the contribution factors, which are the factors within the context of 
Saudi Arabia that could inflate the effect of the weak points, will also be identified. 
The data have been analysed after being collected using the literature and interview 
based approaches explained in section 3.10. 
The identification of the weaknesses also is going to be beneficial for other 
researches that aim to improve the public projects’ performance. Beside the poor 
performance exploration in section 2.6.1, the Saudi Arabian Minister of State 
admitted, during the announcement of the state budget 2016, that in 2015 a review 
over the five-year plan’s records shows that 7,200 government projects are in 
default with a total value of about 1.0 trillion riyals (44.8% of the total value of 
government projects between 2005-2015) (Omari, 2016). 
The identification of the weaknesses will be through a focus on the context, 
processes and practises that have been explored in chapter two and objective one. 
This is logical, as the high number of projects which are under different ministries 
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(owners) suggests that the weaknesses are context, processes and practices 
related, rather than related to one agency or party.  
4.3.1 Context weaknesses: 
The context in which a construction project is developed and built has an impact on 
the project’s performance. The following weaknesses have been identified through 
the data analyses. 
4.3.1.1 Lack of a stable environment: 
The major data inputs affecting the annual plan and project development do not lie 
within the technical level authority. The main effects come from the functional level 
and the external environment, both of which are not unusual to change, as 
mentioned in the interviews. However, such a weakness usually leads to a change 
in the projects' scope and objectives. Interviews have given examples where project 
scope has been changed at a very late stage of construction, leading to the project 
being suspended, sometimes for years, before receiving authorisation and funds to 
apply the changes in the scope. 
In addition to the unpredictability of the input factors, data suggest both a lack of 
awareness in the higher levels of organisational structure of the effect of such 
change, and a lack of learning from suspended projects. 
4.3.1.2 Lack of legitimate legal mechanism: 
The development of a legitimate legal mechanism is one of the most important 
points that complement the balance of contracts in the matter of liabilities and 
damages. It prevents a party from abusing his powers. However, it is not unusual 
that contractors face a public owner who abuses his powers. 
According to the contractors' interviewees, going to court to prevent abuse could 
cost more than the abuse because of a lengthy delay. The unlawful confiscation of 
the contractor's bonds is one of the abuses of power that was given to the owner by 
the PWC. Contractors also mentioned the lack of a fair compensation system within 
the legal system encourages them to avoid any misunderstanding or clash with the 
owner. 
The above points (raised by interviewees) agree with the literature criticising the 
mechanism of the Saudi legal system relevant to the public sector, for which 
weaknesses were discussed in section 2.6.1. 
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4.3.1.3  Nature of the industry weaknesses: 
The different nature of the construction industry and its supply chain compared to 
other industries such as manufacturing is one of the main reasons limiting the ability 
to adopt solutions from other industries such as manufacturing (O’brien, 1999). 
Some specific weaknesses of the construction industry (identified from the data) 
that differentiate the industry from other industries and lead to poor performance in 
projects are: 
• Project-based production systems  
• Customer influence  
• Buyer-supplier relationship  
• Low invest in training and development  
• Participants’ multiple goals 
• Temporary relationship(s)  
• Fragmentation within the industry  
• Resistance to change nature  
• Number and type of stakeholders 
• Lack of openness and opportunistic behaviour 
Saudi public construction is not the only industry suffering from such characteristics; 
literature suggests this is the norm of the construction industry worldwide (Fearne 
and Fowler, 2006; Pesämaa et al., 2009; Kornelius and Wamelink, 1998; Miller et 
al., 2002; Lu and Yan, 2007; Arantes et al., 2015; Egan, 1998; Cheng et al., 2010; 
Love et al., 2002; Baiden et al., 2006; Hu, 2008; Briscoe and Dainty, 2005; Yadav 
and Ray, 2015; Kumaraswamy et al., 2005; Cheng et al., 2001; Xue et al., 2007; 
Huxham, 1996; Cox and Townsend, 1998). 
4.3.2 Organisational structure weaknesses: 
The data identify the following weaknesses in the organisational structure 
4.3.2.1 Traditional organisational structure: 
As shown in section (4.2.1), the administrative levels build relations, in response to 
regulations, in a vertical manner; control flows from the top of the structure down. 
The organisational structure is bureaucratic, rigid, inflexible, and centralised, with 
authority vertically flowing between connections according to hierarchical channels 
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only. Moreover, the decision-making process is governed by formal regulations and 
precise instructions. Such a structure builds a gap between the various 
departments and the top of the management hierarchy as well as impeding 
communication (Lowry, 2001). Moreover, the structure causes problems among the 
members of the agency, resulting in tension and dissatisfaction and thus a lack of 
productivity and poor quality which is further affected by the structure being less 
responsive to changes to the external environment surrounding the structure. 
Nevertheless, decision-making regarding the degree of delegation of authority to 
subordinates is weak, resulting in a lack of flexibility within the structure. This lack of 
flexibility leads to a poor organisational climate, employees always feeling under 
pressure, and many restrictions that prevent creativity and productivity. 
4.3.2.2 The absence of a project management role: 
The organisation structure applied by the Saudi public organisation normally covers 
tens of projects at a time, leading to inefficiencies and significant transaction costs 
(explained in section 4.2.1). Moreover, unlike contractors, the concept of the project 
manager as identified in the literature (project manager as the client’s 
representative, responsible for project success, and oversees all project aspects 
including planning, developing, implementing, and closure (Love et al., 1998)), is 
not applied by the Saudi public authorities. Project manager responsibilities and 
their implementation are segmented over departments and persons (section 4.2.1) 
and, to make it worse; the current structure regulations do not support or encourage 
integration, cooperation, in addition to there being unusual communication systems 
between professionals (owner representatives in different phases and within the 
same phase; see section 4.2.3). 
4.3.2.3 Decision-making cycle: 
The essence for an organisation's success is the efficiency of the decision-making 
process as it significantly affects achieving of its objectives; some studies link the 
efficiency of any organisation to the efficiency of decisions taken at different levels. 
However, the data shows that decision-making in a Saudi public context is 
centralised in the hands of senior management – a situation linked with killing 
ambition and creativity among staff and ignoring uniqueness among projects as the 
interviews data shows. 
In the Saudi public case, inflexible regulations, laws, and rules issued from outside 
sources (the Council of Ministers and MOF), make no room for a public 
organisation to go out of the norm for creativity in decision making as one response 
to construction projects becoming more complex and creative.  
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An excellent example of the effect of decisions on construction projects is the 
critical decision of choosing the service provider (designer, consultant, and 
contractor). According to the STPL, the minister has the authority to make that 
decision based on the tender analysis committee's recommendation (explained 
thoroughly in section 4.2.4). Although the decision is a crucial decision, the 
following weak points can be identified: 
• The decision process is confined to inflexible regulations. 
• Top management decision; the departments that are working directly 
with providers are not participating in the process. 
• Due to the centrality of the decisions, the degree of delegation is low, 
and the powers are governed by the regulations. 
• The decision cycle is long and complicated. 
4.3.2.4 Communication: 
As a result of the central system, bureaucratic structure, and the depth of the 
organisational structure in a public agency, the coordination between the various 
departments, communication system, and the work procedures are poor (a vertical 
form from top to bottom and vice versa), can be centralised, and requires a long 
cycle to achieve its objectives. 
Poor flow of information between the decision makers (top management level) and 
the departments that interact with projects directly leads to a blockage within the 
information exchange channels, thereby leading to project delay. Interviewees 
mention that decisions could take over a year to be taken, leading them to suspend 
work on that part of the project.  
Lack of communication mechanism between professionals and departments in the 
current method means that problems in the specific phase are handled by the 
department responsible for that phase only. 
4.3.3 Procurement weaknesses: 
The procurement approach has been discussed in section 4.2.4. Some of the 
weaknesses that have been discussed are: 
• No Selection (Fixed approach) of project delivery approach. 
• No Selection (Fixed approach) of service providers approach. 
• Poor Selection of mode of payment. 
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• The owner may take advantage of the contractor 
• The general contract of construction does not specify the administrative 
structure of the employer. 
• The weaknesses of the contract are linked to the weaknesses of the general 
organisation structure. 
• Giving the Ministry Engineer (owner representative) absolute powers. 
• Failure to give the Consultant Engineer his due powers. 
• The consultant and the contractor shall bear all responsibilities in case of 
violations. 
The research resources that discuss the PWC are very limited; very few studies 
were found. The researcher examined the PWC and compared it to the FIDIC 
building and engineering works contract, designed by the employer (Red Book). 
The reason of choosing the FIDIC contract that the claim by the contractors’ 
committee in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the statement by the 
official spokesman for FIDIC in the Arab Gulf region that adopting the FIDIC 
contract for the public sector will decrease defaulted projects by 70% (AlKanani, 
2012). 
The researcher’s findings concerning the main parts of the contract that make it 
different are shown in Figure 31. 
The main points of difference between the FIDIC contract and the PWC have been 
illustrated in Table 40. The points are not limited to the one in the table. However, 
they are the main ones that could affect the contractors’ cost performance. 
 
Figure 31: Main part of the contract that makes the PWC different. 
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Employer's 
risks
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Main Part 
of 
difference. 
 FIDIC building and engineering 
works, designed by the 
employer  
The Public Work Contract 
D
is
p
u
te
 
re
s
o
lu
ti
o
n
 The contract outlines a procedure which 
contains three levels to solve any conflict 
which occurs: 
First Level: Project Consultant 
Second level: Dispute Adjudication Board 
Third level: Arbitration. 
There is a special court to bring 
cases against government agencies 
called the “Board of Grievances.” 
S
it
e
 D
a
ta
 It is the Employer’s responsibility to make 
available to the Contractor his information 
regarding the project sub-surface and 
hydrological conditions, before and after 
the Base Date (Article 4.10). 
Nothing was mentioned regarding 
the Employer’s responsibility. 
U
n
fo
re
s
e
e
a
b
le
 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
D
if
fi
c
u
lt
ie
s
 If the Contractor encounters unforeseen 
physical conditions, he will be entitled to a 
time extension for the delay, and payment 
of any cost (Article 4.12). 
Nothing was mentioned regarding 
the unforeseen physical conditions. 
However, it was stated that the 
Contractor should make his 
investigation of the site before 
submitting his tender. 
E
x
te
n
s
io
n
 o
f 
T
im
e
 
fo
r 
C
o
m
p
le
ti
o
n
 
The Contractor is entitled to a time 
extension under the following causes: 
scope variation, climatic conditions, 
unforeseeable shortages in the availability 
of personnel or goods, the delay 
attributable to the Employer, and delays 
caused by authorities. The Contractor 
determines the time extension (Article 8.4 
and 8.5).  
If the delay is due to unforeseen 
circumstances or for reasons beyond 
the contractor’s control, the contract 
will be extended (Article 52). 
However, the employer determines 
the time extension. 
S
u
s
p
e
n
s
io
n
 o
f 
W
o
rk
 
Unless the Contractor causes the 
suspension, the Contractor is entitled to a 
time extension for any delay, and payment 
of any cost. After 112 the contractor could 
terminate the contract (Article 8.8, 8.9, 
8.10 and 8.11). 
The owner has the authority to 
suspend the work progress at any 
time and without any extra cost if it: 
• Is stipulated in the contract. 
• Is necessary, to perform the 
work properly. 
• Occurs by reason of weather 
conditions. 
• Is the Contractor's default. 
• Is necessary for the safety of 
works (Article 32). 
However, it was not mentioned if the 
Contractor is entitled to payment of 
costs for other cases. Moreover, the 
contractor does not have the 
authority to terminate the contract 
under any circumstances.  
A
d
ju
s
tm
e
n
ts
 f
o
r 
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
in
 C
o
s
t 
If Contractor provides “table of adjustment 
data”, the cost will be adjusted for rises or 
falls to the cost of labour, Goods and other 
inputs to the Works by using a formula 
(Article 13) 
Fixed cost. 
E
m
p
lo
y
e
r’
s
 
R
is
k
s
 
The contract mentions Employer’s risks if 
it affects the work progress directly, such 
as: 
War, rebellion, terrorism, disorder, the 
Employer uses any part of the Permanent 
Works, design, forces of nature which are 
unforeseeable (Article 17.3). 
Nothing was mentioned in the 
contract about Employer’s Risks 
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F
o
rc
e
 M
a
je
u
re
 
The Force Majeure, which could be 
defined as an exceptional event or 
circumstance that is beyond a Party’s 
control, is well defined and examples were 
given such as (not limited to): war, 
hostilities, rebellion, terrorism, riot, 
explosive materials, and natural 
catastrophes. 
If the Contractor is prevented from 
performing his substantial obligations and 
suffers delay and/or incurs Costs by 
reason of such Force Majeure, the 
Contractor shall be entitled subject to a 
time extension for the delay, and payment 
of any cost. After 112 any party could 
terminate, and the contract is entitled to a 
time extension for payment of any cost 
that occurs during that time and any 
expected profit. (Chapter 19). 
The Force Majeure is not defined or 
mentioned in the contract, and only 
one example was mentioned and 
could be under the umbrella of Force 
Majeure Military Action such as war, 
hostilities, rebellion, terrorism, and 
explosives. However, if that cause 
occurs, the contractor must continue 
his obligations unless the owner asks 
him to hold work progress. Moreover, 
the contractor does not have the 
option to terminate the contract. If the 
owner terminates the contract, the 
contractor will not be entitled to any 
expected profit as it is against Sharia 
law. 
Table 40: Main points of difference between the FIDIC contract and the PWC. 
Sources: (IFCE, 1999; Royal-Decree-No.M/58, 2006). 
 
4.3.4 Project life cycle weaknesses: 
Following the explanation of the project life cycle in section 4.2.2, Where it was 
shown that the construction project life cycle follows similar cycles to that presented 
in the literature by different authors (Turner et al. (2009); Wideman (2004)) and that 
construction projects in Saudi public sectors are executed in segmental and 
sequential processes and phases, it can be added that different departments and 
personnel are responsible for handling each phase and requirements, thereby 
resulting in a fragmented method with deliverables as they are handed over from 
one phase to the next phase. Decisions also are taken separately and without 
considering their impact on other phases and professions, which has been argued 
to build unseen ‘walls’ between disciplines, professionals and departments, as well 
as a lack of creativity and innovation (Love et al., 1998). Besides the lack of 
coordination and communication between participants (Egan, 1998), the literature 
shows that the current approach has the following weaknesses shown in Table 41. 
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Main category  Weaknesses Points  
Cost Increase real costs. 
Margins maintenance. 
Poor production planning. 
Recourses Poor transparency in transactions. 
Poor resources utilise. 
Value Poor value-adding across the entire supply chain. 
Deliver poor value to the client. 
Uncertainty of out-turn costs. 
Maximise transaction costs. 
Efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Poor internal and external efficiency. 
Poor competitive advantage. 
Innovation Poor innovation in products, processes and 
organisation 
Processes Fragmented business processes. 
Increase waste in the process. 
Communication Poor communication among the collaborating 
partners. 
Relationships Lack of trust 
Adversarial inter-organisational relationships. 
Poor synergy. 
Short-term relationship. 
Experience and 
learning 
Lack of transfer expertise between all parties. 
Targets Project delivered does not meet user needs. 
Time Overrun. 
Cost Overrun. 
Miss organisational goals. 
Poor customer satisfaction. 
Table 41: Weaknesses points in the traditional project life cycle. 
4.3.5 Context and practices weakness matrix: 
Based on the previous founds in objective two, the research start establishing the 
linking between the weaknesses that has been identified in Objective Two. The 
links, which are presented in Table 42, were identified from the data that has been 
analysed. All the links will be used in model that will be developed in Objective Five. 
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P
h
a
s
e
 
Weakness points in the process Contributed factors Result in 
P
la
n
n
in
g
 P
h
a
s
e
 
Lack of stable environment Lack of ability and control estimation of future events 
Poor project planning 
Fixed project delivery method 
Lack of best practices in contracting for construction 
services 
Bureaucratic system. 
Low commitment to project control through deadlines. 
Distant relationships with project managers. 
Change is perceived as negative. 
Long process between different government agencies. 
Lack of coordination between owners and government 
service providers. 
Number and type of stakeholders 
A gap and lack of communication 
between the departments and top 
management. 
Traditional organisational structure 
(Long and complex organisational 
structure). 
The routine in the business without change or 
development or response to the changes that are 
external to the environment. 
Lack of active communication. 
Tension and dissatisfaction with work 
and thus lack of productivity and poor 
quality. 
D
e
s
ig
n
 
Choose designers on lowest price. 
Not clear about end-user requirements. 
Lack of designer experience. 
No contractors, sub-contractors, and supplier’s early 
involvement. 
Short-term relationship. 
No classification system for designer. 
Lack of technical tender assessment. 
Premature tender documents 
(drawings, BOQ, and specifications) 
Choose consultants on lowest price. 
Lack of consultant experience. 
No clear role for consultants during construction phase. 
Lack of trust between contractors and other parties. 
Short-term relationship. 
No classification system for designer. 
Lack of technical tender assessment. 
Poor consultant performance 
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P
h
a
s
e
 
Weakness points in the process Contributed factors Result in 
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 P
h
a
s
e
 
No clear role for consultants during 
construction phase. 
Fragmentation in projects development phases. 
Projects are developed by different stakeholders. 
Lack of trust between contractors and 
other parties. 
Short-term relationship. 
Adversarial environment between 
parties. 
Choose contractors on lowest price. 
Lack of technical tender assessment. 
Short-term relationship. 
Poor contractors’ performance 
Unbalanced risks allocation. 
No arbitration options. 
Very long court process. 
Lack of legitimate legal mechanism. 
Participants’ multiple goals 
Owner abuse his authority 
No resolution office 
No compensation against owner 
Lack of trust between contractors and 
other parties. 
Short-term relationship between 
contractors and public sector 
No direct contact between contractor sub-contractors, 
and suppliers and designer. 
No direct contact between sub-contractors and 
suppliers with owner, designer and consultant. 
Lack of transfer knowledge and 
expertise between parties. 
No information sharing between 
contractors and other parties. 
Method of payment for completed 
work 
Lack of stable economic. 
Change on the state regulation and economic. 
Inflation 
shortage of input resources most of which are imported 
(material and machinery) 
weak industries and supply chains with which 
construction interacts 
low skilled manpower supplies. 
Payment Delay 
Cost overhead overruns. 
Owners’ representative has high 
authorities over contractors. 
Low investment in training and development 
Owners’ representative abuses his 
authority 
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h
a
s
e
 
Weakness points in the process Contributed factors Result in 
Lack of communication protocol 
between the stakeholders 
Fragmentation within the industry 
Poor communication between projects’ 
stakeholders. 
C
lo
s
u
re
 a
n
d
 H
a
n
d
o
v
e
r 
No clear hand over process Customer influence Projects do not meet user needs. 
Long guarantee duration Unbalanced contract risks Contractors’ cost overrun 
Table 42: Context and practices weakness matrix 
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4.4 Objective Three: 
Although there is an argument that construction project practices should accept 
cost overrun as part of the industry (Hartmann and Dorée, 2015), the SLR shows 
that hundreds of studies are investigating the problem. Objective three is to 
systematically review and evaluate the cost overrun literature to identify the main 
issues within the cost overrun research. To achieve this objective, cost overrun 
literature data was collected using a literature review approach. 
4.4.1 Data Analysis: 
This sub-section is continuing the work presented in chapter three. The formulation 
of the keyword was already presented (section 3.6.1). As will be shown in this 
section and based on the data that has been identified, the researcher will analyse 
the data that will be used to achieve the Objective Three and Objective Four. The 
105 resources will be analysed based on different characteristics such as location, 
followed by excluding the unrelated resources. 
4.4.1.1 Resources criteria filtration: 
As a continuation of the SLR steps (section 3.6.1), the criteria identified in step one 
will be applied in the literature review search output that has been presented in 
chapter three. Table 43 describes the tool that has been used for each criterion. 
The number of resources identified through the filtration is shown in Table 44. As a 
result of applying the criteria to the identification of papers to be included in the 
data, the number of papers was reduced from over 5700 to 71. The number of 
papers reduces gradually as each criteria is applied (Table 44). 
Criteria Filtration mechanism 
Published The researcher, where available, used the filter provided by the 
database. In case no filter is available, all the results went to the 
next step and were filtered by the researcher in the “research aim” 
filtration step. 
Peer-
reviewed 
Language 
Type of 
sources 
Research 
aim 
Unlike the previous criteria. A manual technique was used. The 
researcher filters the articles by their title as a first step, then by 
their abstract as a second step. 
Table 43: SLR filtration mechanism for SLR criteria. 
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Database 
Number 
of 
search 
results 
Number of 
Prereview 
Language Type Aim 
Remove 
duplication 
ABI 
Complete 
(ABI Global) 
324 130 130 125 21 21 
Business 
Source 
Premier 
236 232 222 222 15 13 
Science 
Direct - 
Elsevier 
3,291 3,291* 3,291* 3,236 13 10 
SAGE 
journals 
62 31 62 31 2 0 
Emerald 42 42 42 23 9 4 
Willy online 
library 
106 102 102* 102 2 0 
Scopus - 
Elsevier 
887 888* 833 594 52 23 
Institution 
of Civil 
Engineers 
Digital 
Library 
835 772 772 233 2 0 
Total 5783 5488 5454 4566 116 71 
Table 44: number of resources through the filtration. 
(*) the filter is not available. 
 
4.4.1.2 Literature Review Analysis: 
As the above table shows, the evaluating activity resulted in 71 papers being 
identified. Moreover, 34 new resources were identified through reference list 
checking. To ease the analysis and synthesis processing, a coding system was 
introduced for 105 potential resources identified from the previous identification 
steps (presented in Table 45). 
4.4.1.3 Primary analysis: 
The 105 resources have been extracted from different databases as Figure 32 
shows: 
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Figure 32: The 105 Studies' databases sources. 
 
The 105 papers have been extracted from 61 Journal titles (Table 46). The leading 
journal title is presented in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33: The main journal titles the 105 were extracted from. 
 
On regards location, ten studies contain a study sample from around the world. One 
of the good examples for that is study No. 91, which contains a sample of 258 
projects located in four continents. Two papers contain a sample of data from a 
specific continent (Asia), and three papers are not applicable to such classification. 
As Table 47 shows, the rest are spread over 39 countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4%
20%
12%
10%
22%
32%
The 105 Studies' databases sources
Emerald
ABI Complete (ABI Global)
EBSCO
Sciencedirect
Scopus
Reference List
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
International Journal of Project Management
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Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
(Famiyeh et 
al., 2017b) 
N
o
. 
1
 
(Iyer and Jha, 
2005a) 
N
o
. 
2
2
 
(Toh et al., 
2012) 
N
o
. 
4
3
 
(Meier, 2010) 
N
o
. 
6
4
 
(Ahiaga-
Dagbui et 
al., 2016) N
o
. 
8
5
 
(Dada and 
Jagboro, 
2007) N
o
. 
2
 
(Barinov, 2007) 
N
o
. 
2
3
 
(Arditi et al., 
1985) 
N
o
. 
4
4
 
(Adafin et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
6
5
 
(Abderisak 
et al., 2017) 
N
o
. 
8
6
 
(Park and 
Papadopoulo
u, 2012) N
o
. 
3
 
(Ahsan and 
Gunawan, 2010) 
N
o
. 
2
4
 
(Bari et al., 
2012) 
N
o
. 
4
5
 
(Knight and 
Fayek, 2000) 
N
o
. 
6
6
 
(Olawale 
and Sun, 
2010) N
o
. 
8
7
 
(Enshassi et 
al., 2009) 
N
o
. 
4
 
(Jennings, 2012) 
N
o
. 
2
5
 
(Cheng, 
2014) 
N
o
. 
4
6
 
(Memon and 
Rahman, 2014) 
N
o
. 
6
7
 
(Vu et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
8
8
 
(Dissanayak
a and 
Kumaraswa
my, 1999) N
o
. 
5
 (Shing-Tao 
Chang, 2002) 
N
o
. 
2
6
 
(Aziz, 
2013a) 
N
o
. 
4
7
 
(Lee and Kim, 
2016) 
N
o
. 
6
8
 
(Cunningha
m, 2017) 
N
o
. 
8
9
 
(Lu et al., 
2017) 
N
o
. 
6
 
(Alinaitwe et al., 
2013) 
N
o
. 
2
7
 
(Samargha
ndi et al., 
2016) N
o
. 
4
8
 
(Shanmuganath
an and Baskar, 
2015) N
o
. 
6
9
 
(Cantarelli 
et al., 2010) 
N
o
. 
9
0
 
(Skitmore 
and Drew, 
2003) N
o
. 
7
 
(Shane et al., 
2009) 
N
o
. 
2
8
 
(Sovacool 
et al., 2014) 
N
o
. 
4
9
 
(Mhlanga et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
7
0
 
(Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2002) 
N
o
. 
9
1
 
(Nasina and 
Nallam, 
2016) 
N
o
. 
8
 (Creedy et al., 
2010b) 
N
o
. 
2
9
 (Wang and 
Yuan, 
2011b) 
N
o
. 
5
0
 
(Eliufoo, 2017) 
N
o
. 
7
1
 
(Bubshait 
and Al-
Juwairah, 
2002) N
o
. 
9
2
 
(Meeampol 
and Ogunlan, 
2006) N
o
. 
9
 
(Ameh et al., 
2010) 
N
o
. 
3
0
 
(Nassar et 
al., 2005) 
N
o
. 
5
1
 
(Allahaim and 
Liu, 2015) 
N
o
. 
7
2
 
(Jarkas and 
Haupt, 
2015) N
o
. 
9
3
 
(Aljohani et 
al., 2017) 
N
o
. 
1
0
 
(Omran and 
Mamat, 2011) 
N
o
. 
3
1
 
(Bhargava 
et al., 2010) 
N
o
. 
5
2
 
(Baloyi and 
Bekker, 2011) 
N
o
. 
7
3
 
(Singh, 
2009a) 
N
o
. 
9
4
 
(Love et al., 
2012) 
N
o
. 
1
1
 
(Rosenfeld, 2014) 
N
o
. 
3
2
 
(Enshassi 
et al., 2010) 
N
o
. 
5
3
 
(Dissanayaka 
and 
Kumaraswamy, 
1998) N
o
. 
7
4
 
(Doloi, 
2013) 
N
o
. 
9
5
 
(Frimpong et 
al., 2003) 
N
o
. 
1
2
 
(Lee, 2008a) 
N
o
. 
3
3
 
(Rashed 
and 
Shaqour, 
2014) N
o
. 
5
4
 
(Durdyev et al., 
2012) 
N
o
. 
7
5
 
(Kim et al., 
2008) 
N
o
. 
9
6
 
(Kaming et 
al., 1997b) 
N
o
. 
1
3
 
(Alzebdeh et al., 
2015) 
N
o
. 
3
4
 (Abdul 
Rahman et 
al., 2013) 
N
o
. 
5
5
 
(Le-Hoai et al., 
2008b) 
N
o
. 
7
6
 
(Abusafiya 
and 
Suliman, 
2017) N
o
. 
9
7
 
(Mahamid 
and Dmaidi, 
2013) N
o
. 
1
4
 
(Wanjari and 
Dobariya, 2016) 
N
o
. 
3
5
 
(Rahman et 
al., 2013b) 
N
o
. 
5
6
 
(Memon et al., 
2011b) 
N
o
. 
7
7
 
(Flyvbjerg, 
2008) 
N
o
. 
9
8
 
(Kaliba et al., 
2009) 
N
o
. 
1
5
 
(Mahamid, 2014) 
N
o
. 
3
6
 (Ramabodu 
and Verster, 
2013) N
o
. 
5
7
 
(Memon et al., 
2012) 
N
o
. 
7
8
 
(Ansar et 
al., 2014) 
N
o
. 
9
9
 
(Yang and 
Chen, 2015) 
N
o
. 
1
6
 
(Larsen et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
3
7
 
(Memon 
and 
Rahman, 
2013) N
o
. 
5
8
 
(Okpala and 
Aniekwu, 1988) 
N
o
. 
7
9
 
(Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2009) 
N
o
. 
1
0
0
 
(Olaniran et 
al., 2015a) 
N
o
. 
1
7
 (Derakhshanalavi
jeh and Teixeira, 
2017) 
N
o
. 
3
8
 
(Muya et 
al., 2013) 
N
o
. 
5
9
 
(Terrill et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
8
0
 
(Ahiaga-
Dagbui and 
Smith, 
2014) N
o
. 
1
0
1
 
(Lind and 
Brunes, 
2015) N
o
. 
1
8
 
(Rahman et al., 
2013a) 
N
o
. 
3
9
 
(Zafar et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
6
0
 
(Chimwaso, 
2000) 
N
o
. 
8
1
 
(Bhargava 
et al., 2017) 
N
o
. 
1
0
2
 
(Mansfield et 
al., 1994) 
N
o
. 
1
9
 
(Niazi and 
Painting, 2017) 
N
o
. 
4
0
 
(Kim et al., 
2017) 
N
o
. 
6
1
 
(Radujkovic, 
1999) 
N
o
. 
8
2
 
(El-Maaty et 
al.) 
N
o
. 
1
0
3
 
(Baloi and 
Price, 2003) 
N
o
. 
2
0
 
(Polat et al., 
2014) 
N
o
. 
4
1
 
(Alghonamy
, 2015) 
N
o
. 
6
2
 
(Al-Agele and 
Al-Hassan, 
2016) N
o
. 
8
3
 
(Love et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
1
0
4
 
(Koushki et 
al., 2005) 
N
o
. 
2
1
 
(Love, 2011) 
N
o
. 
4
2
 (Hameed 
Memon et 
al., 2013) 
N
o
. 
6
3
 
(Love et al., 
2015) 
N
o
. 
8
4
 
(Merrow, 
2011) 
N
o
. 
1
0
5
 
Table 45: The coding system for the 105 studies. 
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Journal Number of 
resources 
Journal Number of 
resources 
International Journal of Project 
Management 
8 IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management 
1 
Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management 
7 International Journal of advances 
in applied sciences 
1 
Construction Management and 
Economics 
5 International Journal of Applied 
Engineering Research 
1 
Engineering, Construction and 
Architectural Management 
5 International Journal of 
Collaborative Enterprise 
1 
Journal of Financial 
Management of Property and 
Construction 
4 International Journal of 
Innovation, Management and 
Technology 
1 
Journal of Management in 
Engineering 
4 International Journal of 
Managing Projects in Business 
1 
KSCE Journal of Civil 
Engineering 
4 International Journal of 
Mechanical and Mechatronics 
Engineering 
1 
Journal of Construction in 
Developing Countries 
3 International Journal of Science 
and Management 
1 
Procedia Engineering 3 International Journal of 
Sustainable Construction 
Engineering and Technology 
1 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences 
3 Investment Management and 
Financial Innovations 
1 
Project Management Journal 3 Journal of Applied Sciences 1 
International Journal of 
Construction Management 
2 Journal of Academic Research in 
Economics 
1 
International Journal of Project 
Organisation and Management 
2 Journal of Civil Engineering and 
Architecture 
1 
Journal of Engineering, Design 
and Technology 
2 Journal of Civil Engineering and 
Management 
1 
Modern Applied Science 2 Journal of Engineering and 
Applied Science 
1 
Acta Structilia 1 Alexandria Engineering Journal 1 
Journal of the American 
planning association 
1 Journal of Urban Planning & 
Development 
1 
Applied Research Journal 1 Building and Environment 1 
Australasian Transport 
Research Forum Proceedings 
1 Proceedings of 2nd International 
Conference on Construction in 
Developing Countries 
1 
Organization, technology & 
management in construction: an 
international journal 
1 Research Journal of Applied 
Sciences, Engineering and 
Technology 
1 
California Management Review 1 Sadhan 1 
Built Environment Project and 
Asset Management 
1 Studies on Russian Economic 
Development 
1 
Canadian Journal of Civil 
Engineering 
1 The CIB W55 & W65 Joint 
Triennial Symposium 
1 
Cost Engineering 1 The Engineering Economist 1 
Computer-Aided Civil and 
Infrastructure Engineering 
1 The IES Journal Part A: Civil & 
Structural Engineering 
1 
Energy Policy 1 The Journal of Engineering 
Research 
1 
Energy Research and Social 
Science 
1 The Scientific World Journal 1 
Engineering 1 Transportation Research Part A 1 
Environment and Planning B: 
Planning and Design 
1 World Applied Sciences Journal 1 
European Planning Studies 1 None 1 
European Journal of Transport 
and Infrastructure Research 
1   
Table 46: All journal titles for the 105. 
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Country / 
Region 
Number 
of 
resources 
Country / 
Region 
Number 
of 
resources 
Country / 
Region 
Number 
of 
resources 
Malaysia 11 UK 3 Iraq 1 
Australasia 6 Vietnam 3 Israel 1 
India 5 China 2 Kuwait 1 
USA 5 Ghana 2 Mozambique 1 
Nigeria 4 Iran 2 New 
Zealand 
1 
Palestine 4 Zambia 2 Oman 1 
Egypt 3 Afghanistan 1 Pakistan 1 
Hong Kong 3 Bahrain 1 Qatar 1 
Korea 3 Botswana 1 Russia 1 
Saudi 
Arabia 
3 Canada 1 Sweden 1 
South 
Africa 
3 Croatia 1 Tanzania 1 
Taiwan 3 Denmark 1 Thailand 1 
Turkey 3 Indonesia 1 Uganda 1 
Table 47: Literature Review location disruptions. 
 
Based on the United Nations country grouping, Figure 34 shows the percentage 
each group holds. The Latin American and Caribbean group are the only group with 
no paper which could be related to the language as Spanish is the primary 
language used in this group. On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific group holds the 
most significant percentage. 
 
Figure 34: Location country grouping percentage. 
 
The 105 papers were published over the period from 1985 to 2017 and Table 48 
shows the number of papers published annually over that period. As Figure 35 
shows 93% of the studies are published after 2000. 
 
 
 
African 
Group
17%
Asia-Pacific 
Group
44%
Eastern European 
Group
2%
Latin American 
and Caribbean 
Group
0%
Western 
European and 
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Year Number of 
resources 
Year Number of 
resources 
Year Number of 
resources 
Year Number of 
resources 
1985 1 2000 2 2007 2 2013 11 
1988 1 2001 1 2008 4 2014 9 
1994 1 2002 2 2009 5 2015 9 
1997 1 2003 3 2010 8 2016 13 
1998 1 2005 3 2011 5 2017 12 
1999 2 2006 1 2012 7   
Table 48: Distribution of 105 over the years 1985 - 2017. 
 
 
Figure 35: Distribution of 105 in the 80s, 90s, and 2000s. 
 
The main focus of the study is construction projects. Thus studies that focus on 
construction projects are extracted from the databases. To analysis the sources 
depending on the construction project type, the research adopted a classification 
system that is agreed by international organisations such as: 
• The International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
(Statistical Division at United Nations, 2008). 
• UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 2007 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2009). 
• Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community 
(Statistical Office at European Communities, 2008). 
The "construction" category excludes the following activities: 
• Architectural and engineering. 
• Project management. 
The main classification section and sub-section can be summarised in Figure 36. 
It is worth knowing that not all the papers mentioned which type of construction 
projects that they were focused on, thus the construction projects category is for 
studies where the focus is not mentioned or is kept general. 
80s
2%
90s
5%
2000s
93%
162 
 
Figure 36: Construction main classification section and sub-section. 
 
Project types No. of resources Project included 
Construction 
(Construction of 
buildings) 
26 Educational building, Hospitals, 
Industrialised Building System, 
Administrative, Residential. 
Construction 
(Civil 
engineering) 
30 Transport, Pharmaceutical, 
Groundwater, Hydrocarbon, 
Wastewater, Olympic Games, 
Engineering Design, Electricity, 
Asphalt Paving, Stadia. 
B1- Roads and 
Railways 
18 
B2- Utility 9 
B3- Other 3 
Construction 
Projects 
46 Not Specific construction project type 
mentioned. 
N/A 2 Not Applicable. 
Table 49: Study number based on construction industry classification. 
 
It is not unusual that time and quality performances are measured beside the cost 
performance in the same study within the construction industry literature. Some 
studies have found a simultaneous relationship exists between poor cost and time 
performance and suggest that cost and time performance should be studied 
together rather than separately (Bhargava et al., 2010). The analysis of the papers’ 
aims and objectives show that three types of research focus exist (Table 50). 
Focus Number of the studies 
Focus on cost performance only 77 
Focus on cost and time performance 25 
Focus on cost, time, and quality 
performance 
2 
Table 50: Studies classification based on cost, time, and quality performance. 
 
Construction
Construction 
of buildings
Construction of buildings (all types of 
residential buildings, all types of non-
residential buildings (buildings for 
industrial production, hospitals, 
schools, office buildings, hotels, 
stores, shopping malls, restaurants, 
airport buildings, indoor sports 
facilities, parking garages, 
warehouses, religious buildings))
Civil engineering
Construction of roads 
and railways. 
(construction of 
motorways, roads, 
pedestrian ways, 
bridges, tunnels, 
asphalt paving of 
roads, railways, 
subways, and airfield 
runways)
Construction of utility 
projects. (pipelines, 
communication and 
power lines, water 
main, irrigation 
systems, reservoirs, 
sewer systems, 
sewage disposal 
plants, pumping 
stations, power 
plants, water well 
drilling).
Construction of other 
civil engineering 
projects (construction 
of industrial facilities 
except buildings, 
waterways, harbor 
and river works, dams 
and dikes, and 
outdoor sports 
facilities)
Specialised construction 
activities
Demolition and site 
preparation 
(Demolition, Site 
preparation)
Electrical, plumbing 
and other 
construction 
installation activities 
(Electrical installation, 
telecommunications 
computer network 
and cable television 
wiring, heat and air-
conditioning 
installation, industrial 
machinery in 
buildings)
Building completion 
and finishing(interior 
and exterior plaster, 
installation of doors 
windows, fitted 
kitchens, staircases, 
installation of 
furniture)
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4.4.1.4 Excluding Processing: 
The literature analyse was dependent on the information extracted from a paper’s 
abstract. In addition to this, the researcher did not have access in every case to all 
the full papers. Papers in Table 51 are those excluded because no access was 
available to the full paper even though the researcher tried alternative methods. 
While the researcher has access to the university (RGU) database as well as the 
Saudi Digital Library database, neither subscribe to the inderscience journal's 
website (Inder Science, 2019). The author also contacted the below papers' 
author(s) asking them for an individual copy of their work if that was allowed. 
However, only one author agreed to do so. Thus, the papers in Table 19 are not 
included in the analysis: 
Study Journal 
No. 50 International Journal of Project Organisation and Management 
No. 54 Journal of Engineering and Applied Science 
No. 57 International Journal of Project Organisation and Management 
No. 69 International Journal of Applied Engineering Research 
Table 51: Papers with no access. 
 
It is worth noting that the construction industry has developed rapidly over the last 
50 years (Tah and Carr, 2000a). The construction industry environment and 
stakeholders have changed to become more complex, larger in size, as well as 
more global. Moreover, the procurement types and contracts have been updated 
compared to the ones used 20 years ago. Thus, it was decided to exclude the 
studies that have been conducted before the year 2000 from any further analysis. 
The total number of excluded resources is 7 (Table 52). 
As can be seen from Table 47, some of the geographical regions were the focus of 
more than one study, therefore the author investigated whether the causes in these 
studies are duplicated, as this could affect the accuracy of the causes of cost 
overrun identification, which is one of the results of the systematic literature review. 
Reidentified the same causes from the same region (duplication of a study) is 
believed to affect the accuracy of the related causes’ importance. Thus, it was 
decided to exclude any study present the same causes from the same region 
(duplication) as Table 53 shows. 
Study Code Year Study Code Year 
No. 5 1999 No. 74 1998 
No. 13 1997 No. 79 1988 
No. 19 1994 No. 82 1999 
No. 44 1985   
Table 52: Papers excluded based on year of publication. 
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Excluded 
Study 
Similar 
to 
Country / 
Region 
Any difference 
No. 4 No. 53 Palestine Studies No. 4 and No. 53 contain the same 
causes but looking at the problem from two 
different perspectives. 
No. 14 No. 36 Palestine Studies No. 14 and No. 36 contain the same 
causes but looking at the problem from two 
different perspectives. 
No. 39 No. 55 Malaysia The same causes have been used in No. 40 
and No. 55; however, it has been evaluated 
from the different point of view. Thus, it has 
been decided to include No. 55 (the 
contractors' point view) as it is more related 
to the research aim. 
No. 56 No. 55 Malaysia 
No. 58 No. 55 Malaysia 
No. 63 No. 55 Malaysia 
No. 67 No. 55 Malaysia 
Table 53: Duplicated location studies. 
 
The large number of context countries identified within the literature raised a 
question regarding transferability of the knowledge from this diversity of contexts to 
the research context. At this stage, a general focus is taken, and this excludes 
studies related to contexts exhibiting unusual circumstances that affect cost 
performance or considered to be a non-normal context. In such a context it could be 
argued that the unusual environment/context for construction projects affects the 
transferability of the knowledge from this source. For example, Palestine has been 
unstable politically for over 60 years, and as a result, the leading causes that have 
been identified for cost overrun are related to chronic political instability. The closing 
of borders (not a normal situation) is one of the main causes of cost and time 
overrun. In a similar case, where the paper aims to evaluate the factors causing 
cost overrun in a road project within a terrorism affected area in Pakistan, results 
show that “idling cost of plant and equipment due to security threats” and “site 
investigation due to security threat” were major factors responsible for cost overrun. 
Table 54 includes the papers that have been excluded on this basis. 
Study 
code 
Country / 
Region 
Study 
code 
Country / Region 
No. 36 Palestine  No. 60 Terrorism Affected Areas in 
Pakistan 
No. 53 No. 83 Iraq 
No. 40 Afghanistan   
Table 54: Excluded studies because of knowledge transferability concerns. 
 
Another analysis shows that some papers use secondary rather than primary data. 
It was decided to exclude studies not using primary data and depending only on 
secondary data on the basis of such a study possibly generating duplication of the 
causes. Thus, the following studies are excluded: No. 10, No. 86, No. 89, and No. 
94. 
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A deep analysis of each paper shows the type of projects where the construction 
cost is not the major cost of the total project's budget such as telecommunication, 
IT, and military projects. Thus, it was decided to exclude such studies unless the 
study mentions the evaluation of construction cost (see Table 55). 
Study number Projects type 
No. 17 Gas-Oil Industry 
No. 30 Information and Communication Technology (ICT). 
No. 38 Gas-Oil Industry 
No. 64 The Federal defence and intelligence acquisition programs. 
No. 68 Modular construction. 
No. 105 Gas-Oil Industry 
Table 55: Excluded studies based on the being non-construction industry. 
 
Moreover, the papers in Table 56 were excluded as they focus on residential 
(domestic scale) projects. Such projects are normally small and owned by the 
individual private owner. 
Study number Projects type 
No. 21 Residential Projects. 
No. 75 Residential Projects. 
Table 56: Excluded studies as a private owner. 
 
It is worth mention that of the 105, most papers did not mention the type ownership 
of the project; however, only 33 papers clearly mentioned a focus on a public 
project. 
A deep analysis of the papers focusing on time and quality performance beside cost 
shows that some of the studies are measuring the overall effects of a cause on 
cost, time, and/or quality in combination instead of measuring the effects 
separately. This way of measuring the effect of a cause on cost, time and quality 
overall is of limited value here, as it is claimed that cost, time, and quality are each 
affected by the same cause in significantly different ways (Larsen et al., 2016). 
Thus, if the effect is as different as the literature shows, it would not be accurate to 
measure the effects of a cause on two issues as it could affect a responder’s 
judgement. Thus, No.12, No.48, No.70, No.76, and No.78 studies are excluded. 
A robust analysis within the contents of each paper shows some papers have 
issues regarding the type of the causes/factors/ risks that are identified and Table 
57 illustrates the reason(s) for excluding such studies. 
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Study 
Code 
Reason for 
excluding 
Study focus 
No. 2 
The study is not 
identifying clear 
factors /causes 
/risks factors of cost 
overrun. 
Risk factors 
No. 7 Factors influencing the accuracy of the pre‐
tender building price forecasts 
No. 9 The effects of the successful factors 
No. 22 The effects of the failure and success attributes 
No. 24 Causes of cost under-run. 
No. 31 The effects of construction projects’ successful 
factors. 
No. 43 The cost factors that need to be considered 
when cost estimations are prepared. 
No. 45 Seven classification types of cost 
No. 49 Explaining and comparing the cost performance 
statistical data in different types of projects. 
No. 52 Provide evidence that a simultaneous 
relationship exists between cost and time 
overruns 
No. 85 Evaluate the literature on cost. 
No. 87 Factors inhibiting effective project cost control. 
No. 92 Factors contributing to construction cost. 
No. 93 General risks 
No. 102 Investigate the variation of cost estimates 
Table 57: Excluded studies based on the type of causes/factors/ risks that are 
identified. 
 
Out of the 105 papers, 55 studies have been excluded for different reasons as 
presented in the above section. The rest of the studies (50 papers) are used to 
achieve objective 3 and objective 4 (Table 58). 
Figure 37 summarises the process filtration of cost overruns’ literature sources. 
 
Figure 37: Sources identifications process summary. 
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Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
Source 
C
o
d
e
 
(Famiyeh et al., 
2017a) N
o
. 
1
 
(Jennings, 
2012) 
N
o
. 
2
5
 
(Polat et al., 
2014) 
N
o
. 
4
1
 
(Knight and 
Fayek, 
2000) N
o
. 
6
6
 
(Flyvbjerg 
et al., 
2002) N
o
. 
9
1
 
(Park and 
Papadopoulou, 
2012) N
o
. 
3
 (Shing-Tao 
Chang, 
2002) N
o
. 
2
6
 
(Love, 2011) 
N
o
. 
4
2
 
(Eliufoo, 
2017) 
N
o
. 
7
1
 
(Doloi, 
2013) 
N
o
. 
9
5
 
(Lu et al., 2017) 
N
o
. 
6
 
(Alinaitwe et 
al., 2013) 
N
o
. 
2
7
 
(Cheng, 
2014) 
N
o
. 
4
6
 
(Allahaim 
and Liu, 
2015) N
o
. 
7
2
 
(Kim et al., 
2008) 
N
o
. 
9
6
 
(Nasina and 
Nallam, 2016) N
o
. 
8
 
(Shane et 
al., 2009) 
N
o
. 
2
8
 
(Aziz, 
2013a) 
N
o
. 
4
7
 
(Baloyi and 
Bekker, 
2011) N
o
. 
7
3
 (Abusafiya 
and 
Suliman, 
2017) 
N
o
. 
9
7
 
(Love et al., 
2012) 
N
o
. 
1
1
 
(Creedy et 
al., 2010b) 
N
o
. 
2
9
 
(Nassar et 
al., 2005) 
N
o
. 
5
1
 
(Memon et 
al., 2011b) 
N
o
. 
7
7
 
(Flyvbjerg, 
2008) 
N
o
. 
9
8
 
(Kaliba et al., 
2009) 
N
o
. 
1
5
 
(Rosenfeld, 
2014) 
N
o
. 
3
2
 
(Abdul 
Rahman et 
al., 2013) N
o
. 
5
5
 
(Terrill et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
8
0
 
(Ansar et 
al., 2014) 
N
o
. 
9
9
 
(Yang and 
Chen, 2015) 
N
o
. 
1
6
 
(Lee, 2008a) 
N
o
. 
3
3
 
(Muya et al., 
2013) 
N
o
. 
5
9
 
(Chimwaso, 
2000) 
N
o
. 
8
1
 
(Flyvbjerg 
et al., 
2009) N
o
. 
1
0
0
 
(Lind and 
Brunes, 2015) 
N
o
. 
1
8
 
(Alzebdeh et 
al., 2015) 
N
o
. 
3
4
 
(Kim et al., 
2017) 
N
o
. 
6
1
 
(Love et al., 
2015) 
N
o
. 
8
4
 (Ahiaga-
Dagbui 
and Smith, 
2014) N
o
. 
1
0
1
 
(Baloi and 
Price, 2003) 
N
o
. 
2
0
 
(Wanjari and 
Dobariya, 
2016) N
o
. 
3
5
 
(Alghonamy, 
2015) 
N
o
. 
6
2
 
(Vu et al., 
2016) 
N
o
. 
8
8
 
(El-Maaty 
et al.) 
N
o
. 
1
0
3
 
(Barinov, 2007) 
N
o
. 
2
3
 
(Larsen et 
al., 2016) 
N
o
. 
3
7
 
(Adafin et 
al., 2016) 
N
o
. 
6
5
 
(Cantarelli et 
al., 2010) 
N
o
. 
9
0
 
(Love et 
al., 2016) 
N
o
. 
1
0
4
 
Table 58: Included studies after excluding irrelevant studies. 
4.4.2 General View of the SLR: 
After reviewing the studies, the following general points are identified:  
• The systematic review shows there is a lack of comprehensive overview 
papers over cost overrun causes, 
• The majority of the studies are repetitive studies and do not overcome the 
shortcomings in similar previous studies, include similar causes, and use 
similar methodology rather than build on previous work 
• A diverse collection of terminologies was used to describe the same cause 
and concept. 
• The complexity of the cost overrun issue in construction projects and its link 
to a different aspect. 
• Lack of unified and clear cost overrun definitions in most of the studies. 
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4.4.3 Cost overrun definition: 
Aspects of cost overrun were discussed in chapter one (section 1.1.3). The 
magnitude of cost overrun in different contexts worldwide and the factors affecting 
the magnitude have been identified and discussed. Moreover, the cost performance 
and the importance of positive performance from the contractor’s perspective has 
also been discussed and to what extent different contractors are willing to accept 
cost overrun. Figure 38 shows the different cost performance positions that a 
contractor could be in after a project is finished. 
The review of studies within the literature evidences a number of cost overrun 
definitions, as presented in Table 59. 
The cost overrun definitions in these studies are not clear. Although there is an 
agreement that cost overrun is the difference between the cost in two points 
(predicted cost and actual cost, normally at project completion). However, a 
contract could be in different points in a project’s life cycle depending on the 
procurement routes, for example, in DBB procurement, the contract starts just 
before the construction phase, while in the design-build procurement route, the 
contract starts just before the design phase. Moreover, at what percentage is 
overrun considered to be a problem and have an effect on project performance, is 
not mentioned in most studies. However, Alzebdeh et al. (2015) considered it to be 
30% or more. 
By the end of the project, when compared to the initial budget, a contractor is going 
to be in one of the situations illustrated in Figure 38, which are: (1) make more profit 
than planned, (2) make the planned profit, (3) make less profit than planned, (4) no 
profit has been made (Breakeven), or (5) loss. Nevertheless, identifying costs for 
contractors is more complicated as an item bid price contains different components 
over the basic cost. Thus, for some contractors, any overrun over the bid price is 
considered as a cost overrun, whereas for other contractors, as long as the overrun 
has not consumed the expected profit, there is no cost overrun. 
For this research, the definition was adopted is the difference between the 
estimated cost and the final cost. The final cost is defined as the real and 
accounted total costs calculated at the time of project handover. The estimated 
cost, on the other hand, is defined as the total estimated cost at the tendering 
stage. Cost estimates become more accurate during the project process. 
Interviewees from the contractors’ side mentioned that any increase from the tender 
price submitted during the tendering stage should be considered a cost overrun. 
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However, there is a difference in opinions as to when cost overrun is acceptable. 
The percentages mentioned by the interviewees are between 2 and 7%. 
Study 
code 
Definition 
No. 1 The percent difference between the final cost of the project and the 
original contract sum 
No. 3 The difference between the actual cost at completion and the contract 
amount agreed between the client and contractor. 
No. 15 The increase in the amount of money required to construct a road project 
over and above the original budgeted amount. 
No. 16 The variation between the planned value before a project starts and the 
actual value once the project finishes.  
No. 18 The basic definition of ‘cost overrun’ is that the final cost is higher than 
was budgeted in an earlier stage. 
No. 20 The percentage difference between the final contract amount and the 
contract award amount. 
No. 27 An increase in the amount of money required to construct a project over 
and above the original budgeted amount. 
No. 33 The difference between the actual and estimated costs as a percentage 
of the estimated cost, with all costs calculated in constant prices. 
No. 47 Cost overrun can be simply defined as ‘‘when the final cost of the project 
exceeds the original estimates. 
No. 71 The difference between the agreed cost (contract amount) and the final 
actual cost of a construction project at completion, agreed by the 
client/employer and the contractor. 
No. 88 Cost overrun is defined as actual cost over budget. 
No. 97 The actual cost for the project is more than the estimated cost. 
No. 101 The difference in cost at project completion and project definition stage. 
Table 59: Cost overrun definitions in the SLR. 
 
 
Figure 38: Contractors’ cost performance results by the end of a project. 
4.4.4 Cost Overrun’s schools of thought: 
The literature shows that there have been different approaches to investigating the 
causes of the cost overrun problem. Some studies listed different causes and 
ranked them by expertise, while others tried to link the causes of cost overrun into 
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existing theories. In this section, the schools of thought of investigating the cost 
overrun problem are presented. Regarding the way of viewing and explaining the 
cost overrun, the researcher classified the 50 studies under three groups. 
4.4.4.1 First Category: 
In this group, studies sought to embed the explanation of cost overrun in a 
construction project to existing behavioural, economic, political theories. It is 
believed that embedding could be beneficial for understanding the phenomenon 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010). The studies included in this group are No. 18, No. 25, No. 
80, No. 90, No. 91, No. 98, No. 99, and No. 100. 
In this category, studies present a framework of explanation of the cost overrun in 
construction projects. Bent Flyvbjerg’s studies are the most well-known in this 
category, and some work builds on the Flyvbjerg explanation framework, such as 
No. 18. 
Rather than identifying specific causes for cost overrun, in this category, studies 
presented four main explanation groups; the division seems to be based primarily 
on theories the explanations are based on or related to, which are: 
• Technical explanations which include, for example, forecasting errors 
(including price rises, poor project design, and incompleteness of 
estimations), scope changes and inadequate organisational structures and 
processes. Forecasting theory and planning theory are the fundamental 
theories behind this type of explanation. 
• Economic explanations are exemplified by deliberate underestimation due to 
lack of incentives, lack of resources, strategic behaviour, and poor 
financing/contract management. The background theories mentioned here 
are neoclassical economics and rational choice theory. 
• Psychological explanations, exemplified by optimism bias among local 
officials, the cognitive bias of people involved in the project and a cautious 
attitude towards risk. Prospect theory and rational choice theory are 
mentioned as the relevant theories in this area. 
• Political explanation which includes deliberate cost underestimation and 
manipulation of forecasts based on private information. Here, 
Machiavellianism and agency theory are mentioned as relevant. 
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The studies examine the explanation given for cost overrun in projects from the 
worldwide sample (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b) and specific countries sample (Cantarelli 
et al., 2012a; Cantarelli et al., 2012c). 
The following points are extracted from this category of studies: 
• Cost overrun is a worldwide issue and could exist in any project. 
• Cost overrun varies depending on the project geographical location 
(country) and type. 
• The problem of cost overrun lies in the pre-implementation phase. 
• Out of the four explanations, the psychological, political, economic 
explanations were accepted, while the Technical explanation was excluded 
as an explanation of the cost overrun. 
• Projects that are more important are more vulnerable to strategic 
misrepresentation behaviour from project developers. 
Researchers in the category support their output by the Prospect theory which 
proposes that humans make venture decisions based on the likelihood of gains or 
loss, but not based on the real outcome of that decision. According to the theory, 
humans show typically high confidence in their knowledge and are unable to realise 
their ignorance and any uncertainty in their knowledge, resulting in overestimating 
income and underestimating risk (Kahneman and Egan, 2011). Thus, at the stage 
of promoting a project, project developers and decision-makers are more likely to 
be under such human behaviour during the estimating of cost, risks, and outcomes. 
Researchers also found that these biased decisions are systematically taken over 
the years, and are often predictable, rather than random (Flyvbjerg, 2007). 
Moreover, according to the data extracted from this category studies, there has 
been no improvement in project cost performance over the last 70 years, although 
expertise and technology have been improving over the same period. Although 
some explanations have been expressed by Kruger and Dunning (2009) as well as 
Ehrlinger et al. (2008) in regards the lack of improvement, the supporters of this 
category prefer that cost estimation is deliberately reduced for economic and 
political reasons which have been illustrated earlier. Moreover, they believe this 
excludes the technical explanation, as an improvement in technical aspects should 
reflect an improvement in cost performance which has not been the case. 
While the first category studies have made a significant contribution to the 
identification of causes of cost overrun, the researcher found their explanations suit 
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a particular type of project and explain the cost overrun in a particular project 
development phase. In other words, the causes and explanation of the studies is 
not necessarily an answer of cost overrun causes for all projects' type, size, phase, 
stakeholder, and most importantly, context. 
Although the data included in the studies contains 258 projects from 20 countries, it 
seems that authors are assuming that projects are developing in the same process 
in all countries. The familiarity of a specific context could cause such 
misunderstanding. For example, cost overrun in this category has been defined as 
the difference of cost from the time of making the decision to build the project to 
finish the project, but in which milestone of the project life cycle the decision is 
made could be different. It has been found that in some contexts, such as with the 
Dutch for example, the decision to build goes through different stages over the 
project life-cycle (Odeck, 2004). In the Saudi public context on the other hand, the 
real decision to build a project is after the design phase is finished, where the 
financial approval is given. In such a late phase of project delivery, the project’s 
designs and tender documents are fully mature. In such cases, project developers 
are unlikely to lie about the real cost of the public projects (optimism bias and 
strategic misrepresentation), unlike an early stage of the project development 
where the design remains immature. Thus, the causes of the cost overrun provided 
by the first category could be used to explain the cost overrun in the early stage of 
project development. Nevertheless, the discussion also presents the importance of 
studying the projects' context in investigating the cost overrun problem which 
supports the importance of achieving Objective One in this study.  
On the other side, the output of this category's studies lacks identification, 
examination, or explanation of intermediary conditions and events between the 
"Explanations" and cost overruns, resulting in a gap in time and events between the 
explanation (initial event) and output. This is also supported by Love et al. (2011) 
who analysed and evaluated cost and time overrun in two Australian case studies 
and concluded that the simple explanation provided by this category's studies 
(optimism bias and are strategic misrepresentation or deception and delusion) do 
not adequately explain cost overrun in these cases. Love labelled the output of this 
category as “misleading” because the studies do not delve into the complex 
interaction between variable and cost overrun during project development and 
implementation. This could be presented the importance of liking between the 
events (weaknesses) over the project development, and the issue needs to be 
solved (cost overrun) to overcome the limitation of studies in this category.  
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4.4.4.2 Second Category: 
The studies included in the second category are No.11, No.42, No.84, No.85, and 
No.104. In this category, studies from this category move beyond the causes that 
have been identified in the first category (optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation) to identifying intermediary events that lead to cost overrun. Love 
et al. (2012) called those events “pathogens” that occur during project development 
and delivering. Pathogens have been defined as "latent conditions" within the 
project development system, and they are distinctive by: 
• They are results of decisions taken by persons in top management and 
leading decision makers 
• They are not identified until an error takes place 
• Their impacts are not known before they are discovered. 
Researcher in this category believes these pathogens, which are stimulated by 
strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias, are not included in the cost 
estimation leading to cost overrun. A mixed blend of “pathogens” has been 
identified in these studies, such as lack of capability, optimism bias, short time 
given to develop the design, unsuitable procurement approach, and unexpected 
events or bad luck. This view on construction projects in general (looking and 
identifying causes of poor performance in construction projects) is supported by 
other researchers such as (Pasco and Aibinu, 2008), (Odeck, 2004) and (Odeyinka 
et al., 2012). However, regarding the limitations of this view, the method of 
measuring these pathogens and the link between them is not clear. 
4.4.4.3 Third Category: 
The third category contains the largest number of studies (37 studies). In this 
category, studies’ authors believe that the best way to identify the main cost 
overrun causes is by identifying a list of causes through the literature and/or 
interview and present them in a questionnaire to the experts and decision-makers in 
the construction field where they rank and/or identify their effect on cost using Likert 
scales. Studies in this category start with a very long list of factors, and through the 
use of advanced statistical methods, the most important factors are identified. It is 
believed in these studies that the "broad experience" and the "well-founded view" 
will be reflected in judging the common cost overrun causes. 
Authors criticised studies in Categories One and Two in that only a few causes of 
cost overrun are identified which is a result of the selective approach adopted. To 
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overcome this limitation, the approach adopted in this category is to include all 
possible causes to reflect the whole image of cost overrun. The researcher believes 
that including all the causes is beneficial as some causes are significant in one 
context and not in another. 
Studies in this category are divided into the following: 
A. Studies that identify causes only and verify them normally using the 
literature review to identify the causes. 
B. Studies that identify the causes and measure their effects (severity). 
C. Studies that identify and rank the causes. 
In general, there is a concern regarding the quality of the output of those studies 
that used a statistical approach to investigate complex issues in the construction 
industry such as cost overrun. Comparing to qualitative data, quantitative data 
generally are less deeply investigating in a problem. Further weaknesses of this 
category are: 
• No clear definitions and characteristics for the categorisation as well as the 
causes itself. 
• The use of superficial and ambiguous terminology for causes will be 
discussed later. 
• Factor statements do not really reflect what is meant. For example, one of 
the studies presents a cause as “Project Financing”, while what is meant by 
it is “the consequences of payment delay by owners such as delay and 
inability to cope with that”. 
• Poor understanding of project systematicity and lack of demonstrable 
causality. 
• The majority of studies frame the overrun problem in a manner that ignores 
the complex and highly dynamic context of projects. 
• Focus on independent, single-cause identification and traditional net-effect 
correlational analysis. 
• Poorly designed survey instruments. The respondents have to answer so 
many questions that this raises a question about the quality of the answers. 
• Questionnaires tool has three types of bias which are: observation by the 
individual, bias in the structure of the questionnaire and bias in the sample 
(Lind and Brunes, 2015). Although it is difficult to prevent these biases, none 
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of the studies has mentioned these biases nor provided any evidence to 
prevent them. 
• The respondents are from mixed professional, etc. groups which will lead to 
misleading output as each group will give feedback of the causes from their 
point of view. 
• The large difference in number from different respondent groups. In one of 
the studies, the number of respondents from contractors’ groups is 4 times 
the number of respondents from clients’ groups. This difference affects the 
output of the study as it depends on the average of all the groups. 
• Some studies use the data from completed projects and measure the 
relationship between the causes/factors and the cost overrun amount in a 
statistical manner to identify patterns of cost overrun. Although this type of 
paper extracts the information from real cases, the real (deep) causes of the 
cost overrun might not be identified, typically due to project documentation 
possibly not being accurate (more general cause such as change order 
...etc.). In one of the studies, the author acknowledged that the document 
that was used in his study might not point to the real cause (Ameh et al., 
2010). 
• Lack of the impact of interrelationships/causalities between two or more 
factors. The causes are listed as stand-alone causes, thus ignoring any 
interaction between causes. 
• Researchers used statistical methods to rank the contributing factors 
according to their impacts without considering the interactions among these 
factors. Moreover, the studies suggested solutions and remedies without 
identifying the root causes of the overruns. Any attempt to address the cost 
overruns would be futile unless the root causes are identified because cost 
overruns are a net result of complex relationships between one or more 
factors. 
• Poor causes impact measuring tool. The studies used tools such as RIW 
score which does not represent the statistically significant measurement of 
any instance. 
4.4.5 Conclusion (Synthesis): 
The SLR shows that there are attempts to investigate the causes of the cost 
overrun problem without much success (Ashworth and Perera, 2015). The in-depth 
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analysis of the 50 studies that identify the causes of the cost overrun shows a lack 
of a holistic view to the construction projects and its context apart from the second 
categories studies that show a holistic view to construction projects and ignore its 
context. 
Construction projects, in general, are dynamic and complex in their nature, 
developed over a long timeframe, and involved different persons and departments. 
Different stakeholders have different aims, backgrounds, skills, and view to the 
projects, from the trigger of that project until it's completed. This nature stimulates 
change and it is not unusual that projects' aspects (such as Goals, Scope, Design, 
Budget, Technology...etc.) are changing through different phases that are going 
through (Gil and Lundrigan, 2012). It is argued that construction projects continue 
changing over the "timeframe" and project’s phases, and these changes are 
positively linked to the duration of development timeframe. Thus, the project and its 
characteristics that are handed over are different from those at the conception 
phase; the project in one phase is arguably different from the prior phase and these 
changes reduce over the maturity of that project. The Scottish Parliament Building 
is an excellent example of these changes as the project started an extension of the 
old building with an initial budget of £40 million and ended as a whole new building 
at over £400 million cost (Fraser, 2004). The changing nature of construction 
projects, which has been expressed above, emphasises the importance of the 
definition of the cost overrun and the points at which cost overrun are measured 
between; identified as a limitation of the first category. Thus, it is believed that the 
first, second, and third categories measured the difference of cost between two 
different projects, which could explain the claim that 90% of projects suffer cost 
overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a), and the causes identified are not reflecting the 
real causes. 
Global studies on the causes of cost overruns in infrastructure projects may help in 
identifying major causes in Saudi Arabia. However, due to differences in 
governance systems, geographical location, and cultural practices, the outputs of 
the other contexts’ studies are not reflecting the real causes for the Saudi Arabian 
context and are insufficiently comprehensive in relation to Saudi industry practice. 
This is supported by Cantarelli et al. (2012a) study which confirms that cost overrun 
in Dutch projects performed differently from other contexts. Furthermore, the area-
specific study repeats the past findings — moreover, the consideration of the 
stakeholders’ responsibilities in addressing this chronic issue of cost overrun. 
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Based on these limitations, the SLR shows the previous works have not generally 
produced an adequate understanding, nor provided insights to the cost overrun 
causes in general, and for the public Saudi Arabian context specifically. 
To overcome these limitations a new way of looking into the cost overrun problem is 
needed. The identification of singular and independent causes, which in most cases 
only describe the proximal causes, is counterproductive, as overrun causation can 
only be understood by looking at the whole project system in which it occurs, and 
how variables within that system dynamically interact with each other. Merely 
identifying and listing factors that may contribute to a cost overrun does not provide 
evidence of causation and the ability to draw conclusions about the underlying 
dynamics that lead to their occurrence. The focus on the net-effect contribution of 
variables, assumed to be linear and independent, may be insufficient to cope with 
the systematically complex systems such as construction projects, as variables of 
causation tend to be interrelated and interdependent as well as dynamic over the 
project’s lifecycle. The crucial skill in understanding cost overrun is not just the 
ability to list or rank factors, but the capacity to see connections between the 
various causal factors as well as how they dynamically evolve over the course of 
the project. Thus, it is essential to adopt a systematic approach to understand the 
causes of cost overrun. 
This research proposes to build a causality model for contractor cost overrun in the 
Saudi public sector. It is believed that such a method will overcome limitations in 
the previous studies which are presented in sections 4.4.4.1, 4.4.4.2, and 4.4.4.3. 
Moreover, based on the findings in the weakness links in section 4.3.5, the model 
will present the closest state to the reality of a well-established causal relationship. 
In addition, the proposed causality model also will reflect a fully understood cost 
overrun causation as it will overcome the limitations of the previous three schools. 
However, although the weakness of the context and practises have been identified 
and linked, further investigation for other possible causes that are not related to the 
contexts and practises will be identified and linked in Objectives Four and Five. 
4.5 Objective Four: 
Cost overruns is embedded in the context of people and organisations and 
interacting in the complex web of business models, governments, technology, 
market structures, procurement strategies, risks and uncertainty. It becomes difficult 
to isolate the root cost causes of overruns using generic broadcasted survey 
instruments and divorced from context (Love et al., 2016). 
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Literature shows that all stakeholders are vulnerable to cost overrun. However, 
contractor cost overrun, or contractors’ loss, is more likely lower, under normal 
conditions, compared to other stakeholders, which are related to contractors’ late 
involvement in projects. Projects, in general, are more mature in their later stages, 
and the vision and design of the projects are clearer compared to the point of owner 
involvement. Moreover, factors such as inflation and price rise are typically less 
affected in a shorter period of time. 
To achieve Objective 4, this research will use the causes identified through the 
literature review as well as the ones identified through interviews. Using two data 
sources to identify the causes is believed to improve the quality of the outputs as 
well as reduce the possibility of missing important causes. However, only the 
causes related to the Saudi context will be included after any similar causes have 
merged and irrelated causes are excluded. 
As could be seen in section (4.4.3), different cost overrun definitions are illustrated 
in the literature, so, as this study is looking at contractor cost overrun in the Saudi 
public projects, and as it has been illustrated in Objective One and Two that Saudi 
public sector is adopting the DBB contract and the first contact of contractors with 
the projects is just before the construction phase, the cost overrun definition that will 
be adopted is the percentage difference between the total final cost of the project 
and the original contract sum. A negative value indicates a project cost saving, 
while a positive value indicates a cost overrun. 
4.5.1 Data Sources: 
The causes of contractors’ cost overrun are extracted from two resources. The first 
resource is the literature review and the second one is data extracted from 
interviews. This has been illustrated in detail in the methods chapter. 
Interviewee data has already been analysed in section 3.10.3. As could be seen, 
the interviewees are experienced professionals in the Saudi public sector as well as 
the Saudi construction industry. Moreover, they are from different departments on 
both the contractor and owner sides. The method of analysing data has already 
been discussed in section 3.11. 
For the literature review, the 50 studies that have been used to achieve Objective 
Three will be used to achieve Objective Four as well. It worth mentioning that 
although the aim of this objective is to identify the cause of contractor cost overrun 
in the Saudi context, the studies included in the literature review are identifying the 
causes from different perspectives which include other than contractors’ 
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perspective, such as the owner. Including such studies is the best way to achieve 
Objective Four as it could be seen in the development of the research query 
(section 3.6.1.1), including the keywords related to the contractors results in a very 
limited number of studies. Moreover, the nature of the construction industry 
(complexity and aggregated) results in these being the issues that are related to a 
stakeholder. Contractors, for example, affect or are affected (strong links) by 
another stakeholders’ issue (owner or consultant for example). Thus, studying the 
causes for cost overrun will build a deep knowledge and understanding of the 
causes of cost overrun in general and contractors' cost overrun specifically. 
Moreover, some of the causes mentioned as cost overrun causes are in fact 
aspects of contractors’ responsibility in another type of contract and should not be 
considered in this context. These were considered in some studies due to not 
adding contractual responsibility (contractor type and conditions) as one of the 
filters for choosing the causes. For example, an increase of the material price 
(identified many studies) considers it as a project cost overrun cause. However, 
where a fixed price contract is applied (Saudi Arabia, for example), contractors 
must absorb any such price increase. This highlights the importance of contractual 
responsibility as a filter/axis when identifying causes, and will be discussed more in 
the causes’ identification section. In addition, many studies have contractors in their 
mix of respondents, and their responses are affecting (skewing) the output of the 
study. I.e. whenever contractors are a majority of respondents, the type of main 
causes in this study are more related to contractors' causes and responsibilities, 
although these studies aim to identify the causes of cost overrun from different 
perspectives. Nevertheless, the identification and classification of contractor cost 
overrun are not the last steps in this study. A further step, which is building paths for 
the causes, links and networks between/from/to causes through different project 
phase, will be followed. Thus, these paths, links, and networks will depend largely 
on the cost overrun literature. 
To increase the reliability of the causes’ identification steps, causes’ filters will be 
developed and applied in the next section. These filters will exclude any causes that 
are not related to the contractors’ cost overrun or the practices of project 
development in the Saudi public sector. 
4.5.2 Causes from the literature review: 
Based on the studies categories (Objective Three), the number of studies in each 
category is presented in Table 60. 
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The 50 studies analysis is presented in Table 61 which is more related to the 
causes. 
One of the criticisms related to the identified literature is the different wording used 
to describe both costs overrun and its causes. Table 62 shows the results of further 
analysis of the wording issue, which caused the researcher to be more cautious 
regarding the causes extracted from these studies. 
Category Code of studies included 
First 8 studies which are: 
No. 18, No. 25, No. 80, No. 90, No. 91, No. 98, No. 99, and No. 100. 
Second 5 studies which are: 
No.11, No.42, No.84, No. 85 and No.104. 
Third 37 studies which are: 
No. 1, No. 3, No. 6, No. 8, No. 15, No. 16, No. 18, No.20, No. 23, No. 
26, No. 25, No. 27, No. 28, No.29, No. 32, No. 33, No. 34, No. 35, 
No. 37, No. 41, No. 46, No. 47, No. 51, No. 55, No. 59, No. 61, No. 
62, No. 65, No. 66, No. 71, No. 72, No. 73, No. 77, No. 80, No. 88, 
No. 90, No. 95, No. 96, No. 97, No. 101, and No. 103. 
Table 60: Number of studies in each category. 
 
Classification Sub- Classification Number of studies 
Project Type 
Construction (Construction of buildings) 12 
Construction (Civil engineering) (Utility) 6 
Construction (Civil engineering) (Roads 
and Railways) 
14 
Construction (Civil engineering) (other) 3 
Construction Projects 15 
Study focus 
Cost, Delay, and Quality 1 
Cost and Delay 6 
Cost only 43 
Owner 
Public 19 
Semi-public 31 
Phase focus 
Construction only 12 
Over phases 38 
Size 
Mega 10 
Large 4 
Medium 6 
N/A 30 
Method of 
primary 
causes 
identification 
Literature review only 18 
Literature review and verified by 
another method 
14 
Case study 2 
Brainstorming 2 
Other 16 
Point view 
Owner (client) 31 
Contractor 9 
Projects 10 
Table 61: Studies analysis. 
The number of causes identified from all the studies is 271 (Figure 39). However, 
as a cause could be in more than one study the total frequency number of causes is 
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719 as can be seen in Appendix A. Thus, the initial causes’ pool contains 271 
causes, and all the causes and the studies they were extracted from are illustrated 
in a 15-page Table (Appendix A). The majority of the causes are considered similar 
therefore it is anticipated that the number of types of causes will be reduced 
dramatically after the similar causes are merged. Moreover, the irrelevant causes 
will be excluded as shown in the next sections. 
Study 
Code 
Wording 
Other reasons 
For Used 
No. 6 
Cost overrun Cost Performance No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes Factors 
No. 8 
Cost overrun Cost escalation. 
No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes 
Reasons. 
Issue. 
No. 
20 
Cost overrun Poor Cost Performance 
- 
Causes Global Risk Factors 
No. 
26 
Cost overrun Cost Increase No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes Reasons 
No. 
29 
Cost overrun 
Cost Overrun 
Significant Cost Overrun 
No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study 
Causes 
Risk Factors 
Owner risk 
Variables 
Reasons 
Factors 
No. 
59 
Cost overrun Cost Escalation 
No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes 
Major Causes 
Factors Attributed to 
Cause Cost Escalation 
No. 
65 
Cost overrun Variability of cost 
No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes 
Risks. 
Risk factors that 
influence the variability of 
cost. 
No. 
81 
Cost overrun Cost performance 
No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes 
Factors influence cost 
overruns 
No. 
95 
Cost overrun Cost Overruns 
No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes 
Attributes associated 
with cost performance 
No. 
96 
Cost overrun Cost Variance 
No cost overrun definition 
was used in the study Causes 
Cost-influencing 
variables. 
Table 62: Studies with a wording issue. 
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Figure 39: Initial Causes' Pool. 
4.5.3 Causes from interviews: 
Another source for the identification of causes is the interviews with industry 
experts. 11 experts from different background and representing different 
stakeholders (owner, contractors, and designers) were interviewed. All the 
interviewees were asked about the causes of the contractors’ cost overrun. Their 
answers were analysed, and the causes extracted. The difference in background 
and viewpoint contributes to a deep understanding of the contractors’ cost overrun 
issue. For example, owner representatives have argued that the contractors’ cost 
overrun is a result of related causes such as an unqualified contractor being 
chosen, a poor method of construction implemented, or an inexperienced 
contractor. On the other hand, contractors blame the owner and present causes 
that are not related to the contractor, such as late payment, or a long approval 
process. As a result, other causes have been extracted from their answers such as 
a distrusting work environment between owner and contractor. It has been found 
that “blaming the other party” is not new in the construction research conducted in 
the Saudi Arabia context. Al‐Kharashi and Skitmore (2009) and Assaf et al. (2013) 
who investigated delay causes mentioned that their data shows that contractors 
blame the owner and consultant, and vice versa. However, as another source of 
data is already included, this blaming effect is reduced. 
Initial Causes' Pool (271 causes)
Third 
Category 
(233 
causes)
Second 
Category 
(27 
causes)
First 
Category 
(11 
causes)
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4.5.4 Excluded causes: 
Although the majority of the causes are related to the context of the research and 
are eligible to add to the causes’ pool, some of the causes are unsuitable causes. 
These causes are normally identified in a single paper which relates to the context 
of the projects reported in that paper more than to construction projects in general. 
They could therefore be described as unique factors that would not merge with 
other factors. Thus, it was decided to exclude them from any further analysis. 
Examples of these factors and reasons are presented in Table 63. 
The factor Study 
Code 
Reason for exclusion 
Domination of the 
construction industry by 
foreign firms and aids 
No.47 Such a factor seems to be context 
specific. Moreover, it has been identified 
as the least effect factor in the study. 
The types of clients No.46 The research focuses on public projects 
such a factor considered to be out of the 
research boundaries. 
Contractors' bankruptcy No.46 This is an effect of the cost overrun 
rather than a cause of cost overrun. 
Complex investment 
process and administrative 
procedures 
No.88 The research focuses on public projects 
such a factor considered to be out of the 
research boundaries. 
Others No.16 This factor has been excluded for its 
unclear meaning. Such a factor could 
mean anything. 
Table 63: Example of the excluded causes. 
4.5.5 Merging causes:  
To merge the similar causes, at the beginning the unexcluded causes are divided 
into external and internal causes. The internal and external are then divided into 
sub-categories based on different characteristics. For example, the external 
categories are divided into context related subcategories such as a country’s 
economic situation, relevant regulations ...etc. The internal categories, on the other 
hand, are divided based into phase-related subcategories such as planning, 
development, construction …etc. As the number of causes identified exceeds 250, 
another sub-division is also applied so as to accommodate similar causes 
accurately. An example of this sub-division is the causes within the implementation 
phase; they are divided into finance, scope, progress, experience, resources, 
technical, and project characteristics subdivisions. This helps the researcher to 
merge the similar causes in a more scientific way since the causes of cost overrun 
identified within the literature typically suffer from uncertainty and vagueness (Tah 
and Carr, 2000b). 
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The vague terms, which describe causes, are considered unavoidable (the reasons 
presented in section 4.4.4.3) in such type of research. To reduce the effect this 
limitation and improve the accuracy of the merging process, the researcher 
reviewed every cause definition in each study in order to inform the making of a 
better judgment regarding the definition of cost overrun causes. Moreover, the 
merging process is subject to human error, the effects of which can be mitigated, 
and the outputs improved along with the research validity, the merging process and 
its outputs (merged causes) were reviewed by two industry experts. The two 
experts have each been working in the Saudi public sectors for over 35 years. The 
reviewing process and related discussion resulted in changing some of the merged 
causes (split a cause into two causes or merge two causes into one). Moreover, the 
expert's comments resulted in some causes’ wording being changed so as to be 
more understandable. An example of merging causes is illustrated in Table 64. The 
full list of merging causes can be found in Appendix B. 
New cause Merged Causes 
Inappropriate 
procurement route 
and procedure 
Insufficient time for bidders to study and prepare the tender 
Inappropriate contractual procedure 
The long period between design and time of 
bidding/tendering. 
Bureaucracy in the bidding/tendering method 
Table 64: Example of merging causes. 
4.5.6 Final list causes:  
The merging process results in 49 causes which are presented in Table 65. 
Table 66 presents the analysis of the 49 causes. The first column presents the 
number of studies that a cause occurs in, the second column is the number of 
occurrences (equal to or higher than the first one) in terms of the total number of 
the merged cause occurrence (the merged causes is represented more than one 
cause). To represent each cause’s importance based on the first and second 
columns, a colour code was used where dark green means most essential and dark 
red means the lowest importance. The last two columns present a causes order 
(out of 49 causes) based on the number of studies that cause occurs in and a 
number of occurrences. 
Based on the analysis in Table 66, five ranking categories have been developed to 
distribute the 49 causes based on their occurrence during the identification steps 
(Table 67). The first category includes the most frequent causes 13 causes, the 
second category 8 causes, the third category 8 causes, the fourth category 7 
causes, the least frequent category including13 causes. 
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Code Cause 
C1 Inappropriate procurement route and procedure 
C2 Selection and assignment criteria 
C3 Discrepancies and/or deficiencies in contract documents 
C4 
Inappropriate (Discrepancies and/or deficiencies) local/national data, 
regulation/policies, requirements, and political environment 
C5 Difficult/Unstable/change in country's economic conditions 
C6 Force majeure (strikes/weather/regulation changes/accidents, etc.). 
C7 Changes in governmental regulations 
C8 Risk and uncertainty (Unforeseen events) 
C9 Fraudulent practices, kickbacks, corruption, Bribes. 
C10 Social and cultural impacts 
C11 
Inadequate planning, preparation, and pre-construction process and 
studies 
C12 Deficiencies in cost and time estimates prepared by public agencies 
C13 Strategic misrepresentation 
C14 Optimism bias 
C15 
Inadequate Inappropriate (Discrepancies and/or deficiencies) design 
process and documents 
C16 Inadequate site and ground investigations 
C17 
Immature tender documents (drawings, bill of quantities, specifications, 
contracts and legal documents) 
C18 
Difference between selected bid and the consultants’ estimate (Tender-
winning prices are unrealistically low) 
C19 Inaccurate cost and schedule estimates by contractor 
C20 Inadequate planning and preparation by contractors 
C21 Financial difficulty by client during construction phase 
C22 Delay in payment of completed works 
C23 Contractors’ financial difficulties 
C24 Changes in the project's scope, design, specifications 
C25 Cost of penalties 
C26 Schedule delay caused by contractors 
C27 Schedule delay caused by client 
C28 Schedule delay caused by external factor 
C29 Poor communication and coordination between a project's parties 
C30 Poor project/site controlling, monitoring, and management 
C31 
Conflicts, disputes, and lack of trust culture among the parties involved in 
the project 
C32 Extra works not included in the contract 
C33 Rework and wastage on site 
C34 Increased material costs 
C35 Shortage of materials 
C36 Poor material quality 
C37 Increase in labour cost 
C38 Inadequate manpower productivity  
C39 Shortage of labour 
C40 Increased equipment costs 
C41 Inadequate or inefficient equipment, tools and plants. 
C42 Equipment availability and failure 
C43 Lack of experience/ability/competence 
C44 Lack of owner / owner representative / team experience/ability 
C45 Lack of contractor / subcontractors / team experience/ability 
C46 Project size 
C47 Project location 
C48 Project complexity 
C49 High guarantee period of products 
Table 65: Results of merging causes. 
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Cost overrun cause 
No. of 
study 
occurs 
in 
No. of 
occurrence 
Cause’s 
order 
based on 
No. of 
study 
occurs in 
Cause’s 
order based 
on No. of 
occurrence 
C1 
Inappropriate procurement 
route and procedure 
15 18 26 25 
C2 
Selection and assignment 
criteria 
10 11 33 32 
C3 
Discrepancies and/or 
deficiencies in contract 
documents 
18 22 19 20 
C4 
Inappropriate (Discrepancies 
and/or deficiencies) 
local/national data, 
regulation/policies, 
requirements, and political 
environment 
18 22 20 21 
C5 
Changes in governmental 
regulations 
26 37 7 4 
C6 
Difficult/Unstable/change in 
country's economic conditions 
27 30 4 12 
C7 
Force majeure (weather) could 
include the (strikes/regulation 
changes/accidents, etc.). 
3 4 46 46 
C8 
risk and uncertainty 
(Unforeseen events) 
10 10 34 36 
C9 
Fraudulent practices, 
kickbacks, corruption, Bribes. 
13 13 31 31 
C10 social and cultural impacts 6 6 41 41 
C11 
Inadequate planning, 
preparation, and pre-
construction process and 
studies 
27 36 59 5 
C12 
Deficiencies in cost and time 
estimates prepared by public 
agencies 
19 23 16 19 
C13 Strategic misrepresentation 10 11 35 33 
C14 Optimism bias 15 15 27 30 
C15 
Inadequate Inappropriate 
(Discrepancies and/or 
deficiencies) design process 
and documents 
18 27 21 16 
C16 
Inadequate site and ground 
investigations 
19 24 17 17 
C17 
Premature tender documents 
(drawings, bill of quantities, 
specifications, contracts and 
legal documents) 
21 30 12 13 
C18 
Difference between selected 
bid and the consultants’ 
estimate (Tender-winning 
prices are unrealistically low) 
6 6 42 42 
C19 
Inaccurate cost and schedule 
estimates by contractor 
26 30 8 14 
C20 
Inadequate planning and 
preparation by contractors 
2 4 49 47 
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C21 
Financial difficulty by client 
during construction phase 
16 17 24 27 
C22 
Delay in payment of completed 
works 
19 24 18 18 
C23 
Contractors’ financial 
difficulties 
8 8 39 40 
C24 
Changes in the project's scope, 
design, specifications 
44 72 1 1 
C25 
Schedule delay caused by 
contractors 
15 18 28 26 
C26 
Schedule delay caused by 
client 
21 29 13 15 
C27 
Schedule delay caused by 
external factor 
21 31 14 11 
C28 
Poor communication and 
coordination between a 
project's parties 
18 19 22 23 
C29 
Poor project/site controlling, 
monitoring, and management 
26 34 9 8 
C30 
Conflicts, disputes, and lack of 
trust culture among the parties 
involved in the project 
27 55 6 2 
C31 
Extra works not included in the 
contract 
15 16 29 29 
C32 Cost of penalties 15 17 30 28 
C33 Increased material costs 29 36 2 6 
C34 Shortage of materials 29 33 3 10 
C35 Poor material quality 21 49 15 3 
C36 Increase in labour cost 3 3 47 48 
C37 
Inadequate manpower 
productivity 
18 19 23 24 
C38 Shortage of labour 16 21 25 22 
C39 Increased equipment costs 24 34 11 9 
C40 
Inadequate or inefficient 
equipment, tools and plants. 
8 9 40 39 
C41 
Equipment availability and 
failure 
5 5 44 45 
C42 Lack of experience/ability 10 10 36 37 
C43 
Lack of owner / owner 
representative / team 
experience/ability 
11 11 32 34 
C44 
lack of contractor / 
subcontractors / team 
experience/ability 
5 6 45 43 
C45 Rework and wastage on site 26 35 10 7 
C46 Project size 10 10 37 38 
C47 Project location 10 11 38 35 
C48 Project complexity 6 6 43 44 
C49 
High guarantee period of 
products 
3 3 48 49 
 
Total number of causes 786 1018   
Table 66: 49 causes analysis. 
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Ranking category Causes 
First Category C5, C6, C11, C19, C24, C26, C27, C29, C30, C33, C34, 
C39, and C45. 
Second Category C15, C16, C17, C22, C28, C35, C37, and C38. 
Third Category C1, C3, C4, C12, C21, C25, C31, and C32. 
Fourth Category C9, C14, C42, C43, C46, C47, and C48. 
Fifth Category C2, C7, C8, C10, C13, C18, C20, C23, C36, C40, C41, 
C44, and C49. 
Table 67: Causes’ ranking categories. 
4.5.7 Taxonomy System (Classification): 
Causes can be classified in many ways, including controllable and uncontrollable 
causes which may vary by project type and project stakeholder, but the aim is to 
improve understanding in order to minimise cost overrun. 
As Table 68 shows, there are many suggestions for classifying causes of cost 
overrun, which reflect different thoughts about the cost overrun problem and, 
therefore, cannot be universally accepted. Examples of the classification systems 
used in the literature are: 
Study Classification system 
(Abdul 
Rahman et 
al., 2013) 
The study categorises the cost overrun in 7 groups. These groups 
that investigated are the Contractor’s Site Management related 
factors, Design and Documentation related factors, Financial 
Management, Information and Communication, Human Resource, 
Project Management, and Contract Administration. 
(Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2002) 
Categorised the sources of cost overruns on construction projects 
into four groups: technical (error), psychological, economic and 
political. 
(Mahamid, 
2014) 
The factors were divided into five groups: cost estimating, 
construction items, construction parties, environmental, and 
financing. 
(Le-Hoai et 
al., 2008a) 
The causes are grouped into the following groups: Owner-related 
group, Contractor-related group, Consultants-related group, 
Project-related group, Material and labour group, and External 
factors-related group. 
(Long et al., 
2004) 
The factor analysis in Long study identifies 7 category groups 
which are: slowness and lack of constraint, incompetence, design, 
market and estimate, financial capability, government, and worker. 
(Radujkovic, 
1999) 
Causes in this study are divided into the main category based on 
the cause resource which are external sources and internal 
sources. The main groups subdivided into: 
External source into legal, political, economic, social, natural. 
Internal source into: management, technical documentation 
(design), human factor, supply and logistic, contract. 
(Berechman 
and Wu, 
2006) 
In the Berechman and Wu study the factors are grouped into 
Technological, Construction, General economic and financial, 
Regulatory, Organisational and orient management, Political, and 
Contractual or legal. 
Table 68: Examples of causes’ classification systems in the literature. 
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As Table 68 shows, the literature pieces of evidence that different classification 
criteria have been used to classify cost overrun causes; nature of the cause, time of 
occurrence, contract’s reasonability and systemic criteria. However, this leaves 
other classification aspects, which might be important, outside of consideration. 
Studies from the Saudi context show another type of classification, such as the 
Assaf et al. (1995) study, which classified the delay causes into nine categories: 
Project, Owner, Contractor, Consultant, Design, Materials, Equipment, Labours, 
External. However, no definitions were given for each category. 
The literature shows that developing a taxonomy system is essential for the 
following reasons: 
• It is apparent that there are many causes of overruns and many share 
similar patterns of impact on overrun costs. Therefore, it will be functionally 
useful and conceptually meaningful to develop a classification/taxonomy of 
causes based on their impact on the overruns of construction projects. 
• A classification/taxonomy of causes should be developed to aid the 
assessment of cost overrun causes for construction projects. 
• The classification will reduce the complexity of understanding the causes by 
grouping number of them that may share similar patterns of how it impacts 
on cost overrun, and that help to facilitate effective management of such 
causes. 
• The problem of the cost overrun is still occurring which could be the results 
of the bad classification. 
Based on the themes and nodes that results of the context analysis of the interview 
and documents, and guided by the previous classification systems, the author 
proposes a classification (taxonomies) system comprising three levels. 
A three levels taxonomy seeks to include all the possible causes of contractors' 
cost overrun in the Saudi construction industry. Although the taxonomy system 
does not intend to include all the causes for another context, other researchers 
could use the system as a generic framework to customise the causes for other 
contexts by adding or removing causes. Besides the causes, there were semi-
causes which the researcher regarded as amplifiers; not a cause by it is nature 
rather than project characteristics. These characteristics have been identified in 
many previous studies, however, from the researcher point view they are not acting 
as a cause, rather they amplify the effects and impact of other causes and between 
causes relationship. For example, the project size, to which the impact of causes is 
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positively linked; the impact of a cause such as Increase in labour cost is higher in a 
mega project compared to medium and small size projects. It is posited that the 
developed system covers the limitations of previous work for the following reasons: 
• Definition and characteristics have been identified so any new causes could 
be classified in. Moreover, because of the complexity and novelty of the 
construction projects, it is impossible to cover all the causes that lead to cost 
overrun, so we need to identify the definition and characteristics for any 
clusters so as to accommodate new causes. 
• The cost overrun causes taxonomy system provides a structured view that 
enables objective evaluation of decision methods. Therefore, the model can 
be used to aid the assessment of cost overrun causes for construction 
projects and to effectively mitigate risks of significant overruns. 
• New perspective: the developed taxonomy system is from the contractors’ 
perspectives while others are mostly from owner perspectives. 
The three levels of the taxonomy system are: 
 
Level One: 
Causes are divided into external causes, organisational causes, project internal 
causes, and amplifiers.  
Level Two: 
External causes divided into Procurement, Regulation, Country’s economy, Force 
majeure, Uncertainty, Fraudulent practices, and Social. 
Organisational causes divided into Process and Behaviour. 
Project internal causes divided according to their sources – client, design 
consultant, contractor and others. 
Level Three: 
Descriptions of Level 3 causes are self-explanatory. 
4.5.7.1 External causes: 
These factors are usually beyond the control of project teams. They exist and 
evolve independently of any individual project. External causes are divided into the 
sub-level which are: Procurement, Contract, Regulation, Country’s economy, Force 
majeure, Uncertainty, Fraudulent practices, and Social. 
191 
External causes 
Procurement 
C1 Inappropriate procurement route and procedure 
C2 Selection and assignment criteria 
Contract 
C3 Discrepancies and/or deficiencies in contract documents 
C49 High guarantee period of products 
Regulation 
C4 
Inappropriate (Discrepancies and/or deficiencies) local/national data, 
regulation/policies, requirements, and political environment 
C7 Changes in governmental regulations. 
Country’s economy 
C5 Difficult/Unstable/change in country's economic conditions 
C21 Financial difficulty by client during construction phase 
Force majeure 
C6 Adverse weather 
Uncertainty 
C8 Risk and uncertainty (Unforeseen events) 
Fraudulent practices: 
C9 Fraudulent practices, kickbacks, corruption, Bribes. 
C13 Strategic misrepresentation 
Social 
C10 Social and cultural impacts 
C14 Optimism bias 
4.5.7.2 Organisational causes: 
These factors are related to organisations directly involved in a project. Because 
most organisations are often involved in more than one project, organisational 
causes are also project independent. Organisational causes are divided into the 
sub-level which are: Process, and Behaviour. 
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Organisational causes 
Process 
C11 
Inadequate planning, preparation, and pre-construction process and 
studies 
C15 
Inadequate Inappropriate (Discrepancies and/or deficiencies) design 
process and documents 
C22 Delay in payment of completed works 
C29 Poor communication and coordination between a project's parties 
Behaviour 
C31 
Conflicts, disputes, and lack of trust culture among the parties involved in 
the project. 
4.5.7.3 Project internal causes: 
These factors are project specific and directly related to an individual project. 
Causes are divided into the sub-level (divided according to their sources) which are: 
Project internal causes 
Owner/ Owner representative related 
C12 Deficiencies in cost and time estimates prepared by public agencies 
C16 Inadequate site and ground investigations 
C17 
Premature tender documents (drawings, bill of quantities, specifications, 
contracts and legal documents) 
C27 Schedule delay caused by client 
C44 Lack of owner / owner representative / team experience/ability 
Contractor related 
C18 
Difference between selected bid and the consultants’ estimate (Tender-
winning prices are unrealistically low) 
C19 Inaccurate cost and schedule estimates by contractor 
C23 Contractors’ financial difficulties 
C26 Schedule delay caused by contractors 
C25 Cost of penalties 
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C20 Inadequate planning and preparation by contractors 
C30 Poor project/site controlling, monitoring, and management 
C45 Lack of contractor / subcontractors / team experience/ability 
C33 Rework and wastage on site 
C34 Increased material costs 
C35 Shortage of materials 
C36 Poor material quality 
C37 Increase in labour cost 
C38 Inadequate manpower productivity  
C39 Shortage of labour 
C40 Increased equipment costs 
C41 Inadequate or inefficient equipment, tools and plants. 
C42 Equipment availability and failure 
Project related: 
C24 Changes in the project's scope, design, specifications 
Other 
C28 Schedule delay caused by external factor 
C32 Extra works not included in the contract 
4.5.7.4 Amplifiers: 
This category is not considered as a cause rather than factors influencing the 
causal relationship between the causes (discussed further in objective 5). 
C46 Project size 
C47 Project location 
C48 Project complexity 
C43 Lack of experience/ability/competence 
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4.6 Objective Five: 
A casual model contains multi-casual chains. To understand the causal model, the 
casual chain needs to be understood. To explain the chain, Figure 40 shows the 
causal chains’ components. 
To build the initial model, paths were identified based on literature, Interviews, the 
case study, and the 49 causes identified in Objective Four. Based on the causes’ 
types (Figure 40), four factors (C8 Risk and Uncertainty (Unforeseen events), C43 
Lack of experience / ability / competence, C46 Project size, C47 Project location, 
and C48 Project complexity) have been classified as factors affecting causal 
relationships (Amplifiers). The rest of the 45 causes are classified as illustrated in 
Table 69. The smallest group of causes are the Root causes, followed by direct 
causes with10 causes, and the majority of the causes are intermediate causes. 
 
Figure 40: Casual chain’s components. 
 
Using both the causality model’s classifications and the cause classification system, 
as identified in objective four, the researcher developed a cost overrun causes’ 
matrix that is illustrated in Table 70. As it could be seen in the table, although the 
intermediate causes are distributed over the three classification categories 
(External, Organisational, and Internal), all the root causes are classified as 
external causes and mainly related to regulation. In addition, the direct causes are 
mainly internal causes and related to contractors. 
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Classification Causes 
D
ir
e
c
t 
C
a
u
s
e
s
 
C9 Fraudulent practices, kickbacks, corruption, Bribes. 
C19 Inaccurate cost and schedule estimates by contractor. 
C23 Contractors’ financial difficulties. 
C25 Cost of penalties. 
C31 Conflicts, disputes, and lack of trust culture among the parties 
involved in the project. 
C32 Extra works not included in the contract. 
C33 Rework and wastage on site. 
C34 Increased material costs. 
C37 Increase in labour cost. 
C40 Increased equipment costs. 
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
 C
a
u
s
e
s
 
C1 Inappropriate procurement route and procedure. 
C2 Selection and assignment criteria. 
C3 Discrepancies and/or deficiencies in contract documents. 
C11 Inadequate planning, preparation, and pre-construction process 
and studies. 
C12 Deficiencies in cost and time estimates prepared by public 
agencies. 
C14 Optimism bias. 
C15 Inadequate Inappropriate (Discrepancies and/or deficiencies) 
design process and documents. 
C16 Inadequate site and ground investigations. 
C17 Premature tender documents (drawings, bill of quantities, 
specifications, contracts and legal documents) 
C18 Difference between selected bid and the consultants’ estimate 
(Tender-winning prices are unrealistically low). 
C20 Inadequate planning and preparation by contractors. 
C21 Financial difficulty by client during construction phase. 
C22 Delay in payment of completed works. 
C24 Changes in the project's scope, design, specifications. 
C26 Schedule delay caused by contractors. 
C27 Schedule delay caused by client. 
C28 Schedule delay caused by external factor. 
C29 Poor communication and coordination between a project's 
parties. 
C30 Poor project/site controlling, monitoring, and management. 
C35 Shortage of materials. 
C36 Poor material quality. 
C38 Inadequate manpower productivity. 
C39 Shortage of labour. 
C41 Inadequate or inefficient equipment, tools and plants. 
C42 Equipment availability and failure. 
C44 Lack of owner / owner representative / team experience/ ability. 
C45 Lack of contractor / subcontractors / team experience/ ability. 
C49 High guarantee period of products. 
R
o
o
t 
C
a
u
s
e
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C4 Inappropriate (Discrepancies and/or deficiencies) local / national 
data, regulation/ policies, requirements, and political environment. 
C5 Difficult / Unstable / change in country's economic conditions. 
C6 Adverse weather. 
C7 Changes in governmental regulations. 
C9 Fraudulent practices, kickbacks, corruption, Bribes. 
C10 Social and cultural impacts. 
C13 Strategic misrepresentation. 
Table 69: Casual chain causes. 
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4.6.1 Building the causal chains (Paths): 
The method that used to build the cause paths commences from the direct causes 
(Figure 41) that are linked directly to the contractors’ cost overrun and then trace 
back to its origin’s cause, which is normally the root cause. The tracing and causal 
relation extraction are based on the data analysed from the literature review, 
interviews, and context (case study). The casual chains are illustrated in sub-
divisions based on the direct causes, moving from the less complex to the more 
complex direct cause casual chain. 
 
Figure 41: Direct causes of contractors’ cost overrun. 
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Causality Model 
Classification 
Direct Causes Intermediate Causes Root Causes 
Causes 
Classification 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
Procurement  C1 Inappropriate procurement route and 
procedure. 
C2 Selection and assignment criteria. 
 
Contract  C3 Discrepancies and/or deficiencies in 
contract documents. 
C49 High guarantee period of products. 
 
Regulation   C4 Inappropriate (Discrepancies 
and/or deficiencies) local/national 
data, regulation/policies, 
requirements, and political 
environment. 
C7 Changes in governmental 
regulations. 
Country’s 
economy 
 C21 Financial difficulty by client during 
construction phase. 
C5 Difficult/Unstable/change in 
country's economic conditions. 
Force majeure   C6 Adverse weather. 
Fraudulent 
practices  
C9 Fraudulent practices, 
kickbacks, corruption, Bribes. 
 C13 Strategic misrepresentation. 
Social  C14 Optimism bias. C10 Social and cultural impacts. 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Process   C11 Inadequate planning, preparation, and 
pre-construction process and studies. 
C15 Inadequate Inappropriate 
(Discrepancies and/or deficiencies) design 
process and documents. 
C22 Delay in payment of completed works. 
C29 Poor communication and coordination 
between a project's parties. 
 
Behaviour C31 Conflicts, disputes, and 
lack of trust culture among the 
parties involved in the project. 
  
P
ro
j
e
c
t 
in
te
r
n
a
l Owners’ related  C12 Deficiencies in cost and time estimates 
prepared by public agencies. 
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C16 Inadequate site and ground 
investigations. 
C17 Immature tender documents (drawings, 
bill of quantities, specifications, contracts 
and legal documents). 
C27 Schedule delay caused by client. 
C44 Lack of owner / owner representative / 
team experience/ability. 
Contractors’ 
related 
C19 Inaccurate cost and 
schedule estimates by the 
contractor. 
C23 Contractors’ financial 
difficulties. 
C25 Cost of penalties. 
C33 Rework and wastage on 
site. 
C34 Increased material costs. 
C37 Increase in labour cost. 
C40 Increased equipment costs. 
C18 Difference between the selected bid 
and the consultants’ estimate (Tender-
winning prices are unrealistically low). 
C20 Inadequate planning and preparation 
by contractors. 
C26 Schedule delay caused by contractors. 
C30 Poor project/site controlling, 
monitoring, and management. 
C35 Shortage of materials. 
C36 Poor material quality. 
C38 Inadequate manpower productivity. 
C39 Shortage of labour. 
C41 Inadequate or inefficient equipment, 
tools and plants. 
C42 Equipment availability and failure. 
C45 lack of contractor / subcontractors / 
team experience/ability. 
 
Projects’ related  C24 Changes in the project's scope, design, 
specifications. 
 
Other C32 Extra works not included in 
the contract. 
C28 Schedule delay caused by external 
factors. 
 
Table 70: Causes Matrix based on the causality model classification and causes the classification system. 
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4.6.1.1 First attempt: 
In this section, the first attempt to build the causal model is illustrated. Figures and 
Tables will be used to draw the links, extract, and explain the causal relationship. 
Figure 42 and Table 71 illustrate examples of the figures and the Table that will be 
used to draw, explain and extract the casual relationships. 
 
Figure 42: Causes Chain's Explanation. 
 
 
Figure 43: Causal chain for cause C9. 
 
The total results of the first attempt are illustrated in Figure 44. The model contains 
a causal chain for the direct causes that has been traced back. The process of 
tracing is mainly based on multiple resources which are presented in sections 
3.10.1 and 3.10.2. As the figure shows, the model contains a simple chain (Figure 
43). However, most of the direct causes are a result of long and complex causal 
chains. For example, C25 contains over 25 causal chains, with the shortest chain 
containing 4 causes, and the longest chains containing over 12 causes (Figure 45). 
This was also mentioned by the 2 experts who reviewed the initial model in that 
they requested that the model needs to be less complex so as to be more 
welcomed in the Saudi construction industry and by the decision makers. Based on 
that, the model needs to be simpler, so the causal chain could be identified, 
presented, and extracted. 
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Causal Relation 
Extraction 
Non-Saudi Context Saudi Context 
Chain No. Causes Next Level effects Literature Review Documents Interviews Literature Review 
1 
Cause 1 Effect 1 and cause 2 (Direct)     
Effect 1 and cause 2 (Direct) Cost Overrun     
Table 71: Causes Chains' extraction (Example). 
 
Figure 44: Causal chains for all the causes (First attempt). 
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Figure 45: Causal Chains for cause C25. 
4.6.1.2 Second attempt: 
To reduce the model complexity, the researcher recognised that some of the late 
intermediate causes are linked to the root causes of a single causal chain, on which 
basis the intermediate cause could replace the root cause and the single causal 
chain between them be deleted. This action will reduce the complexity of the model 
through chains becoming shorter and containing a smaller number of causes. To 
illustrate, using Figure 45, it can be seen that the C3 intermediate cause is a result 
of the following chain (C3 – C1 – C4). Thus the C3 causal chain can be presented 
separately at the beginning and presented in the model as CO1. All the identified 
cycles are presented in Figure 46 to Figure 51. Figure 52 illustrates the cycles’ links 
(in grey) as well as deleted causes (in box) which are C1, C2, C4, C5, and C21. 
The revised model is presented in Figure 53. 
4.6.2 Part-chain explanation and causal chain extraction: 
From Table 40 it can be seen that the root sources for all the replaced chains are 
C4 and C5. C4 (inappropriate regulation/policies, requirements, and political 
environment) is a direct cause for C1 (inadequate procurement route and 
procedure), C2 (Selection and assignment criteria), and C11 (Inadequate planning, 
preparation, and pre-construction process and studies). Both C1 (procurement 
route) and C2 (selecting consultants, designers, and contractors based on the 
lowest price) are good examples of the inappropriate regulation as discussed in 
Objective 1 (4.2.4). Moreover, inappropriate regulation also caused an inadequate 
preparation for the projects as the pre-design phases are not included in the 
regulation of public projects. C1 (procurement route) is linked to the inappropriate 
contract document, which is the public work contract. The contract has been 
assessed and its weaknesses illustrated in Objective 2 (4.3.3). The poor selecting 
criteria are directly linked to poor consultant experience (C44), poor contractor 
experience (C45), and accepting very low bidders (C18). On the financial side, an 
unstable national economy (C5), is a direct cause to the owner of financial difficulty 
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during the construction phase (C21) which is a direct cause for delay in payment 
(C22). The country’s unstable financial sources and how it could lead to such a 
problem was discussed in chapter two (2.2). 
Intermediate 
cause 
Root 
Cause 
Chain Deleted 
causes 
New code for the 
intermediate causes  
C3 C4 C4-C1-C3 C4-C1 CO1. 
C11 C4-C11 C4 CO6 
C44 C4-C2- C44 C4-C2 CO2 
C45 C4-C2- C45 CO3 
C18 C4-C2- C18 CO4 
C22 C5 C5-C21-C22 C5-C21 CO5 
Table 72: Part-chain explanation. 
 
 
Figure 46: Cycle one CO1. 
 
 
Figure 47: Cycle two CO2. 
 
Figure 48: Cycle three CO3. 
 
 
Figure 49: Cycle four CO4. 
 
Figure 50: Cycle five CO5. 
 
Figure 51: Cycle six CO6. 
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Figure 52: Causal chains for all the causes with the deleted links and causes. 
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Figure 53: Causal chains for all the causes (Second attempt). 
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As shown in Figure 53, the model complexity reduced after applying the part-chains 
(cycles). For example, Figure 54 illustrates C25 causal chains which contain 10 
chains (longest 9 causes chain) which are less complex compared to the earlier 
version (Figure 45). However, the model remains complex and this can be seen in 
other causes chains such as C23 in Figure 55. Thus, the model’s complexity needs 
to be further reduced. 
 
Figure 54: C25 causal chains using the cycles. 
 
 
Figure 55: C23 causal chains using the cycles. 
4.6.2.1 Third attempt: 
After assessing different solutions to reduce the complexity of the whole causality 
model to produce less complex and more understandable individual causes’ 
causality chains. It is believed that changing the starting point of a chain could be 
the best solution to reduce its complexity (i.e. starting from the intermediate causes 
rather than from root cause) and as a result, most of the chains could be divided 
into two chains. Such an action does not affect the buildability and constructability 
of the model as a whole as it simply reduces the number of repeated part-chains. 
To illustrate, from Figure 55 which presents C23 causal chains, the number of the 
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repeated part-chains caused by C12 only is 12 as it is affected by five causes (C13, 
C14, C15, CO2, and CO6) and affects one cause (CO5). The 12 repeated part-
chains are in C23 causality chains only (i.e. the total number of repeated chains 
caused by C12 is higher con). In other words, if the causal chains start from C12, 
for example, rather than causes affected by (i.e. C13, C14, C15, CO2, and CO6), 
12 Chains will be shorter and less complex. However, applying this solution to a 
unified starting point for the whole model is needed. By Identifying this point, a 
cross-section line will be built; thus, the new starting causes for the chains can be 
identified. 
After discussion with the two experts, it was agreed that the best-unified point is the 
point of the contractors’ involvement with a project in the Saudi public sector. 
Moreover, this research focuses on the contractors’ cost overrun thus starting from 
his involvement could give more value to the research by addressing the causes 
which are more likely to be under the contractor's control or they are involved in, 
and other causes which exist before the contractors’ involvement. Moreover, both 
contractors and the public sector could then clearly see how each part-chain could 
cause problems for the other and then propose a solution each from his side that 
could work for both sides. In the normal public procedure, as it has presented 
earlier in Objective One (4.2.2), contractors are involved in the project at the tender 
stage, after the design stage is finished and construction stage not started. The 
cross-section line passes through the following causes: C12 (Deficiencies in cost 
and time estimates prepared by public agencies), C14 (Optimism bias), C17 
(Immature tender documents; drawings, bill of quantities, specifications, contracts 
and legal documents), and CO4 (Difference between the selected bid and the 
consultants’ estimate - Tender-winning prices are unrealistically low). As can be 
seen in Figure 56, these causes are linked with red arrows to the new starting 
causes which are: C19 (Inaccurate cost and schedule estimates by the contractor), 
C20 (Inadequate planning and preparation by contractors), C24 (Changes in the 
project's scope, design, specifications), and CO5 (Delay in payment of completed 
works). Because of such changes, some of the causes and links were deleted 
(shown in grey in Figure 56). 
4.6.2.2 Part-chain explanation and causal chain extraction: 
All the part-chain causal chains are presented in Table 73 and Figure 57. As can be 
seen, the sources are C10, C13, CO1, CO2, CO3, and CO4 and end in one of the 
four causes: CO7, CO8, CO9, and CO10. To explain, starting with the less 
complicated CO3 and CO4, CO3, the lack of contractors’ experience is linked 
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directly to C20 (Inadequate planning and preparation). This link is logical and has 
been found in the literature by (Larsen et al., 2015b; Aziz, 2013a; Nassar et al., 
2005), as well as being pointed out by three interviewees (C1, C3, and O1). CO4 
(Very low accepted tender) is directly linked CO7 (Inaccurate estimate by the 
contractors). Again, this link is logical and has been found in the literature by (Abdul 
Rahman et al., 2013; Aziz, 2013a; Nassar et al., 2005), as well as being pointed out 
by interviewees C4, C6, O1, O2, and O3. C14 (Optimism bias) is another cause for 
CO7 (Inaccurate estimate by the contractors) which has a C10 (Social and cultural) 
background as humane tend to exaggerate benefits and under-estimate risks 
(illusions) (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). This is one of the main findings by 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2008; Ansar et al., 2016) and it has been 
explained thoroughly in 4.4.4.1. Optimism bias is also a cause for C12 (Inaccurate 
estimate by the public agency) and CO8 (Inadequate planning and preparation). 
These links are logical and have been found in the literature (Alghonamy, 2015; 
Doloi, 2012; Famiyeh et al., 2017b; Park and Papadopoulou, 2012), as well as, by 
the following interviewees C5, C6, and C7. 
The other two main factors on the pre-contractor’s involvement causal chains are 
C12 (Deficiencies in cost and time estimates prepared by public agencies), and 
C17 (Immature tender documents (drawings, bill of quantities, specifications, 
contracts and legal documents) which are both are linked to most causes. The 
inaccurate cost and time estimates by the public agency (C12) is a direct cause for 
delay payment for completed work (C10), arising from the public agency needing 
new funds (from the MOF) for the shortfall, caused by inaccurate estimation, to 
finish the project (Saudi Ministry of Finance, 2006). This casual relation has been 
identified by different interviewees (O1, O4, C1, C3, and C4), and the poor 
financing approach has been explained thoroughly for the context of Saudi Arabia 
in 2.4. The contractors’ inaccurate estimation is caused by four different causes 
which are CO2 (Lack of owner experience), C13 (Strategic misrepresentation), CO6 
(Inadequate planning and preparation study), and C15 (Inadequate design process 
and document). Strategic misrepresentation has been identified mainly in the global 
context (Cantarelli et al., 2010; Flyvbjerg et al., 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2008), and is 
discussed more in section 4.4.4.1. However, this causal relation was not identified 
by any of interviewees, or by the Saudi literature review. The approach to financing 
(one financer for all the projects and different stages approval) and development 
(lack of pre-design studies) could be the main reason for lack of effective linking 
between C13 and C12. CO2 (Lack of owner experience) is a logical direct cause for 
the inaccurate estimation (C12), inadequate planning and preparation (CO6), and 
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inadequate design (C15). These logical links are not only are identified by 
interviewees (O1 and O4) but also in the worldwide literature review (Memon et al., 
2011a), and the Saudi literature review (Albogamy et al., 2012; Al-Khalil and Al-
Ghafly, 1999; Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006; Othman, 2009).  
C17 (Immature tender documents) is a direct logic cause to inaccurate estimation 
by contractors. This logical relationship was identified by both literature ((Rosenfeld, 
2014); (Larsen et al., 2015a), and (Hameed Memon et al., 2013) and interviews 
(O1, O4, and C4). Contractors’ normally build their estimation on the tender 
documents which are more likely to contain errors when an unqualified designer 
and consultant is chosen. However, the lack of clarity of the document could lead 
contractors to inaccurately price the project, which could then lead to cost overrun 
(if the price very low) or to lose the competition (if the price is very high). C17 
(Immature tender documents) is caused by C16 (Inadequate site and ground 
condition) (Eliufoo, 2017) and interviews (O2, O4, and C3)), and has a logical 
connection to C15 (Inadequate design process) (choosing designer on price factor 
only) (Al-Rabiah, 2013; ASSAF and AL-HAMMAD, 1992) and interviews (O1, O3, 
and O4)), and toCO1 (Poor contract documents). Poor contract document was 
assessed, and its weaknesses has been identified in section 4.3.3. 
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Intermediate 
cause  
Root 
Cause 
Chain Deleted causes New code for 
the intermediate 
causes  
C24 CO1 CO1-C17-C24 CO1 and C17. CO9 
CO2 CO2-C15-C17-
C24 
CO2, C15, and 
C17. 
CO2-CO6-C15-
C17-C24 
CO2, CO6, C15, 
and C17. 
CO2-CO6-C16-
C17-C24 
CO2, CO6, C16, 
and C17. 
CO5 CO2 CO2-C12-CO5. CO2 and C12. CO10 
CO2-CO6-C12-
CO5. 
CO2, CO6, and 
C12. 
CO2-CO6-C15-
C12-CO5. 
CO2, CO6, C15, 
and C12. 
C13 C13-C12-CO5. C13 and C12. 
C10 C10-C14-C12-
CO5. 
C14 and C12. 
C19 CO1 CO1-C17- C19 CO1 and C17. CO7 
CO2 CO2-C15-C17-
C19 
CO2, C15, and 
C17. 
CO2-CO6-C15-
C17-C19 
CO2, CO6, C15, 
and C17. 
CO2-CO6-C16-
C17-C19 
CO2, CO6, C16, 
and C17. 
CO4 CO4- C19 - 
C10 C10-C14-C19 C14 
C20 CO1 CO1-C17-C20 CO1 and C17. CO8 
CO2 CO2-C15-C17-
C20 
CO2, C15, and 
C17. 
CO2-CO6-C15-
C17-C20 
CO2, CO6, C15, 
and C17. 
CO2-CO6-C16-
C17-C20 
CO2, CO6, C16, 
and C17. 
C10 C10-C14-C20 C14 
CO3 CO3-C20 - 
Table 73: Part-chain explanation and causal chain extraction (Second attempt). 
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Figure 56: Causal chains for all the causes with the deleted links and causes. 
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Figure 57: Pre-contractors’ involvement causal chains. 
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Figure 58: Causal chains for all the causes (Third attempt). 
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4.6.3 Final Model’s Causal Chains Extraction: 
Figure 58 presents the final model after eliminating the pre-contractor’s involvement 
causal chains. Moreover, the researcher presents evidence for the causal chains in 
Table 74, with the evidence being extracted from a systematic literature review, 
interviews, documents, and the Saudi context literature. In the following sub-
sections, direct causes and their chains will be explained.  
4.6.3.1 Fraudulent practices, kickbacks, corruption, bribe’s causal 
chain(s): 
It is not unusual that the construction industry and corruption are mentioned 
together, with some of researchers and organisations viewing the construction 
sector and industry in general as dangerously corrupted (Transparency 
International, 2005; Transparency International, 2017; Krishnan, 2010). 
Although the definition of corruption differs based on the context (Jain, 2001), in 
construction, corruption is defined as an abuse of authority power and project 
resources for personal gains (Le et al., 2014; Shan et al., 2016). Different studies 
identified the causes of corruption in construction (Brown and Loosemore, 2015; 
Zhang et al., 2016; Shan et al., 2017), and it has been concluded that corruption 
has the ability to be part of any construction projects' activity and could occur in 
different forms (Tabish and Jha, 2011; Stansbury, 2009). Thus, because of the 
unlimited causes of the corruption and the limited information of it in the context of 
Saudi Arabia and the research scope, the researcher negates the causes of 
corruption and focuses on the effect of corruption on contractors' cost overrun. 
The research has discussed corruption and fraud in the Saudi business 
environment in section 2.3.4, and it has been explained that regulations and culture 
are the real triggers, and examples have been given. As can be seen in Table 74, 
corruption has been identified as a direct cause of contractors’ cost overrun in the 
literature. However, this cause has not been identified by the interviews carried out 
within this research as a cause of cost overrun. The researcher posits that the 
interviewees would not admit being a part of the corruption procedure as it could 
affect their image. Another reason is that some forms of corruption (Favouritism and 
Nepotism) are generally accepted in the Saudi culture (section 2.3.2) and therefore 
not seen as corruption by the interviewees. 
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Figure 59: C9 causality chains. 
4.6.3.2 (Inaccurate cost and schedule estimates by contractor)’s causal 
chain(s): 
The accuracy of a contractor's estimate could be measured by comparing the final 
cost of projects (item) to the estimated price at the tender stage (Yang and Chen, 
2015). The research defined the final scenarios of contractors' estimation accuracy 
in section 4.4.3. In the case of poor estimating of cost and/or time by a contractor, it 
will lead to cost overrun and/or time overrun (Bari et al., 2012). There is agreement 
over all the evidence’ resources on this cause as it has been identified as a direct 
cause of cost overrun in more than half of the SLR. Moreover, poor estimating of 
cost and time was identified as the cause of cost overrun by almost all interviewees. 
Nevertheless, the contract document used is a fixed price contract. 
In the international context, over the years different studies have identified the 
causes of inaccurate estimation, especially from the owner perspective, such as 
(Oberlender and Trost, 2001) and (Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). In the Saudi context, 
there is not a study to identify the causes directly; rather it has been discussed 
while investigating other issues such as (Shash and Abdul-Hadi, 1992) and (Assaf 
and Al-Hejji, 2006). The causes of the inaccurate estimation have been explained in 
pre-contractor’s involvement cycles in section 4.6.2.2. 
Although contractors are mainly responsible for their poor estimation, owners and 
consultants are also responsible, as suggested by Long et al. (2004). In general, 
contractors are under pressure to reach a level of highly accurate estimation by 
including all the possible risks so as to allow them to win the project tender as well 
as to make a profit. In the Saudi context, the pressure is higher, as the STPL 
accepts the lowest bid even if it is lower than the market price by 35%, at which 
point normally such tenders are rejected in other contexts. Such an environment, 
where most of the risks are the contractors’ responsibility, encourages contractors 
to neglect some risks to win the business (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2012). In 
some cases, this leans towards suicide bidding (Figure 60) which typically results in 
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abandoned projects by contractors. This poor situation is expected to continue 
unless the owner changes his attitude by refusing to accept suicide estimation, 
change the risk appropriation, and encourage contractors to identify risks major 
risks and deal with them early (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2014). 
 
Figure 60: Contractors’ estimation conditions. 
 
Figure 61: CO7 causality chains. 
 
4.6.3.3 (Conflicts, disputes, and lack of trust culture among the parties 
involved in the project)’s, and (Extra works not included in the 
contract’s) causal chain(s): 
As Figure 62 shows, Conflicts, disputes, and lack of trust culture among the parties 
involved in the project, and Extra works not included in the contract, are direct 
causes of contractors’ cost overrun. Both causes are triggered by the poor contract 
(PWC) that is used in all Saudi public projects. The PWC has already been 
assessed when discussing Objective Two (4.3.3).  
Poor contract documents, in general, has been found to encourage conflicts 
between contractors and owners, as assumptions are found to “lead” the 
contractors' estimation (Harbuck, 2004). Nevertheless, the PWC encourage the low 
commitment of MoF to the compensation of contractors' financially, which will be 
shown in the next sections as another reason for conflict. The PWC also puts the 
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owner in a powerful position where contractors admit doing extra work to make him 
happy and avoid conflicts. 
 
Figure 62: C31 and C32 causality chains. 
 
4.6.3.4  (Rework and wastage on site)'s causal chain(s): 
As the final model and Figure 63 described, Rework and wastage are results of the 
three intermediate causes: lack of contractors’ experience, adverse weather, and 
the long period of guaranteeing works. Redoing the work will lead to cost overrun 
as contractors normally price for work to be done only once. Out of the three 
triggers for rework, the guarantee period is the weakest trigger as it been identified 
in only three resources of SLR (ranked 48 out of 49), and has not been mentioned 
by the interviewees. This could be related to the fact that contractors are fully aware 
of the guarantee period ahead of pricing their bid. The adverse weather and lack of 
experience followed as they were identified more in the SLR and interviews as 
Table 74 shows. For Saudi Arabia, the natural climate, in general, is good and 
predictable. However, recent years have shown dramatic changes in weather such 
as snowfall and flooding, which when combined with an unprepared infrastructure, 
impact heavily and could destroy the whole project (Al-Ahmed, 2009). 
 
Figure 63: C33 causality chains. 
 
4.6.3.5 (Cost of penalties)’s causal chain(s): 
Cost of penalties is the sixth direct cause for the contractors’ cost overrun. As 
shown in Figure 64, the extra cost comes as a result of the delay caused by the 
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contractor or an external factor, as the PWC points out only one type of penalty 
(delay penalty). Besides daily extra cost caused by delay such as the cost of 
overhead (Morris, 2003), according to PWC, the total delay penalties could be as 
high as 10% of the projects’ price, which also includes the consultation cost. 
Although the penalties are limited to 10%, for contractors who work in a competitive 
environment this could eat the whole profit and mark-up (Shash and Abdul-Hadi, 
1992). 
In term of SLR, the direct cause itself ranked as arguably low (30 out of the 49) 
compared to the two triggers (13 and 14 out of 49). This is caused by the limitation 
of the previous works (discussed in section 4.4.2), as most of the previous studies 
have issues with the wording of the direct cause of cost overrun. Moreover, the 
different views on the cost overrun (owners’ and contractors’ perspectives) typically 
mean that words such as “penalties” are normally not used against owners. 
The delay causes as discussed in a large volume of studies (Larsen et al., 2016); 
(Singh, 2009a), and in the Saudi context (Al‐Kharashi and Skitmore, 2009) reflect 
the limitations of these studies. However, both the literature and the interviews 
agree that contractors’ poor management of the project and its site and adverse 
weather are the main triggers for delay, as Table 74 shows. 
 
Figure 64: C25 causality chains. 
 
4.6.3.6 (Increased material costs)’s, (Increase in labour cost)’s and 
(Increased equipment costs)’s causal chain(s): 
The increased cost of the main contractors’ work resources (materials, labour, and 
equipment) are other direct causes of the contractors’ cost overrun. The three 
causes are affected by the same root causes which are poor contractors’ project 
and site management as well as a change in the government regulations (Figure 
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65). The intermediate causes are mainly a shortage of resources or poor 
quality/productivity. 
From the cost overrun SLR, an increase in material and equipment cost ranked 
high (2 and 11 respectively), while, the increase in labour cost ranked very low (47 
from 49). However, interviewees recognised them as being at the same level of 
importance. The difference in perceived importance is more likely related to the 
uniqueness of the Saudi context that has been illustrated in section 2.4. 
The importance of these direct causes is coming from a combination of material, 
equipment, and labour costs representing over 90% of the bid price (Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 1992) and small cost increases impacting on contractors’ cost 
performance. Nevertheless, the PWC does not protect nor compensate for the 
increase in the resources cost, even in the case of changes in government 
regulation. 
In the Saudi context, as was explained in section 2.4, contractors are dependent 
mainly on foreign resources (labour and materials) which are directly impacted on 
by government regulation changes. However, interviewees working in road projects 
placed more emphasis on equipment cost, while those who work in building 
projects focused on materials cost both groups gave the labour resource a similar 
level of importance. 
 
Figure 65: C34, C37, and C40 causality chains. 
 
4.6.3.7 (Contractors’ financial difficulties)’s causal chain(s): 
Table 74 presents contractors’ financial difficulties as the last direct cause and 
represented by nine causal chains. The financial difficulties mainly result from 
delay, payment delay, and change in government regulations. 
The delay caused by contractors and external factors and their effects on cost have 
been discussed in section 4.6.3.5. Although the PWC mentioned that contractors 
are compensated by the awarding of extra time equal to the delay caused by the 
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owner, they are not compensated financially regarding the extra cost caused by 
delay, suspensions, or overheads and changes in resources price. 
The payment delay for completed work is also going to cause financial difficulties 
because of the limited cash flow. According to the PWC, contractors are expected 
to continue working and perform normally, even in the case of payment delay. 
However, in reality, contractors are going to perform poorer, leading to delay 
penalties or borrowing money from a third source to keep going. Both options lead 
to extra cost. 
 
Figure 66: C23 causality chains. 
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Causal Relation 
Extraction 
Non-Saudi Context Saudi Context 
Chain 
No. 
Causes Next Level effects Literature Review Documents Interviews 
Literature 
Review 
C9 Fraudulent practices, kickbacks, corruption, bribes.  
1 
C9 Fraudulent practices, 
kickbacks, corruption, 
bribes. 
Cost overrun (Park and Papadopoulou, 2012), 
(Wanjari and Dobariya, 2016), 
(Polat et al., 2014), (Aziz, 2013a), 
(Kim et al., 2017), (Eliufoo, 2017), 
(Allahaim and Liu, 2015), and 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010) 
PWC  (Al‐Kharashi and 
Skitmore, 2009) 
and (Alsaqer, 
2011) 
CO7 Inaccurate cost and schedule estimates by contractor. 
2 CO7 Inaccurate cost 
and schedule estimates 
by contractor 
Cost overrun (Famiyeh et al., 2017b), (Park and 
Papadopoulou, 2012), , (Nassar et 
al., 2005), (Abdul Rahman et al., 
2013), (Knight and Fayek, 2000), 
(Allahaim and Liu, 2015), (Memon 
et al., 2011b), (Abusafiya and 
Suliman, 2017). 
PWC C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5, C6, 
and C7. O1, 
O2, O3, O4, 
and O5. 
(Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 
1992), (Al-Harbi 
et al., 1994), 
(Assaf and Al-
Hejji, 2006), and 
(Assaf et al., 
2013) 
C31 Conflicts, disputes, and lack of trust culture among the parties involved in the project. 
3 CO1 Discrepancies 
and/or deficiencies in 
contract documents 
C31 Conflicts, 
disputes, and lack of 
trust culture among 
the parties involved 
in the project. 
(Park and Papadopoulou, 2012), 
(Aziz, 2013a), (Cantarelli et al., 
2010), (Wanjari and Dobariya, 
2016), and (Polat et al., 2014). 
 
PWC C2, C5, and 
O3. 
(Baghdadi and 
Kishk, 2015), 
(Medallah, 2015), 
(Assaf and Al-
Hejji, 2006), and 
(Assaf et al., 
1996). 
C31Conflicts, disputes, 
and lack of trust culture 
among the parties 
involved in the project. 
Cost overrun (Kim et al., 2017), (Eliufoo, 2017), 
and (Allahaim and Liu, 2015) 
 C1, C3, C4, 
and C5. 
 
C32 Extra works not included in the contract. 
3 CO1 C31     
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Non-Saudi Context Saudi Context 
Chain 
No. 
Causes Next Level effects Literature Review Documents Interviews 
Literature 
Review 
C31 Conflicts, disputes, 
and lack of trust culture 
among the parties 
involved in the project. 
C32 Extra works not 
included in the 
contract. 
(Polat et al., 2014), and (Yang and 
Chen, 2015). 
 C1, C3, C4, 
and C5. 
(Assaf et al., 
2013),(Al‐
Kharashi and 
Skitmore, 2009) 
      C32 Extra works not 
included in the contract. 
Cost overrun (Polat et al., 2014) PWC  
4 CO1 Discrepancies 
and/or deficiencies in 
contract documents. 
C32 Extra works not 
included in the 
contract. 
 PWC C1, C3, C4, 
and C5. 
 
   C32  Cost overrun -    
C33 Rework and wastage on site. 
5 C6 Adverse weather. C33 Rework and 
wastage on site. 
(Famiyeh et al., 2017b), (Kaliba et 
al., 2009), (Alinaitwe et al., 2013), 
(Knight and Fayek, 2000) 
 C3, C4, C5, 
and O1. 
 
   C33 Rework and 
wastage on site. 
Cost overrun (Kim et al., 2017), (Knight and 
Fayek, 2000), (Iyer and Jha, 
2005b), (Abu El-Maaty et al., 2017). 
   
6 CO3 Lack of contractor / 
subcontractors / team 
experience/ ability. 
C33 Rework and 
wastage on site. 
(Park and Papadopoulou, 2012), 
(Nassar et al., 2005), (Rahman et 
al., 2013a), and (Abusafiya and 
Suliman, 2017). 
 C5, C6, and 
O3. 
 
   C33 Cost overrun -    
7 CO1 Discrepancies 
and/or deficiencies in 
contract documents. 
C49 High guarantee 
period of products. 
(Polat et al., 2014), (Abu El-Maaty 
et al., 2017) 
PWC   
C49 High guarantee 
period of products. 
C33 Rework and 
wastage on site. 
(Polat et al., 2014) and (Abu El-
Maaty et al., 2017). 
PWC   
C33 Cost overrun     
C25 Cost of penalties. 
8 C6 Adverse weather. C28 Schedule delay 
caused by external 
factor. 
(Rosenfeld, 2014) and (Wanjari and 
Dobariya, 2016) 
PWC C3, C4, C5, 
and O1. 
(Al‐Kharashi and 
Skitmore, 2009), 
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Non-Saudi Context Saudi Context 
Chain 
No. 
Causes Next Level effects Literature Review Documents Interviews 
Literature 
Review 
   C28 Schedule delay 
caused by external 
factor. 
C25 Cost of 
penalties. 
(Cheng, 2014) and (Allahaim and 
Liu, 2015) 
 (Al-Khalil and Al-
Ghafly, 1999), 
and (Assaf and 
Al-Hejji, 2006).       C25 Cost of 
penalties. 
Cost overrun (Polat et al., 2014), (Nassar et al., 
2005), and (Rahman et al., 2013a). 
PWC 
9 CO3 Lack of contractor / 
subcontractors / team 
experience/ ability. 
C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, 
monitoring, and 
management. 
(Alghonamy, 2015) and (Eliufoo, 
2017). 
 C4, C5, and 
C7. 
(Al‐Kharashi and 
Skitmore, 2009), 
(Al-Khalil and Al-
Ghafly, 1999), 
and (Assaf and 
Al-Hejji, 2006). 
   C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management. 
C26 Schedule delay 
caused by 
contractors. 
(Chimwaso, 2000), (Abusafiya and 
Suliman, 2017), (Nassar et al., 
2005), and (Rahman et al., 2013a). 
 
      C26 Schedule delay 
caused by contractors. 
C25 Cost of 
penalties. 
 PWC 
         C25 Cost overrun   
10 CO3 Lack of contractor / 
subcontractors / team 
experience/ ability. 
CO8 Inadequate 
planning and 
preparation by 
contractors. 
(Cheng, 2014), (Memon et al., 
2011a), and (Abusafiya and 
Suliman, 2017) 
 C4, C5, and 
C7. 
(Al‐Kharashi and 
Skitmore, 2009), 
(Al-Khalil and Al-
Ghafly, 1999), 
and (Assaf and 
Al-Hejji, 2006). 
   CO8 Inadequate 
planning and 
preparation by 
contractors. 
C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, 
monitoring, and 
management. 
(Love et al., 2016) and (Eliufoo, 
2017) 
 
      C30  C26    
         C26  C25   
            C25  Cost overrun   
C40 Increased equipment costs. 
11 C7 Changes in 
governmental 
regulations. 
C40 Increased 
equipment costs. 
(Alzebdeh et al., 2015) PWC C1, C2, C3, 
C5, C6, and 
C7. 
(Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 
1992), (Al-Barrak, 
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   C40 Increased 
equipment costs. 
Cost Overrun. (Park and Papadopoulou, 2012), 
(Alzebdeh et al., 2015), (Aziz, 
2013a), and (Memon et al., 2011b). 
 1993), (Al-Harbi 
et al., 1994), and 
(Bageis and 
Fortune, 2009). 
12 CO3 CO8     
   CO8 C30     
      C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management. 
C42 Equipment 
availability and 
failure. 
(Nassar et al., 2005),(Abdul 
Rahman et al., 2013), and (Baloyi 
and Bekker, 2011). 
 C5, C6, and 
C7. 
 
          C42 Equipment 
availability and failure. 
C40 Increased 
equipment costs. 
(Abusafiya and Suliman, 2017), and 
(Abu El-Maaty et al., 2017). 
  
             C40 Cost Overrun.     
13 CO3 CO8    (Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 
1992), (Al-Barrak, 
1993), (Al-Harbi 
et al., 1994), and 
(Bageis and 
Fortune, 2009). 
   CO8 C30    
      C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management. 
C41 Inadequate or 
inefficient 
equipment, tools and 
plants. 
(Alinaitwe et al., 2013), (Allahaim 
and Liu, 2012), and (Rahman et al., 
2013b) 
 C5, C6, and 
C7. 
          C41 Inadequate 
or inefficient equipment, 
tools and plants. 
C40 Increased 
equipment costs. 
(Chimwaso, 2000), (Vu et al., 2016), 
and (Doloi, 2013). 
 
             C40 Cost Overrun.     
14 CO3 C30     
   C30 C42     
       C42 C40      
             C40 Cost Overrun.     
15 CO3 C30     
   C30 C41     
       C41 C40      
             C40 Cost Overrun.     
C37 Increase in labour cost. 
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Literature 
Review 
14 C7 Changes in 
governmental 
regulations. 
C37 Increase in 
labour cost. 
The dependency of the industry on 
the foreign labour. Sometimes not 
affect the labour but their families 
(social) 
PWC C1, C2, C3, 
C5, C6, and 
C7. 
(Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 
1992), (Al-Barrak, 
1993), (Al-Harbi 
et al., 1994), and 
(Bageis and 
Fortune, 2009). 
   C37 Increase in labour 
cost. 
Cost Overrun. (Baloyi and Bekker, 2011), 
(Alzebdeh et al., 2015), and (Muya 
et al., 2013). 
PWC  
15 C10 Social and cultural 
impacts. 
C38 Inadequate 
manpower 
productivity. 
(Wanjari and Dobariya, 2016), 
(Alghonamy, 2015), and (Baloyi and 
Bekker, 2011). 
Different nationalities 
 C3, O1, and 
O3 
(Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 
1992), (Al-Barrak, 
1993), (Al-Harbi 
et al., 1994), and 
(Bageis and 
Fortune, 2009). 
   C38 Inadequate 
manpower productivity. 
C37 Increase in 
labour cost. 
(Lu et al., 2017), (Nasina and 
Nallam, 2016), and (Yang and 
Chen, 2015). 
  
      C37 Cost Overrun.    
16 CO3 CO8     
   CO8 C30     
      C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management. 
C39 Shortage of 
labour. 
(Alinaitwe et al., 2013), (Allahaim 
and Liu, 2012), and (Rahman et al., 
2013b) 
 
 C3, C5, C6, 
and C7 
 
          C39 Shortage of 
labour. 
C37 Increase in 
labour cost 
(Barinov, 2007), (Allahaim and Liu, 
2015), and (Jennings, 2012). 
   
             C37 Cost Overrun.     
17 CO3 CO8     
   CO8 C30     
      C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management. 
C38 Inadequate 
manpower 
productivity. 
(Shing-Tao Chang, 2002), 
(Alinaitwe et al., 2013), and (Shane 
et al., 2009). 
 C3, C5, C6, 
and C7 
 
          C38 C37     
             C37 Cost Overrun.     
18 CO3 C30     
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   C30 C39     
       C39 C37      
             C37 Cost Overrun.     
19 CO3 C30     
   C30 C38     
       C38 C37     
             C37 Cost Overrun.     
C34 Increased material costs. 
20 C7 Changes in 
governmental 
regulations. 
C34 Increased 
material costs. 
(Famiyeh et al., 2017b), (Yang and 
Chen, 2015), and (Creedy et al., 
2010a). 
Most advanced material are 
imported. 
PWC C1, C2, C3, 
C5, C6, C7, 
O1, and O3 
(Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 
1992), (Al-Barrak, 
1993), (Al-Harbi 
et al., 1994), and 
(Bageis and 
Fortune, 2009). 
   C34 Increased 
material costs. 
Cost Overrun. (Park and Papadopoulou, 2012), 
(Lee, 2008b), (Polat et al., 2014), 
and (Alzebdeh et al., 2015) 
 
21 CO3 CO8    (Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 
1992), (Al-Barrak, 
1993), (Al-Harbi 
et al., 1994), and 
(Bageis and 
Fortune, 2009). 
   CO8 C30    
      C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management. 
C35 Shortage of 
materials. 
(Cheng, 2014), (Adafin et al., 2016), 
and (Terrill et al., 2016). 
  
          C35 Shortage of 
materials. 
C34 Increased 
material costs. 
(Chimwaso, 2000), (Ahiaga-Dagbui 
and Smith, 2014), and (Alghonamy, 
2015) 
 Here 
             C34 Cost Overrun.     
22 CO3 CO8     
   CO8 C30     
      C30 Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management. 
C36 Poor material 
quality. 
(Famiyeh et al., 2017b), (Memon 
and Rahman, 2014), (Vu et al., 
2016), and (Abusafiya and Suliman, 
2017). 
 C3, C5, C6, 
and C7 
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          C36 Poor material 
quality. 
C34 Increased 
material costs. 
(Kim et al., 2017), (Knight and 
Fayek, 2000), and (Dada and 
Jagboro, 2007). 
  
             C34 Cost Overrun.     
23 CO3 C30     
   C30 C35     
       C35 C34     
             C34 Cost Overrun.     
24 CO3 C30     
   C30 C36     
       C36 C34     
             C34 Cost Overrun.     
C23 Contractors’ financial difficulties. 
25 C7 Changes in 
governmental 
regulations. 
C23 Contractors’ 
financial difficulties. 
(Kaliba et al., 2009), (Alinaitwe et 
al., 2013), (Enshassi et al., 2006), 
and (Dissanayaka and 
Kumaraswamy, 1999). 
PWC C1, C2, C3, 
C5, C6, C7, 
O1, and O3. 
 
   C23 Contractors’ 
financial difficulties. 
Cost Overrun. (Abdul Rahman et al., 2013), (Vu et 
al., 2016), (Meeampol and Ogunlan, 
2006), and (Frimpong et al., 2003). 
   
26 CO10 Delay in payment 
of completed works. 
C23 Contractors’ 
financial difficulties. 
(Larsen et al., 2015a), (Nassar et 
al., 2005), (Mahamid, 2014), 
(Ramabodu and Verster, 2013), and 
(Okpala and Aniekwu, 1988). 
 C1, C2, C3, 
C5, C6, C7, 
O1, and O3. 
Lack of flow  
 
   C23 Cost Overrun.     
27 CO10 Delay in payment 
of completed works. 
C27 Schedule delay 
caused by client. 
(Vu et al., 2016), (Cunningham, 
2017), and (Jarkas and Haupt, 
2015). 
PWC C3, C5, and 
C7. 
 
   C27 Schedule delay 
caused by client. 
C23 Contractors’ 
financial difficulties. 
(Lee and Kim, 2016), 
(Derakhshanalavijeh and Teixeira, 
2017), and (Niazi and Painting, 
2017). 
PWC   
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Can’t work cause to penalties 
      C23 Cost Overrun.     
28 C6 C28     
   C28 Schedule delay 
caused by external 
factor. 
C23 Contractors’ 
financial difficulties. 
(Famiyeh et al., 2017b), (Cheng, 
2014), (Singh, 2009a), and 
(Bhargava et al., 2017). 
Can’t work cause to penalties 
 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, and C5 
 
      C23 Cost Overrun.     
29 CO9 Changes in the 
project's scope, design, 
specifications. 
C27 Schedule delay 
caused by client. 
(Alinaitwe et al., 2013), (Shane et 
al., 2009), and (Niazi and Painting, 
2017). 
PWC C1, C3, and 
C5. 
(Assaf et al., 
1995), (Assaf and 
Al-Hejji, 2006), 
and (Arain et al., 
2006). 
   C27 C23     
      C23 Cost Overrun.     
30 CO1 Discrepancies 
and/or deficiencies in 
contract documents 
C29 Poor 
communication and 
coordination 
between a project's 
parties. 
(Famiyeh et al., 2017b), (Muya et 
al., 2013), and (Radujković and Car-
Pušić, 2004). 
No communication procedure in the 
contract and time limits. 
PWC C2, C3, C5, 
and O2. 
 
   C29 Poor 
communication and 
coordination between a 
project's parties. 
C27 Schedule delay 
caused by client. 
(Alinaitwe et al., 2013), (Alzebdeh et 
al., 2015), and (Nassar et al., 2005). 
  
      C27 C23     
         C23 Cost Overrun.     
31 C10 Social and cultural 
impacts. 
C29 Poor 
communication and 
coordination 
between a project's 
parties. 
Here 
Different nationalities 
 C2, C3, C5, 
and O2. 
 
   C29 C27     
      C27 C23     
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         C23 Cost Overrun.     
32 CO3 CO8     
   CO8 C30     
      C30 C26     
         C26 Schedule 
delay caused by 
contractors. 
C23 Contractors’ 
financial difficulties. 
(Kaliba et al., 2009), (Yang and 
Chen, 2015), (Barinov, 2007), and 
(Adafin et al., 2016) 
PWC   
            C23 Cost Overrun.     
33 CO3 C30     
   C30 C26     
       C26 C23     
             C23 Cost Overrun.     
Table 74: Causal chains extraction evidences. 
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4.7 Conclusion: 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the data collected in this thesis and discuss 
the meaning of the results. The data has been analysed and discussed for each 
objective separately; however, the interaction between the results is discussed. 
As a continuation to achieve objective one, which partly started in the literature 
review in Chapter Two by exploring the Saudi Arabian context, the data analysis 
and discussion related to exploring the process and practises of developing a 
construction project in a Saudi public agency were presented. The organisational 
structure, project life cycle, the process to develop construction projects, and 
procurement methods were explored and evaluated to achieve objective one. A 
Saudi public ministry adopts a vertical organisational structure so that its complexity 
increases with the increase in the agency size. Construction projects are developed 
under different departments and in different organisational levels which leads to 
fragmentation and reduces the communication and lessons learnt among 
stakeholders. In addition, ministries do not assign a single person to supervise a 
project throughout its development. 
Regarding the project life cycle, a construction project in the Saudi public sector 
goes through four main phases: planning, development, construction, and closure. 
As the Saudi public sector is adopting the DBB procurement, there is no 
overlapping between the phases or interaction between the projects' developers, 
constructor, maintainers, and users. The processes and practices are summarised 
in Table 33 which presents the main inputs, stakeholders, and output for every 
single phase. The last part of the exploration is related to the procurement method 
that is used to deliver the construction projects in the Saudi public projects. The 
data showed that a single awarding method based on the lowest price is used for 
outsourcing works (design, consulting, and construction). However, three types of 
contracts were used for each service which its evaluation showed that risks are 
transferred away from the owner to other parties. A comparison with the FIDIC 
contract showed differences in the core of the risk apportion and compensation 
understanding.  
Comparing it to the best practices, Objective Two identifies the weaknesses of 
these data that could affect the contractors’ cost performance. Evaluating and 
comparing each component that has been explored in Objective One, the research 
identified the patterns that are able to affect the contractors' cost performance. A 
matrix was developed by the end of Objective Two which illustrated how the 
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different weaknesses within the context, process and practices would combine 
leading to factors that affect contractors' cost performance. The findings of Chapter 
Two will be used later (in Objectives Four and Five) in identifying the causes of the 
contractors’ cost overrun and build the causal chains. 
Objective Three was focused solely on the cost overrun literature review and 
evaluation of the cost overrun literature. The literature showed that the cost overrun 
causes had been studied for over 50 years, and the problem still exists in the 
construction industry. The definition of cost overrun that are adopted between the 
studies affects the amounts of the cost overrun. Moreover, the data shows that 
three schools of thought exist in identifying and understanding the cost overrun 
causation. However, all three studies have their limitations. The research proposes 
a new understanding of the cost overrun that considers the context that the project 
was developed in as well as interactions between factors over the project life cycle. 
In Objective Four, the research identified the causes of the contractors' cost 
overrun based on the literature and the interviews. Over 200 causes have been 
identified and go through a number of sieves reducing the causes to 49 causes. 
Finally, the causes have been ranked based on their appearance in the data. 
The 49 causes have been used to develop the model in Objective Five using the 
CLD tool. To develop the chains, causes have been divided into three main types 
which are direct, intermediate, and root causes. The chain has been developed 
based on evidence extracted from the literature, documents, and interviews. 
Moreover, the chains have been explained thoroughly. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction: 
As chapter one stated, the study aims to build a causality model of the contractors' 
cost overrun in the Saudi public sector based on the weaknesses that have been 
explored and identified within the industry’s nature and current practices. 
As presented in Chapters Two and Four, the study commenced by presenting an 
analysis of the nature of the legislative, cultural and commercial environments 
within which a Saudi public project is delivered. Moreover, the practices and 
processes that are used to deliver a construction project in the Saudi public sector 
were explored and illustrated. Based on these illustrations, the weaknesses within 
the environment, practices, and processes that affect contractors' cost performance 
were identified. Based on that and analysis of the cost overrun literature, the main 
causes of cost overrun were identified and paths linking causes and effects have 
been built. 
This chapter summarises the main findings and discusses the process by which 
objectives were achieved in order to explain how each individual objective was 
addressed and its contribution to the research aim. Finally, the contribution to 
knowledge from the research as well as future research recommendations will be 
presented. 
5.2 Research questions/objectives revisited: 
5.2.1 Research questions: 
Chapter One presented two questions that the research was built to answer. The 
first question being: 
• What are the nature of the environments around the construction industry and 
the construction project processes and practices that a Saudi public sector 
uses to deliver a construction project? Related to this, How do the 
environments, processes, and practices lead to contractors' cost overrun? 
Grouped under four main profiles (Economic, Business, Resources, and 
Regulation), the nature of the environment within which a public project is delivered 
was explored. The profiles were presented in sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6 
respectively. On the other hand, the process and practices were presented in 
sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4. The contexts' exploration includes: 
 232 
• Economic profile,  
• Business profile, with sub-profiles of governance and regulatory, culture, 
disputes, and corruption;  
• Resources profile, with sub-profiles of finance, material, labour, and plant. 
• Regulation profile, 
• Process and practices, which include organisation structure, construction 
project phases, public project process, and procurement delivery method. 
In general, the context, process, and practices have been explored and explained. 
Although the data shows some similarity in the project development process as it 
has been discussed in section 4.2.3, the context that a project within which is 
developed shows a high degree of uniqueness. The uniqueness comes from 
economic, business, and resources profiles mainly as it has been discussed in 
section 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. 
• What are the main causes of contractors' cost overrun? How are the causes 
interacting within the context of the Saudi public sector to lead to contractors 
cost overrun? 
The first part of the question, which is related to the identification of the causes, was 
presented in sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. The causes identification step used mainly 
data from the systematic literature review and interviews. As a result, over 500 
causes were identified. The exclusion step was followed whereby the identified 
causes go through several sieves to exclude unrelated causes, as is presented in 
section 4.5.4. Finally, those causes with a high level of similarity were merged, and 
as a result, 49 causes have been identified, as sections 4.5.5 and section 4.5.6 
show. 
In general, the data shows three schools of thought regarding the causality of cost 
overrun, with each of them having its limitations as presented in section 4.4.4. The 
literature suggested a new way of considering the causality of cost overrun, 
whereby the causes are traced back to their origins, as presented in section 4.4.5.  
For the second part of the question, the mechanism by which the interaction takes 
place was presented across several different sections, commencing with the 
identification of weaknesses in the Saudi public-sector context profiles, as 
presented in section 4.3 and progresses to the interaction between the causes as 
presented in section 4.6.3, where the evidence for causality was divided into Non-
Saudi and Saudi data. The non-Saudi data are the data extracted from the 
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Systematic Literature Review. The Saudi data are extracted from the literature 
review, documents, and interviews, as presented in section 4.6.3. The causal 
chains are presented based on direct causes, of which ten are identified and each 
one is followed with a number of chains. The contribution of the context's 
weaknesses, which have been presented earlier, are also illustrated in the 
extraction process. 
In general, a causality model has been successfully developed, as discussed in 
section 4.6.3. However, because of the model complexity and very long paths, the 
researcher developed a method to reduce the complexity and path length, as is 
presented in section 4.6.2. 
5.2.2 Research objectives: 
Besides the research questions; the research set five objectives. In this section, 
discussion of whether the research achieved each individual objective and, if so, 
how it was achieved, is presented. The research set the following objectives: 
5.2.2.1 Objective 1: To explore the commercial context of the Saudi 
public construction projects procurement: 
Exploring the context, current practices and process of delivering construction 
projects in the Saudi public sector is an important objective of this study. The 
literature shows that construction projects are affected by and in turn affect the 
context within which they are delivered. Accordingly, using the Saudi public sector 
as its case, the research at first explored the main profiles that could affect 
construction project performance and expressed the uniqueness of the Saudi public 
sector. Economic, Business, Resources, and Regulation profiles have been 
explored in-depth in Chapter Two of this study. Second, the practices and the 
process of delivering construction projects have been explored and illustrated under 
Objective One in Chapter Four. Exploring the process is very important in 
developing the causality paths and model regarding the responsibility and order of 
the causes. Nevertheless, literature shows that the causes of the cost overrun differ 
based on the process and practises of delivering the projects. 
5.2.2.2 Objective 2: To establish the linking between the commercial 
context of the Saudi public construction projects procurement and 
contractors' performance: 
Based on the exploration of the context, practises, and process in Objective One, 
the weaknesses within them that affect contractors' cost performance have been 
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identified. The weaknesses either work as causes themselves or encourages the 
action of other causes; thus, identifying them is very important, as evidenced while 
extracting the causes’ paths. The mechanisms of the weaknesses were also 
identified under Objective Two. Nevertheless, identifying the weaknesses within the 
Saudi practises, when compared to the international practices, allows the 
opportunity to improve the practices in future work. Data from the interviews and the 
documents have been used in the process of the identification. Objective Two is 
therefore considered as having been achieved. 
5.2.2.3 Objective 3: To critically review and establish the causalities of 
cost overrun in Saudi Arabian construction projects: 
Exploring and evaluating the previous research on the causes of cost overrun is a 
very important stage of the research as this research is intended to take the 
previous work further, rather than simply repeating previous research and thereby 
not addressing any limitations within that work. To achieve this research, a 
systematic literature review was adopted where over 105 resources were identified 
based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, which has been discussed in section 
(3.6.1.2.1), out of the thousands of resources available as data analysis under 
Objective Three shows. However, the deep analysis shows that only 50 papers 
were suitable for this research. In the beginning, the 50 papers were analysed 
based on different factors such as their resources and country of focus. 
Based on the 50 papers, cost overrun definitions were identified and evaluated, and 
the definition for this research was illustrated. Moreover, the analysis of the papers 
identified three main schools of thought. The first school of thought identified 
optimism bias and data misrepresentation as the causes of cost overrun and 
eliminated technical causes such as poor contractors’ experience. However, the 
limitation of this school was shown to be that only two causes could not accurately 
explain the cost overrun in different projects’ phases and context. The second 
school of thought believes that the causes of cost overrun are generated from 
“pathogens” in the systems. The pathogens explanation avoids the limitation of the 
first school of thought, where a limited number of causes has been identified. 
However, the limitation of such an explanation also identified in section 4.4.4.1, 
which does not illustrate the intermediate causes between four main explanations 
and the cost overrun.  
The majority of the papers are under the third school of thought which lists causes 
that were ranked by responders as the causes of cost overrun. The papers show 
that the literature repeatedly identifies similar causes, but that a different rank is 
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shown in a different context or following the use of other statistical analysis tools. 
Similar to the first and second schools the limitation of this school was presented in 
section 4.4.4.3 which, besides not showing the interaction between the causes and 
ambiguity in terminologies, another ten points of limitation have been identified.  
The evaluation of the 50 papers/studies shows that cost overrun causes are not 
fully identified yet, although different tools have been used in order to attempt to 
achieve that. The literature suggested a new way of looking into the problem by 
moving from the individual causes’ identification to an approach where the causes 
are traced back to their origins and thereby show the interaction between the 
causes of cost overrun. 
5.2.2.4 Objective 4: To classify and evaluate the possible causalities of 
cost overrun in Saudi Arabian construction projects: 
As a first step of developing the causality model of the contractors’ cost overrun in 
the Saudi public sector, the causes that form the paths (links) and model were 
identified. The approach used to identify the causes of the contractors’ cost overrun 
was a detailed literature review combined with the analysis of interviews and other 
relevant documents. 
• Initially, the resources of the causes have been identified which are based 
on literature and interviews. The literature resource is based on the 50 
papers used to achieve Objective Three. The 50 resources were classified 
in Table 61 based on different factors such as project type, and focus. 
Moreover, a limitation related to the different wording used to describe both 
costs overrun and causes has been identified in literature resources. The 
initial pool of the causes contains over 300 causes from all sources. 
• The causes in the initial pool go through different sieves related to their 
suitability to the Saudi public projects on one hand and being under 
contractor’s responsibilities on the other hand, and the unrelated causes 
were removed. 
• Finally, the similar causes out of the sieves are merged resulting in 49 
causes of contractors’ cost overrun. The causes analysis based on their 
occurrence in the data was the last step of the contractors’ cost overrun 
identification. 
The research developed a taxonomy system comprising three levels to classify the 
causes of contractors’ cost overrun as presented for Objective Four in Chapter 
Four. The system was built based on the data extracted from the literature review 
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as well as from the themes extracted from the context analysis. The system can be 
used for any new causes that will be identified in the future. Based on the above 
discussion, Objective Four is considered to have been achieved. 
5.2.2.5 Objective 5: To develop a causality model that illustrates the 
interdependency between the causes of the contractors’ cost overrun 
within the Saudi construction public projects based on the evaluation 
of the context and process: 
The developing model was the objective of this study. The 49 causes identified in 
the previous step were used to develop the paths and model. Initially, the causes 
were divided based on their location within the chain, i.e. direct cause, intermediate 
cause, or root causes. From three types the contractors’ cost overrun causality 
paths were formed based on four sources of data; SLR, interviews, documents, and 
Saudi context literature review. Another resource is the weakness within the context 
and process that has been identified in Objective Two. 
After the model was initially formed, it emerged that some of the direct causes’ 
paths were very complex and lengthy and therefore difficult to be presented to and 
understood by non-professionals. It was therefore decided to reduce the initial level 
of complexity for the sake of presenting the paths in a less complex model that 
would be more readily understood by decision-makers with the capacity to change 
the case of the poor contractors’ cost performance. Thus, the identified chains have 
been divided based on a contractors’ involvement point resulting in shorten the 
length and complex of the chains as illustrated in the discussion in sections 4.6.1.1, 
4.6.1.2, 4.6.2, and 4.6.3. The simplified model was developed and comprised 49 
causal paths that are linked to 10 direct causes. 
In general, the model was different from the previous research outputs of identifying 
the causes of cost overrun in that it shows the whole picture of the mechanism of 
direct causes development from the trigger ‘event’, which is normally a root cause. 
Through the model development, the processes and results were shared with two 
experienced persons from the Saudi public sector. Their feedback was used to 
guide the structuring of developed paths and the overall model in a more 
understandable way. Moreover, the model was presented during the biggest 
engineering conference that takes place in Saudi Arabia. Feedback from the 
conference delegates was also used to confirm the majority of paths as identified 
and change a small number to reflect feedback. Based on the above discussion, 
Objective Five is considered to have been achieved. 
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5.3 Contributions to theory: 
In this section, the impact of the research on the body of knowledge will be 
discussed. 
5.3.1 Exploring the uniqueness of the Saudi public-sector context 
environment and the process and practices of developing a 
construction project: 
The knowledge contribution of this objective, with regard to the Saudi public-sector 
context and processes of developing public construction projects, is discussed 
along with insights into the uniqueness of the context and practices in the Saudi 
public project environment. 
As Chapter Two highlighted, the construction industry in general, and project 
development process and practices specifically, are influenced by different factors 
and an important one is the national business context as the literature showed very 
few resources that investigate the national context in general and no resource in 
relation to the construction project context. Thus, exploring the context was an 
essential step in the investigation of the cost overrun problem. Through the 
investigation, the uniqueness of the context of the Saudi Arabian public sector 
construction projects was illustrated, with this being used later in justifying the use 
of the Saudi Arabian public sector as a case study for this research. 
An additional factor, the practices and the process of developing a public sector 
construction project, was also considered. The maturity of these practices affects 
both the construction industry and developing projects. Moreover, as this study is 
from the contractors' perspective, the identification of the process shows the point 
of the contractor's involvement in the project and the contractors' responsibilities. 
The findings under this contribution could also be used to tackle other problems 
which are related to the poor Saudi public construction project such as delay in 
public projects which a problem affect 70% of projects as it has been illustrated in 
section 2.6.1. 
5.3.2 Delineating the affecting mechanism of weaknesses of the 
context and process of contractors' cost performance: 
Guided by internationally accepted practices for the development of construction 
projects, the weaknesses within the explored context and practices in the Saudi 
public sector are presented under Objective Two. Relevant literature shows that 
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Saudi public-sector context and practices used in developing projects had not been 
evaluated before in general and not in terms of their affecting the contractors' cost 
performance. Similar to the context, the results showed uniqueness of the 
weakness point of the context and practises. This could affect the process of find 
solutions to these weaknesses and encourage the researchers to provide unusual 
(out of the box) solutions that suit the context. 
The identification of weakness points in the project development systems and 
describing the affecting mechanism are a contribution to the body of knowledge 
which could be used in investigating and understanding other problems related to 
the Saudi public sector such as projects' delay. 
5.3.3 Systematically evaluate the current cost overrun causes 
literature review and identify their limitations: 
Although a large amount of literature investigates the root of the cost overrun 
causes, the problem still exists and thereby suggests limitations in the previous 
studies. As no study has systematically investigated the literature, this research 
completed a systematic literature review and identified the limitations of the 
previous research / studies. The step was an essential part of achieving the aim of 
the research to avoid any repetition and weaknesses of previous work. 
The evaluation of the previous literature is a contribution to the body of knowledge 
as well as facilitating the avoidance, in the context of future research, of the same 
limitation of previous works. As a result of the evaluation of previous studies, a new 
method of looking into the problem was suggested to avoid the limitations of the 
previous literature. 
5.3.4 Identifying the causes of contractors' cost overrun and the 
interaction between the causes in the context of the Saudi public 
sector: 
As discussed under Objective Three, existing attempts to understand the cost 
overrun causality have tended to focus on the causes of cost overrun individually 
while ignoring the interaction between them. Thus, this research identified the 
causes collectively and then adopted the causality model to present the interaction 
between those causes. 
The causality model combines both the identification and interaction of the 
contractors' cost overrun causes rather than only identifying the causes individually. 
Moreover, the causality model highlights the importance of context, responsibilities, 
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and the process of developing construction projects. Therefore, the model gives a 
context-based comprehensive approach to understand the causality of cost overrun 
that could be used as the foundation for future research on the causes of cost 
overrun in a different context or/and point of view. 
5.4 Contributions to practice: 
In this section, the discussion focuses on the contributions of the research to 
construction industry practice in Saudi Arabia. 
5.4.1 Exploring the context and process of developing 
construction projects in Saudi public sector and identifying its 
shortcoming: 
As mentioned earlier, the context and process of developing construction projects in 
the Saudi public sector have not been explored through research before. Identifying 
the shortcomings of the context and process contributes to practice by allowing 
stakeholders to identify and include risks that could be produced from those 
shortcomings. This is important, especially to small and international contractors 
who are not familiar with the Saudi public sector context. 
5.4.2 Contractors' cost overrun causality model: 
Developing the model and extracting the causality paths is believed to add value to 
professional practice within the Saudi public sector by allowing the decision maker 
to understand the effects of such decisions on the contractors' cost performance. 
The data shows that different stakeholders are involved in developing construction 
projects from the owner’s side. Every stakeholder tries to protect their own interest 
without giving attention to such actions. By developing the paths, different 
stakeholders are able to see the later effect(s) of their decision. This is important, 
especially for those stakeholders who are involved in the early stages of the project 
development. 
5.5 Limitations of the study and recommendation for future 
studies: 
The limitation of the studies and recommendation for further studies are combined 
under one subsection; during the examining of the previous works; it was found that 
most of the future studies are triggered by a limitation of the research. 
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In exploring the context and the process of development of construction projects in 
the Saudi public sector, the research takes place at the general (meso) level of the 
organisational levels (different level has been presented in section 4.2.1). This level 
is the level where most of the Saudi public agencies are sharing the same process 
and practices. For example, during the investigation of the process of developing a 
project, the research took the investigation focus within the meso (strategic) level 
instead of a macro (institutional) or micro (technical) levels. In light of this, future 
studies could be recommended to investigate and explore the context, environment, 
and project development process in the macro and micro levels. Moreover, other 
causes for contractors’ cost overrun might be identified from such an investigation. 
The Saudi public project context exploration covered four main profiles: economic, 
business, resources, and legalisation. As possible further studies, each profile could 
be investigated in more detail and analysis of its impact on the project's 
performance in general, or in specific to stakeholders such as owner or contractors, 
undertaken. 
The exploring of the research development process could be investigated at the 
technical level by taking a public agency as a case study. It is believed the results 
from such an approach would be more detailed than from the current approach, as 
the micro level is more related to the technical level. Moreover, focusing on a lower 
level could provide beneficial outcomes for the participating case study agency as 
the results may reveal significant shortcomings in the process that will help to 
improve the performance for all the stakeholders. In this regard, although the study 
presented the causes and the interaction between them, the amount/impact of the 
effective force between the causes or for the causal path was nor illustrated. Such 
output could be useful so as to identify the most powerful/significant causal 
relationship or paths. Thus, it will be useful for the public construction industry if 
further studies are conducted that focus on the quantitative side of the research 
where the effect forces between causes are measured, and the implications are 
tested in practice. 
Regarding data, some of the challenges that this research faced were the limited 
ready-made sources of data about the Saudi public sector and contractors and a 
lack of an established knowledge base, which forced the research to focus on the 
issue at a general level rather than a detailed one. These challenges usually exist in 
studies that investigate construction issues in developing countries and immature 
national business contexts (Duy Nguyen et al., 2004). Moreover, with such 
shortcomings with respect to data, the reliability of the research might be affected 
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as the findings of cost overrun causes might not readily replicate under such 
shortcomings in data (Miles et al., 2014). Thus, further studies could apply a mixed 
method to conduct similar research and compare the results of both data. This 
could be helpful to strengthen the reliability of the research. 
5.6 Conclusion: 
This chapter aimed to summarise the significant findings and present the 
conclusions reached and recommendations made. 
At the beginning of the chapter, the research questions and objectives are 
presented, and explanations were given on how the questions were answered and 
the objectives were achieved. The chapter then discussed the contribution of the 
study to the body of existing knowledge and the practice. Finally, the limitations of 
the study and recommendations for further studies were presented. 
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Inappropriate 
procurement route 
and procedure 
 *        *        * *        *     *      
Insufficient time for 
bidders to study and 
prepare the tender 
                                    * 
Inappropriate 
contractual 
procedure 
                       *              
Long period between 
design and time of 
bidding/tendering. 
                  *     *              
Bureaucracy in 
bidding/tendering 
method 
*                  *          * *        
Selection and 
assignment criteria 
               *                      
Contract awarded to 
lowest bidder 
 *                 *     *    *          
Level and number of 
competitors 
                       *           *   
Discrepancies and/or 
deficiencies in 
contract documents 
        *                             
Scope for the 
contractor not well 
defined 
                          *           
Unclear, ambiguous, 
and contradicting 
terms in the tender 
documents. 
         *  *   *    *        *           
Unbalanced 
distribution of risk 
between owner and 
contractor. 
           *     *                     
The owner’s 
disinterest in paying 
any compensations 
due to the decline in 
the economic and 
political conditions 
                                    * 
Severe contract 
conditions 
                *                     
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Mode of financing 
and payment for 
completed work 
                  *           *        
Clearly define the 
scope of project in 
the contract 
                 *                    
Unclear division of 
responsibilities and 
lack of clear 
requirements for 
professional 
management. 
           *                          
Project conditions                *                      
Inappropriate 
(Discrepancies 
and/or deficiencies) 
local/national data, 
regulation/policies, 
requirements, and 
political environment 
 *               *  *                *   
Laws and regulatory 
frameworks 
                           *          
Absence of 
construction cost 
data 
                  *                   
Lack of standard 
requirements from 
designers and poorly 
enforced 
professional liability 
of designers. 
           *                          
Political insecurity 
and instability 
        *         *          *       *   
Obstacles from 
government 
                           *          
Unforeseeable 
authority 
requirements or 
restrictions 
               *                      
Local government    *                                  
Deficiencies in the 
infrastructure 
                           *          
Local concerns and 
requirements 
         *                            
Difficult/Unstable/cha
nge in country's 
economic conditions 
                                    * 
Economic Instability                        *           *   
Gross domestic 
products (GDP) 
                 *                    
High interest rates 
charged by bankers 
on loans received by 
contractors 
                 * *     *    *    *     * 
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High inflation, 
insurance and 
interest rates. 
   *     *        *      *               
Effects of inflation          *         *         *          
Inflationary pressure                        *              
Market conditions          *      *            *          
Increase in 
tax/change in 
government 
fiscal/monetary 
policies 
                          *          * 
Change in foreign 
exchange rate. 
 *            *              *    *      
Inadequate planning, 
preparation, and pre-
construction process 
and studies 
               *   * *    *         *     
Inattention to risk 
inside government. 
      *                               
Lack of planning and 
coordination or less 
emphasis to 
planning 
                          *           
Inadequate planning 
and scheduling 
                    *         *     *   
Inadequate pre-
construction study 
 *                 *                   
Lack of preliminary 
examination before 
design or tendering 
               *                      
Inadequate 
preparation of the 
project concerning 
planning and 
execution. 
                                    * 
Wrong / 
inappropriate choice 
of project site 
                                    * 
Failure of land 
expropriation 
                               *      
Land acquisition 
costs 
                  *                   
Late start of the 
planning process, 
and with too low a 
budget 
           *                          
Insufficient, 
unstandardized 
owner’s brief 
           *    *    *                  
Lack of end user’s 
involvement 
                          *           
Inadequate project 
objectives 
                          *           
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The gap between the 
construction plan 
and the reality is too 
great. 
                 *                    
No practical use of 
the earned value 
management system 
            *                         
Poor feasibility and 
project analysis 
*                                     
Deficiencies in cost 
and time estimates 
prepared by public 
agencies 
                           *          
Inaccurate estimates 
by consultant 
*                                     
Inadequate planning 
for the project costs 
and the lack of 
following-up costs 
during the project 
execution. 
                                    * 
Unreasonable 
estimation and 
adjustment of project 
costs 
            *                         
incompleteness of 
estimations 
                                *     
unreasonable project 
time frame 
                       *  *  *  *        
Inadequate duration 
of contract period 
 *               *       *              
Cost 
underestimation 
                          *           
Strategic 
misrepresentation 
                           *          
Deliberate cost 
underestimation 
                                *     
Manipulation of 
forecasts 
                                *     
consciously 
manipulated 
     *                                
Political focus on 
reduced project 
costs or time 
               *                      
Political interference *                                     
Optimism bias       *   *                  *     *     
Cognitive bias of 
people 
                                *     
unconsciously 
manipulated 
     *                                
Optimistic 
expectation 
regarding time, cost, 
and quality 
              * *  *             *       
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Inadequate 
Inappropriate design 
process and 
documents 
                                     
Too small design 
budget 
           *                          
Mistakes and errors 
in design 
                   * *   *   *   *     *   
Unconstructable 
design. 
           *                          
Poor design                     *         *   *  *   
Difficulties and 
feasibility that design 
does not consider 
construction 
                               *      
Noncompliance of 
design with client’s 
requirements 
                          *           
Noncompliance of 
design with 
government 
regulations 
                          *           
Design problems                 *                     
Delay of drawings 
and site instructions 
 *                                    
late design work                        *              
Impractical and 
complicated design 
                             *        
Discrepancies 
between design and 
technical standards 
                               *      
Inadequate site and 
ground 
investigations 
 *                 *        *   *        
Insufficient 
information about 
ground conditions 
           *                          
Differing site 
conditions 
        *                  *         *  
Unforeseen 
conditions 
         *                            
Geological 
conditions of actual 
construction are 
inconsistent with 
geological conditions 
of survey and 
design. 
                               *      
Unforeseen site 
conditions 
 *                * *       *    *        
Fossils or things of 
geological interest 
                          * *          
 276 
Immature tender 
documents 
           *      *  * *         *        
Errors or 
inconsistencies in 
project documents 
               *                      
Insufficient/incomplet
e drawings 
                         *            
Inaccurately 
estimated quantities 
    *               * *      *  * *     *  * 
Omissions and 
errors in the bills of 
quantities 
                             *        
Inaccurate material 
estimates 
                            *         
Unclear drawings 
and specifications 
    *                                 
Unclear technical 
specifications 
               * *          *           
Unclear project 
scope 
                *                     
Difference between 
selected bid and the 
consultants’ estimate 
    *                        *         
Contract tender price 
higher than original 
estimate 
                      *               
Tender-winning 
prices are 
unrealistically low 
           *                          
Inaccurate cost and 
schedule estimates 
by contractor 
* *                 * * *     *  *  *     *   
Forecasting errors 
including price rises 
                                *     
Poor estimating          *    *                        
Missed item in 
estimate 
    *                                 
Inaccurate tender 
offer 
                               *      
Inefficient scheduling 
process 
                *                     
Failure to identify 
risks and institute 
necessary and timely 
remedy and control 
program 
                          *           
Wrong method of 
cost estimation 
                  *                   
Mistakes in cost 
estimates 
                *                     
Failure to price in 
certain risks 
                           *          
Inconsistent 
application of 
contingencies 
         *                            
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Inadequate planning 
and preparation by 
contractors 
                                     
Inaccurate review for 
drawings and 
contract documents 
                                    * 
The contractor 
doesn’t carry out a 
field visit to the site 
during the bidding 
process. 
                                    * 
Contractor’s ignores 
of conducting a 
technical study 
before introducing 
the tender. 
                                    * 
Financial difficulty by 
client during 
construction phase 
*                   * *      *        *   
The client's financial 
capability 
                 *                    
Unreasonable use 
and allocation of 
fund 
                               *      
Financing problems                * *  *                   
Owners’ financial 
difficulties 
                               *      
Delay in payment of 
completed works 
* *               *   * *   *    *  *  *   *   
Delayed payment to 
contractors, 
subcontractors 
and/or suppliers 
        *         *  * *         *     *   
Monthly payment 
difficulties from 
agencies (e.g., 
contractor, owner) 
                           *          
Contractors’ financial 
difficulties 
                               *      
Cash flow and 
financial difficulties 
faced by contractors 
                    *       *  *     *   
Changes in the 
project's scope, 
design, 
specifications 
        * *   *   *  * * * *  * *   * *  * *       
Variations *                                     
Additional work.               *    *    * *  *  *  *        
Addition or 
enhancement 
required by client or 
end users 
                          *           
Supplementary/additi
onal agreement 
         `                 *           
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Change orders by 
client leading to 
variations. 
 *   *                        *         
Project scope creep.          *                  *  *     *   
scope changes, 
whether mandated 
by circumstances or 
requested by client. 
                                *   *  
Too many changes 
in owners’ 
requirements or 
definitions. 
           *                          
Frequent change 
orders 
              *  *  * * *                 
Design changes 
during the 
construction phase 
             *     *     *   * *  *  *   *   
Technology change                           *           
Quantity increased 
measure 
                      *               
Design scope 
change—design 
error. 
                      *     *          
Design/project scope 
change —
environmental 
issues. 
                      *               
Design scope 
change—safety audit 
requirement. 
                      *               
Late user changes 
affecting the project 
or function 
               *                      
Schedule delay 
caused by 
contractors 
   * *        * *      * *  *       *     *   
Delay in project 
implementation 
*                                     
Delays in site 
mobilization 
                *                     
Delays in material 
procurement 
                *             *        
Delays in material 
delivery 
             *   *   * *       *  *     *   
Delay in planned 
activity 
              *                       
Schedule delay 
caused by client 
*                                     
Delay in decision 
making by client. 
*               * *   * *     * *   *     *  * 
Delay preparation 
and approval of 
drawings 
                   * *      * *  *     *   
Delay in inspection 
and approval of 
completed works 
 *               *             *  *      
 279 
Delay in preliminary 
handing over of the 
project by the owner 
                                    * 
Failure on the part of 
the employer to give 
possession of the 
site to contractor as 
agreed in the 
contract 
                          *           
Schedule delay 
caused by external 
factor 
                                     
Stagnant project                  *                    
Site constraints                            *          
Slow permits by 
government 
agencies 
*               *          *            
Difficulty in obtaining 
work permits from 
governmental 
institutions 
                                    * 
Obstacles from other 
contractors 
                *                     
Bureaucracy in 
government 
agencies 
*        *                  *           
Work suspension 
owing to conflicts 
 *                 *                   
Poor communication 
and coordination 
between a project's 
parties 
*        *     *      *       *           
Lack of 
communication 
between parties. 
 *              *     *         *     *   
Slow information 
flow between parties 
                    *         *     *   
the high-level 
management 
decentralizes the 
power 
                 *                    
Lack of coordination 
between 
construction parties. 
              *   * * * *   *      *     *   
Difficult relationship 
with local 
government 
                               *      
How well crew works 
together 
                         *            
Poor project/site 
controlling, 
monitoring, and 
management 
*                   * *          *    *   
Poor contract 
management by 
consultant. 
* *                 *     *      *        
 280 
Inadequate decision-
making process 
                                *     
Poor monitoring and 
control, e.g., due to 
incompetent and/or 
unreliable 
supervisors. 
        *          * * *         *  *   *   
Poor project 
management by 
contractor. 
*                             *        
Project control 
meeting 
                 *                    
Poor schedule/cost 
control and 
management. 
        *                             
Time management                  *                    
Contractor’s poor 
site management 
and supervision 
skills 
* *                * * * *       *  *     *   
Poor financial 
management / 
control on site 
*              *  * * * * *   *    *  *     *   
Quality of 
supervision 
                         *            
Improper 
management 
contracts, which are 
easy to cause the 
contract dispute 
                               *      
Conflicts, disputes, 
and lack of trust 
culture among the 
parties involved in 
the project 
        *   *                          
Litigation                   *                   
Adverse attitudes of 
the owner 
                *                     
Contract document 
conflicts 
         *                 *           
Disputes on site                   *     *              
Contract dispute 
(unclear drawings or 
guidelines/regulation
s) 
                 *                    
Dispute on bill 
settlement. 
              *                       
Extra works not 
included in the 
contract 
                *                     
Oral requests from 
the owner 
                *                     
Additional request by 
client’s 
representative 
    *                                 
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Cost associated with 
test of samples not 
provided in the 
contract 
                          *           
Shortening of 
contract period 
              *    *    *               
Change of schedule                           *           
Acceleration 
required by client 
 *                *         *           
Owner interference                              *        
Increased material 
costs 
* * 
  *         
* * 
  
* * * * 
 
* * 
    
* * * * 
  
* * * 
Price escalation of 
raw material 
              *                       
Material price 
fluctuations 
* *   *             * * * *  * *      *  *   *   
Unstable cost of 
manufactured 
materials 
                  *                   
Material price 
changes (inflation) 
*                      *    *           
Shortage of 
materials 
* *                * * * *         *     *   
manipulation of 
suppliers 
                       *           *  * 
poor resource 
management 
                 *      *              
Inadequate 
production of raw 
material in the 
country 
                  *                *   
Difficulties in 
importing equipment 
and materials 
                                    * 
Theft of materials                 *  *                   
Unreliable sources of 
materials on the 
local market. 
        *                             
inadequate 
production of raw 
materials by the 
country 
                       *              
Lack of project 
structure or material 
               *                      
Poor material quality                       *   *            
Increase in labour 
cost 
                            *         
Increased wages              *                        
High fluctuation in 
labour cost 
                 *                    
High cost of skilled 
labours 
                  *                   
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High cost of labour *                   * *         *     *   
High transportation 
costs 
                  *                   
Labour, insurance, 
work security or 
workers’ health 
problems 
                           *          
Inadequate 
manpower 
productivity 
        *         * *                   
Relationship 
between site 
management and 
labour. 
              *    *     *      *        
Labour productivity                    * *   *      *     *   
Morale/motivation of 
crew 
                         *            
Severe overtime                          *    *        
Shortage of labour                    * *       * * *     *   
Shortages of skilled 
labour 
 *                  * *   *  *   * *     *   
Labour absenteeism                  *  * *     *    *     *   
High staff turnover              *   *                     
Strikes (Strikes by 
site personnel) 
*   *     *                             
Increased equipment 
costs 
             *                        
High cost of 
machinery. 
 *                 *                   
High machineries 
maintenance costs 
                  *           *        
Inadequate or 
inefficient 
equipment, tools and 
plants. 
        *                   *  *        
Equipment 
availability and 
failure 
                   * *       *  *     *  * 
Lack of 
experience/ability/co
mpetence 
                 *  * *       *  *     *   
Lack of competence      *                                
Lack of owner / 
owner representative 
/ team 
experience/ability 
                                     
Competence/knowle
dge of owner 
                         *            
Inexperienced or 
newly qualified 
               *                      
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construction 
supervisors 
Lack of experience 
of technical 
consultants 
               *              *        
lack of contractor / 
subcontractors / 
team 
experience/ability 
                       *   *           
Inexperience of the 
technical staff in the 
company 
                *                     
Lack of 
subcontractors of 
experience/ability 
 *                  * *         *     *   
Selection of 
subcontractor is not 
reasonable 
                               *      
Poor construction 
ability of sub-
contractor 
                         *      *      
Lack of managerial 
capability of the 
company 
                *                   *  
Inappropriate 
contractors 
                  *                   
Contractor's 
workload 
        *                             
Numerous 
construction projects 
/ activities going on 
at the same time 
                  *     *  *    *     *   
Inappropriate 
contractor’s policies 
                  *                   
Firm’s policy     *                                 
Poor ability of 
construction and 
management of 
contractor 
                               *      
Shortage in high-
quality management 
personnel. 
           *      *                    
Rework and wastage 
on site 
        * *             * *      *       * 
Inadequate 
construction 
techniques 
                 *                    
Errors in setting out 
basing on incorrect 
written data supplied 
by the engineer 
                          *           
Mistakes during 
construction 
               * *   * *         *     *   
Quality of work (by 
subcontractors) 
                         *            
Unsuitable 
construction method. 
 *                            *        
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Obsolete or 
unsuitable 
construction 
methods 
                                     
Construction 
errors/defective 
works. 
 *   *          *                       
Technical challenges    *                                  
Lack of 
constructability 
                           *  *        
Improper / misuse of 
construction 
materials 
                                    * 
Wastage on site.               *  *           *  *        
Project size                          *  *         * 
Scale of construction                  *                    
Large and complex 
projects. 
        *          *                   
Project location         *               *  *         *  * 
Remote location 
costs 
                      *               
Services relocation 
costs 
                      *               
Project complexity                *             *         
Complex local 
geological conditions 
                               *      
Engineering and 
construction 
complexities 
         *                            
Force majeure 
(strikes/weather/regu
lation 
changes/accidents, 
etc.). 
           *   *    *                   
Bad weather *   *     *       *          *  *  *        
Adverse weather.  *               * * *     *           *  * 
Natural disaster     *             *                    
Protest                  *                    
Changes in 
governmental 
regulations 
             *                        
Procurement 
changes 
             *                        
Policy changes of 
land requisition 
compensation 
                               *      
risk and uncertainty                                    *  
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uncertainty                                 *     
Bad luck      *                                
Uncertainties in 
economic and 
technical dimensions 
of project 
management 
      *                               
Unforeseen events          *                 *           
Cost of penalties                                      
Indemnities that the 
employer has 
contractually 
undertaken to 
assume 
                          *           
Penalties resulting 
from low quality 
                *                     
Penalties resulting 
from delays 
                *                     
Contractual claims, 
such as, extension of 
time with cost claims 
                   * *         *     *   
Penalties resulting 
from safety 
accidents 
                *                     
Site accidents.         *         *                    
Safety 
considerations 
                 *         *           
Environmental 
protection 
*   *                                  
Fraudulent practices, 
kickbacks, 
corruption, Bribes. 
 *             *  *  *    *    * *          
social and cultural 
impacts 
                       *    *       *   
Political pressures at 
the time of 
construction 
                          *           
Domination of 
construction industry 
by foreign firms and 
aids 
                  *                   
The types of clients                  *                    
Resumption/accomm
odation works 
                      *               
Change of partners 
in the project 
organization 
               *                      
Budget exceptions                  *                    
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Regular budget 
update 
                 *                    
Contractors' 
bankruptcy 
                 *         *           
Complex investment 
process and 
administrative 
procedures 
                               *      
Fuel shortages         *                             
Others     *                                 
High guarantee 
period of products 
                *                    * 
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Appendix B: 
New Cause Causes emerged 
Inappropriate 
procurement route and 
procedure 
Insufficient time for bidders to study and prepare the tender 
Inappropriate contractual procedure 
Long period between design and time of bidding/tendering. 
Bureaucracy in bidding/tendering method 
Selection and 
assignment criteria 
Contract awarded to lowest bidder 
Level and number of competitors 
Discrepancies and/or 
deficiencies in contract 
documents 
Scope for the contractor not well defined 
Unclear, ambiguous, and contradicting terms in the tender documents. 
Unbalanced distribution of risk between owner and contractor. 
The owner’s disinterest in paying any compensations due to the decline in the economic 
and political conditions 
Severe contract conditions 
Mode of financing and payment for completed work 
Clearly define the scope of project in the contract 
Unclear division of responsibilities and lack of clear requirements for professional 
management. 
Project conditions 
Inappropriate 
(Discrepancies and /or 
deficiencies) local 
/national data, 
regulation/policies, 
requirements, and 
political environment 
Laws and regulatory frameworks 
Absence of construction cost data 
Lack of standard requirements from designers and poorly enforced professional liability of 
designers. 
Political insecurity and instability 
Obstacles from government 
Unforeseeable authority requirements or restrictions 
Local government 
Deficiencies in the infrastructure 
Local concerns and requirements 
Difficult/Unstable/chan
ge in country's 
economic conditions 
Economic Instability 
Gross domestic products (GDP) 
High interest rates charged by bankers on loans received by contractors 
High inflation, insurance and interest rates. 
Effects of inflation 
Inflationary pressure 
Market conditions 
Increase in tax/change in government fiscal/monetary policies 
Change in foreign exchange rate. 
Inadequate planning, 
preparation, and pre-
construction process 
and studies 
Inattention to risk inside government. 
Lack of planning and coordination or less emphasis to planning 
Inadequate planning and scheduling 
Inadequate pre-construction study 
Lack of preliminary examination before design or tendering 
Inadequate preparation of the project concerning planning and execution. 
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Wrong / inappropriate choice of project site 
Failure of land expropriation 
Land acquisition costs 
Late start of the planning process, and with too low a budget 
Insufficient, unstandardized owner’s brief 
Lack of end user’s involvement 
Inadequate project objectives 
The gap between the construction plan and the reality is too great. 
No practical use of the earned value management system 
Poor feasibility and project analysis 
Deficiencies in cost 
and time estimates 
prepared by public 
agencies 
Inaccurate estimates by consultant 
Inadequate planning for the project costs and the lack of following-up costs during the 
project execution. 
Unreasonable estimation and adjustment of project costs 
incompleteness of estimations 
unreasonable project time frame 
Inadequate duration of contract period 
Cost underestimation 
Strategic 
misrepresentation 
Deliberate cost underestimation 
Manipulation of forecasts 
consciously manipulated 
Political focus on reduced project costs or time 
Political interference 
Optimism bias Cognitive bias of people 
unconsciously manipulated 
Optimistic expectation regarding time, cost, and quality 
Inadequate 
Inappropriate 
(Discrepancies and/or 
deficiencies) design 
process and 
documents 
Too small design budget 
Mistakes and errors in design 
Unconstructable design. 
Poor design 
Difficulties and feasibility that design does not consider construction 
Noncompliance of design with client’s requirements 
Noncompliance of design with government regulations 
Design problems 
Delay of drawings and site instructions 
late design work 
Impractical and complicated design 
Discrepancies between design and technical standards 
Inadequate site and 
ground investigations 
Insufficient information about ground conditions 
Differing site conditions 
Unforeseen conditions 
Geological conditions of actual construction are inconsistent with geological conditions of 
survey and design. 
Unforeseen site conditions 
Fossils or things of geological interest 
Premature tender 
documents (drawings, 
Errors or inconsistencies in project documents 
Insufficient/incomplete drawings  
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bill of quantities, 
specifications, 
contracts and legal 
documents) 
Inaccurately estimated quantities 
Omissions and errors in the bills of quantities 
Inaccurate material estimates 
Unclear drawings and specifications 
Unclear technical specifications 
Unclear project scope 
Difference between 
selected bid and the 
consultants’ estimate 
Contract tender price higher than original estimate 
Tender-winning prices are unrealistically low (suicide tendering) 
Inaccurate cost and 
schedule estimates by 
contractor 
Forecasting errors including price rises 
Poor estimating 
Missed item in estimate 
Inaccurate tender offer 
Inefficient scheduling process 
Failure to identify risks and institute necessary and timely remedy and control program 
Wrong method of cost estimation 
Mistakes in cost estimates 
Failure to price in certain risks 
Inconsistent application of contingencies 
Inadequate planning 
and preparation by 
contractors 
Inaccurate review for drawings and contract documents 
The contractor doesn’t carry out a field visit to the site during the bidding process. 
Contractor’s ignores of conducting a technical study before introducing the tender. 
Financial difficulty by 
client during 
construction phase 
The client's financial capability 
Unreasonable use and allocation of fund 
Financing problems 
Owners’ financial difficulties 
Delay in payment of 
completed works 
Delayed payment to contractors, subcontractors and/or suppliers 
Monthly payment difficulties from agencies (e.g., contractor, owner) 
Contractors’ financial 
difficulties 
Cash flow and financial difficulties faced by contractors 
Changes in the 
project's scope, design, 
specifications 
Variations 
Additional work. 
Addition or enhancement required by client or end users 
Supplementary/additional agreement 
Change orders by client leading to variations. 
Project scope creep. 
scope changes, whether mandated by circumstances or requested by client. 
Too many changes in owners’ requirements or definitions.  
Frequent change orders 
Design changes during the construction phase 
Technology change 
Quantity increased measure 
Design scope change—design error. 
Design/project scope change —environmental issues. 
Design scope change—safety audit requirement. 
Late user changes affecting the project or function 
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Schedule delay caused 
by contractors 
Delay in project implementation 
Delays in site mobilization 
Delays in material procurement 
Delays in material delivery 
Delay in planned activity 
Schedule delay caused 
by client 
Delay in decision making by client. 
Delay preparation and approval of drawings 
Delay in inspection and approval of completed works 
Delay in preliminary handing over of the project by the owner 
Failure on the part of the employer to give possession of the site to contractor as agreed 
in the contract 
Schedule delay caused 
by external factor 
Stagnant project 
Site constraints 
Slow permits by government agencies 
Difficulty in obtaining work permits from governmental institutions  
Obstacles from other contractors 
Bureaucracy in government agencies 
Work suspension owing to conflicts 
Poor communication 
and coordination 
between a project's 
parties 
Lack of communication between parties. 
Slow information flow between parties 
the high-level management decentralizes the power 
Lack of coordination between construction parties. 
Difficult relationship with local government 
How well crew works together 
Poor project/site 
controlling, monitoring, 
and management 
Poor contract management by consultant. 
Inadequate decision-making process 
Poor monitoring and control, e.g., due to incompetent and/or unreliable supervisors. 
Poor project management by contractor. 
Project control meeting 
Poor schedule/cost control and management. 
Time management 
Contractor’s poor site management and supervision skills 
Poor financial management / control on site 
Quality of supervision  
Improper management contracts, which are easy to cause the contract dispute 
Conflicts, disputes, and 
lack of trust culture 
among the parties 
involved in the project 
Litigation  
Adverse attitudes of the owner 
Contract document conflicts 
Disputes on site 
Contract dispute (unclear drawings or guidelines/regulations) 
Dispute on bill settlement. 
Extra works not 
included in the contract 
Oral requests from the owner 
Additional request by client’s representative 
Cost associated with test of samples not provided in the contract 
Shortening of contract period 
Change of schedule 
Acceleration required by client 
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Owner interference 
Increased material 
costs 
Price escalation of raw material 
Material price fluctuations 
Unstable cost of manufactured materials 
Material price changes (inflation) 
Shortage of materials manipulation of suppliers 
poor resource management 
Inadequate production of raw material in the country 
Difficulties in importing equipment and materials 
Theft of materials 
Unreliable sources of materials on the local market. 
inadequate production of raw materials by the country 
Lack of project structure or material 
Increase in labour cost Increased wages 
High fluctuation in labour cost 
High cost of skilled labours 
High cost of labour 
High transportation costs 
Labour, insurance, work security or workers’ health problems 
Inadequate manpower 
productivity  
Relationship between site management and labour. 
Labour productivity 
Morale/motivation of crew 
Severe overtime 
Shortage of labour Shortages of skilled labour 
Labour absenteeism 
High staff turnover 
Strikes (Strikes by site personnel) 
Increased equipment 
costs 
High cost of machinery. 
High machineries maintenance costs 
Lack of experience 
/ability /competence 
Lack of competence 
Lack of owner / owner 
representative / team 
experience/ability 
Competence/knowledge of owner 
Inexperienced or newly qualified construction supervisors 
Lack of experience of technical consultants 
lack of contractor / 
subcontractors / team 
experience/ability 
Inexperience of the technical staff in the company 
Lack of subcontractors of experience/ability 
Selection of subcontractor is not reasonable 
Poor construction ability of sub-contractor 
Lack of managerial capability of the company 
Inappropriate contractors 
Contractor's workload 
Numerous construction projects / activities going on at the same time 
Inappropriate contractor’s policies 
Firm’s policy 
Poor ability of construction and management of contractor 
Shortage in high-quality management personnel. 
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Rework and wastage 
on site 
Inadequate construction techniques 
Errors in setting out basing on incorrect written data supplied by the engineer 
Mistakes during construction 
Quality of work (by subcontractors) 
Unsuitable construction method. 
Obsolete or unsuitable construction methods 
Construction errors/defective works. 
Technical challenges 
Lack of constructability 
Improper / misuse of construction materials 
Wastage on site. 
Project size Scale of construction 
Large and complex projects. 
Project location Remote location costs  
 Services relocation costs 
Project complexity Complex local geological conditions 
 Engineering and construction complexities 
Force majeure 
(strikes/weather/regulat
ion changes/accidents, 
etc.). 
Bad weather 
Adverse weather. 
Natural disaster 
Protest 
Changes in 
governmental 
regulations 
Procurement changes 
Policy changes of land requisition compensation 
risk and uncertainty 
Uncertainty 
Bad luck 
Uncertainties in economic and technical dimensions of project management 
Unforeseen events 
Cost of penalties Indemnities that the employer has contractually undertaken to assume 
Penalties resulting 
from delays 
Contractual claims, such as, extension of time with cost claims 
Penalties resulting 
from safety accidents 
Site accidents. 
Safety considerations 
Environmental protection 
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Appendix C: Correction: 
Comments The changes made 
1. Whilst there is a problem statement section 
in the thesis it does not actually clearly 
provide a view for the reader on what specific 
problem the research is trying to 
address/solve. There needs to be a clear 
problem explicated within the first chapter. 
Section 1.2, which is the problem statement, 
has been reviewed and amended accordingly to 
be clearer so as to present a specific problem 
explicitly identified in the section. 
2. Based on the above being made clear and 
also supported by the narrative in the 
research the work also needs to more clearly 
set out research aims and objectives. These 
are not necessarily the same as what is 
provided in the thesis at the moment. Indeed, 
research objectives provide a window into the 
objectives of the research - in doing so, we 
get a better idea at the start of the research 
what to expect from the mobilised research 
activities such as, what is the point of the 
SLR's and the output from various phases of 
the research. To be clear they are more 
concerned with the story of the research 
process/design. The objectives need to 
provide something of value to the research. 
Sections 1.3 and 1.4 have been reviewed where 
the research questions, aim, and objectives 
have been amended accordingly under the 
same sections. The wording of the aim and 
objectives have been changed to be clearer and 
strengthen the links between the aim and 
objectives, as well as with the research 
questions. Moreover, the process captured 
within the research design graph has been 
developed and further clarified through material 
added to section 1.7. 
3. There is a need to explain the role of the 
individual parts of the research and how they 
interrelate and connect to deliver objectives 
and fundamentally help to address the 
problem - essentially a broad research 
design. 
The discussion of the research components has 
been developed further in section 1.7, where the 
different sections and subsection of the 
research process have been shown, along with 
how they are linked to each other. Moreover, 
the research design graph in the section has 
also been added to enhance the clarity of how 
each of the sections are linked. 
4. There is a need to perhaps consider the 
theoretical perspective or lens that the 
research adopts to reinforce the argument 
A new section (1.1.4) in Chapter One was 
added to provide the theoretical perspective 
(lens) for exploring the context, and the process 
for this has been explained and linked to 
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that the research is underpinned by a 
sensitivity to context. 
theories. Four profiles (lenses) have been 
identified for context exploration. 
5. The objective of chapter 2 needs to be 
made more explicit at the outset. It is also 
necessary to be absolutely clear regarding 
what role in the research the findings from the 
analysis of the literature provide. 
The introduction of Chapter Two has been 
amended to introduce a clear objective of the 
chapter as well as provide clarity around its role 
in the research. Moreover, the research 
provides a summary at the end of Chapter Two 
for the literature review. 
6. Chapter 3 needs to much more clearly 
explain the choices and the rationale for the 
choices made at every layer of the onion! 
Consider reviewing the methods adopted in 
previous research and how they inform your 
choices. 
Chapter Three has been totally restructured and 
reformed. New sections were added, and other 
sections were removed to achieve the optimum 
research methodology explanation. 
Each layer of the research onion has been 
restructured to illustrate the rational choice for 
each of the layers. The rational choice was 
based on the optimum approach to reaching the 
research aim and objectives. Moreover, 
reviewing of the previous research methods was 
contributed to the rational choice to ensure that 
the research avoids the limitations of reusing 
the same methods. This can be seen in sections 
(3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). 
7. The case study needs much more depth 
and arguments concerning what is 
considered the "phenomena of interest', the 
'case', the basis of generalisation and the way 
that the instruments used to collect data were 
designed - I would also include an idea of the 
sampling strategy and criteria. 
The research has added a new heading section 
(3.6 Research Design) and new subheads 
(3.6.2.1 The study’s question(s), 3.6.2.2 The 
qualitative study’s proposition, 3.6.2.3 Unit of 
analysis, 3.6.2.4 The logic linking the data to the 
proposition/theory, 3.6.2.5 The criteria for 
interpreting the findings) where the phenomena 
of interest, the case, the basis of generalisation 
and the way that the instruments used to collect 
data were designed. Moreover, section (3.7) 
illustrates the sampling strategy and criteria. 
Under section (3.6), the research illustrates 
examples of previous research in choosing the 
research process and illustrates how that 
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affected the choosing of case study and SLR as 
the main research strategies. 
8. The way the data has been treated, 
reduced and analysed using rigorous 
analytical techniques such as thematic 
analysis must be made transparent to the 
reader. Especially the qualitative data. 
Section (3.11 Data analysis) was restructured 
and reformed to show the methods by which the 
collected data have been used, treated, reduced 
and analysed. 
9. The function of the case study must also 
be made clearer - is it used to test 
propositions and if so, where do these 
propositions come from. There needs to be 
transparency on how the analysis of the data 
has produced findings and exactly what those 
findings were. 
In section (3.6 Research Design) and subheads 
(3.6.2.1 The study’s question(s), 3.6.2.2 The 
qualitative study’s proposition), the research 
illustrate the function of the case study as well 
as the research proposition. Moreover, Section 
(3.11 Data analysis) and subheads (3.6.2.4 The 
logic linking the data to the proposition/theory, 
3.6.2.5 The criteria for interpreting the findings) 
shows how the data analysis proceeded. 
Chapter Four, under sections (4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 
and 4.6) illustrates the production of the findings 
of the analysis. 
10. How the findings of the case study relate 
to the research objectives and their relevance 
to other parts of the research must be made 
clear - the logic of its role. 
Under section (3.6 Research Design), a 
research design diagram (Figure 22) was 
developed which shows the findings of the 
research approaches and the research 
objectives. 
11. The survey needs also to have more 
transparent detail regarding its role or 
function - what is it attempting to do and what 
informs the survey. 
Due to misjudgement by the researcher, the 
research in his previous submission considered 
the second Interviews as being a separate 
research approach (Survey). After a new 
assessment, it was clearer for the researcher 
that the second-round interviews should be 
under the main research approach (case study). 
Based on that the Survey research approach 
was eliminated. Thus, no further action was 
taken for comments 11, 12, and 13.  
12. Like the case study there is a need to fully 
explain the sampling strategy/criteria, the way 
the survey data is collected, how the 
instrument was designed, how the data has 
been treated, reduced and analysed using 
rigorous analytical techniques - again the 
logic of how you get from questions of how 
will I collect data' and "what data is 
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necessary' to explaining how data is analysed 
to provide a clear set of findings'. The reader 
needs to see this logic. 
13. How the findings from the survey relate to 
the research objectives and their relevance to 
other parts of the research such as the model 
development also needs to be made quite 
transparent and clear - the logic of its role. 
14. The end of the research methodology 
section needs to provide quite a 
comprehensive research design (a diagram 
would help here) of all the research activities 
such as the SLR's, chapter 2, the case study 
(interviews and project docs), the survey 
interviews, the development steps of the 
model and the articulation of the model and 
how this essentially addresses the research 
problem. 
A new section (3.6 Research Design) was 
introduced, and the research design for the 
case study and the systematic literature review 
illustrate how each of the research approaches 
contribute to achieving the research objectives 
and aim. Moreover, a research design diagram 
(Figure 22) was developed which shows all the 
research activities and how the activities 
engaged with each other to achieve the 
research aim and objectives. 
15. You need to clarify within the 
methodology your philosophical choices more 
clearly and how the research is inductive (if 
inductive is the dominant route chosen) by 
referring the process of induction to the 
research design and choices. Be clear about 
whether you are building or testing theory and 
how you achieve this. 
Sections (3.2 research philosophy, and 3.3 
research approach) were reformed and 
restructured to illustrate the rationale behind the 
choices made. Moreover, examples of the 
previous studies limitations were also explained 
and shown to contribute to the rational decision. 
16. In an analysis chapter, we need to then 
see the results of the various pieces of 
analysis (empirical) and how these are then 
used to build the model. The theoretical and 
analytical techniques used to develop the 
model must also be explicated here or 
perhaps in a previous chapter. 
Based on the improvement on the 15 points 
above and restructuring and reforming of 
Chapter Three, the analysis and discussion 
chapter (Chapter Four) shows clearly the 
various stages of analysis and how these are 
then used to build the model. Moreover, a new 
section (4.3.5) was added where a matrix has 
developed and added to show the links between 
the four profiles (context prospective), process 
weaknesses and the possible causes of cost 
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overrun. This is also considered beneficial for 
the path development and used to build the 
model. Also, sections (3.11.1) and (4.6.1) 
illustrate the theoretical tool that used to 
develop the model and how the matrix in section 
(4.3.5), and causes in section (4.5.7), 
contributed to the building of causality paths that 
are used eventually to build the final model. 
 
